Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and Lessons for Today by Albright, David & Stricker, Andrea
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Center on Contemporary Conflict CCC PASCC Reports
2016-06-28
Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons
Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and
Lessons for Today
Albright, David




REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
ITS HISTORY, DISMANTLEMENT,  
AND LESSONS FOR TODAY
Institute for Science and International Security
The Institute for Science and International Security is a non- profit, 
non- partisan institution dedicated to informing the public about 
science and policy issues affecting international security. Its primary 
focus is on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and related 
technology to additional nations and to terrorists, bringing about 
greater transparency of nuclear activities worldwide, strengthening 
the international non- proliferation regime, and achieving deep cuts in 
nuclear arsenals.
Copyright © 2016 by Institute for Science and International Security
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Press 






Front cover photograph credits: Armscor and Uranium Enrichment 
Corporation of South Africa Limited.
All unsourced photos in the book are from David Albright.
REVISITING SOUTH AFRICA’S  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
ITS HISTORY, DISMANTLEMENT,  
AND LESSONS FOR TODAY
DAVID ALBRIGHT 
WITH ANDREA STRICKER
institute for science and international security 
june 2016

Dedicated to all those who strive  





Chapter 1: Laying the Foundation, 1
Chapter 2: Developing Nuclear Devices, 23
Chapter 3: Getting Highly Enriched Uranium, 45
Chapter 4: Emergence of a Military Nuclear Program, 73
Chapter 5: Kentron Circle Facility, 91
Chapter 6: Nuclear Strategy and Arsenal Expansion, 129
Chapter 7: Advena Central Laboratories, 149
Chapter 8: Nuclear Rollback, 183
Chapter 9: Dismantling the Nuclear Weapons, 195
Chapter 10: International Verification, 219
Chapter 11: Ensuring Against Reversal, 245
Chapter 12: Highly Enriched Uranium Inventory, 267
Chapter 13: Lessons for Today, 275

PREFACE
Twenty five years ago South Africa acceded to Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty after dismantling its nuclear weapons. Yet, the 
full story of that nuclear weapons program was not revealed pub-
licly at that time. Parts were hidden from the International Atomic 
Energy Agency as well. Now, after many years of work by the media 
and independent experts, with the cooperation of a number of for-
mer members of the nuclear weapons program, a much fuller picture 
of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program has emerged.
At the Institute for Science and International Security, work on 
South Africa’s nuclear program goes back to its founding in 1992. 
One of its first projects was working with African National Congress 
(ANC) officials, who were interested in learning more about nuclear 
non- proliferation in anticipation of assuming key government posi-
tions in a democratic South African government. This cooperation 
led to contacts with several former members of South Africa’s nu-
clear weapons program and a range of collaborative endeavors with 
them. It included two tours of the old nuclear weapons production 
sites. On the trip in August 2002, Albright was allowed to photo-
graph the old weapon production sites before they were modified 
beyond recognition of their original purpose. Many of these images 
appear here for the first time.
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We at the Institute are pleased to present the first comprehen-
sive, technically- oriented history of South Africa’s nuclear weapons 
program and its dismantlement. Although not every question could 
be answered, this history reveals a great deal of new information 
about that program.
This book also takes stock of the lessons today of this dynamic 
and complicated nuclear weapons program. Although none of the 
nine states that currently possess nuclear weapons appear on the 
verge of following South Africa’s example, the South African case 
contains many valuable lessons in non- proliferation, disarmament, 
export controls, and verification.
We hope that this book will therefore be regarded as a useful 
qcontribution to policy debates and a compendium of information 
on South Africa’s nuclear weapons program and its dismantlement.
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South Africa’s nuclear development dates back to World War II when 
the US Manhattan Project was looking worldwide for uranium to 
make nuclear weapons. In 1944 Great Britain requested South Af-
rica’s Prime Minister Jan Smuts to investigate reported deposits of 
uranium in South Africa and South West Africa (now called Na-
mibia).1 Following an extensive investigation, Smuts announced that 
uranium had been discovered in many of South Africa’s gold mines.2
After several years of exploration and development, South 
Africa started its first full- scale uranium extraction plant in 1952, 
built with extensive US and British aid. By 1955 sixteen uranium 
extraction plants were in operation.3 Until the mid-1960s, South Af-
rican uranium was sold to the Combined Development Agency, the 
purchasing organization created by Britain and the United States 
to obtain adequate uranium supplies for their nuclear weapons 
programs.
Initially, the development of uranium production was controlled 
directly by the South African Prime Minister’s office. However, in 
1948 the country’s Atomic Energy Board (AEB) was established by 
an Act of Parliament to control all nuclear matters, particularly the 
production and sale of uranium on behalf of the government.
The First United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy, held in Geneva in 1955, stimulated the AEB’s interest 
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in creating an indigenous South African nuclear research and de-
velopment program. Upon its return, the South African mission to 
the UN conference recommended that South Africa send scientists 
abroad for training to enable them to build an experimental reactor. 
It also recommended the construction of a nuclear power reactor at 
Cape Town.
In November 1956, the AEB established the Research Advisory 
Committee. One of its first acts was to appoint A. J. A. “Ampie” 
Roux, then a senior official at the Council for Scientific and Indus-
trial Research (CSIR), to draft a nuclear research and development 
program. The committee also hired the AEB’s first two research 
engineers. They were charged with surveying the processes for pro-
ducing heavy water as a moderator in nuclear reactors.
One month later, the government created a national Commis-
sion of Enquiry into the Application of Nuclear Power in South 
Africa, under terms of reference drafted by the AEB. The commis-
sion appointed Roux to draft a plan for a South African nuclear 
research and development program.
While Roux was producing his report, the two AEB engineers 
started to investigate heavy water in the first applied research un-
dertaken by full- time AEB staff. The AEB had come to believe that it 
could economically produce heavy water. After six months of study 
in South Africa, the two AEB engineers spent 18 months working 
intensively with the Heavy Water Group at the Harwell Atomic 
Energy Research Establishment in Britain. They also visited heavy 
water plants in Germany.
NATIONAL PLAN
Roux spent about a year and a half developing his draft plan for 
a South African nuclear research and development program. After 
visiting ten countries, interviewing hundreds of experts, and seeking 
the views of South African governmental, mining, and industrial au-
thorities, he presented his plan to the AEB in June 1958.
Roux’s ambitious plan recommended a dramatic shift in South 
African industry from a “repair and maintenance” industry to a 
highly sophisticated industry capable of manufacturing nuclear 
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reactors.4 The plan’s objectives included enabling South Africa to 
derive additional benefit from its position as a major uranium pro-
ducer and permitting it to make significant contributions to nuclear 
energy. Roux was also reportedly aware of the need for a program 
that could keep South Africa’s best scientists and engineers from im-
migrating to other countries.
Roux’s plan recommended the pursuit of four major avenues:
• Development of the production and refining of nuclear ma-
terials, including heavy water and thorium, but especially 
uranium. The materials effort was to include the improve-
ment of uranium mining and extraction methods and for 
the study of further steps in uranium processing with the 
goal of improving the uranium’s worth;
• Investigation into the application of nuclear energy for 
electricity production, including the development of a 
power reactor concept appropriate to South Africa;
• Research into the uses of isotopes and radiation in medi-
cine, agriculture, commerce, industry, and research;
• On- going research fundamental to a nuclear energy 
program.
The goal of this plan was to set up a comprehensive nuclear 
energy program that would allow South Africa to “become as in-
dependent of foreign influence concerning its needs in this area, as 
possible.”5 A major aspect of the plan was to provide financial and 
other assistance for the training of researchers in nuclear energy, 
both in South Africa and abroad.
In September 1959, the then Minister of Mines Jan de Klerk 
announced that the Cabinet had approved the proposed nuclear 
research and development program and its relative independence. 
Interestingly, Jan was the father of F.W. de Klerk, who would be-
come President in 1989 and end the nuclear weapons program and 
accelerate the process that led to major downsizing of South Africa’s 
nuclear energy programs.
Roux should be considered the father of nuclear development 
in South Africa. Shortly before his draft nuclear plan was approved, 
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he became the Research Director of the AEB. Later his title was 
changed to Director General. In 1967, he was appointed Chairman 
(later renamed President) of the AEB, a position until then reserved 
for the Minister of Mines.
PELINDABA
The AEB needed a more suitable site to carry out its program than 
its office suite in Pretoria. A new site would need to be relatively iso-
lated to permit the safe operation of reactors, but also close to major 
population centers, universities, and industries. The site would also 
need a major source of water, adequate electricity supply, and good 
access to roads.
The AEB picked a site south of the Hartbessspoort Irrigation 
Dam and on the east side of the Crocodile River, located about 30 
kilometers west of Pretoria. The site was acquired in the early 1960s 
and construction of the National Nuclear Research Center started 
shortly thereafter. The first buildings, including the administration 
building, the chemistry building, and the Van de Graff building, 
were occupied starting in late 1963.6
A prospective name for the site was selected in a similar way as 
other major nuclear centers in the world, namely by referring to the 
town or village serving the establishment.7 Although no settlement 
was located near the site, the scientists learned of former plans to 
create the township of Pelindaba right down the road.
Before picking Pelindaba as a name, however, the scientists 
decided to research its meaning. They learned that Pelindaba was 
the conjunction of two indigenous African words, “Pelile” mean-
ing “finished” and “Indaba” meaning “a council.” Put together, they 
imply the end of discussion. “That’s it,” Roux reacted, “We have 
talked enough; now we get on with the job.”8
The job was formidable. To implement its nuclear research and 
development program, the AEB needed to recruit and train a staff, 
obtain significant amounts of nuclear and nuclear- related infor-
mation, construct research and support facilities at Pelindaba, and 
procure and install a wide range of equipment, including research 
reactors and other complex facilities. Toward these objectives, South 
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Africa depended extensively on its civil nuclear cooperation agree-
ments with the United States and Britain.
Perhaps the most pressing need of the new program was qual-
ified scientists. Starting immediately after the program received 
government approval, the AEB recruited South African scientists 
with proven ability and sent them for overseas training in nuclear 
science and technology in the United States and Europe. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, eleven South Africans, including those who 
became the initial Research Division Heads at the AEB, participated 
in the US Argonne International School of Nuclear Science and En-
gineering and its successor organization.9 A seven- man team was 
sent concurrently for training at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
Upon their return, the Division Heads developed the organization of 
their divisions and the recruitment of scientific personnel, including 
sending their new employees for training overseas.
A substantial number of nuclear scientists who set in motion 
Pelindaba’s program were provided with highly specialized training 
at universities, research institutions, and industrial organizations in 
Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, 
the United States, and West Germany.10 Through 1970 about 90 
South African scientists were trained at Argonne National Labora-
tory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and elsewhere in the United 
States.11
In 1977 Roux specifically acknowledged the help of the United 
States at a seminar in Johannesburg. He told the audience, “We can 
ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the 
training and assistance so willingly provided by the USA during the 
early years of our nuclear program, when several of the Western 
world’s nuclear nations cooperated in initiating our scientists and 
engineers into nuclear science.”12
The program also needed extensive amounts of technical infor-
mation, and South Africa’s nuclear agreements for cooperation with 
Britain and the United States gave South Africa access to considera-
ble amounts of it. For example, the agreement with Britain provided 
South Africa with information on reactors, specifications and prop-
erties of reactor materials, reactor components, reactor physics, 
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reactor engineering, environmental and safety considerations, and 
the production of heavy water.13
Although the information obtained under these bilateral agree-
ments is unclassified, South Africa also sought sensitive information. 
Early on, Roux was aware of the difficulty of obtaining sufficient 
information for his program. According to his draft plan presented 
to the AEB in 1958, “some of the most important developments in 
the field of nuclear power, particularly in the more highly devel-
oped countries such as the US and Britain, have so many military 
implications that no reference would be found to them in the un-
classified literature.”14 Yet, he wrote of the key role of South African 
cooperation with Western countries, particularly in research areas, 
in obtaining information: “Any [research] contribution, however 
small, that can be made, will assist greatly in obtaining secret in-
formation from other countries which they would not otherwise be 
prepared to divulge. We have already experienced this in the little 
work we have done in connection with the production of heavy 
water.”15 Program personnel would obtain secret information about 
nuclear explosives, European gas centrifuges, and nuclear re- entry 
vehicles for ballistic missiles.
Even before the Pelindaba site was selected, the AEB ordered a 
research reactor from the United States. The reactor, a type called 
the Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR), had the power of about seven 
megawatts- thermal (MWth). Its power, however, could be increased 
with relatively minor adjustments to 20 MWth. The United States 
also agreed to provide weapons- grade uranium (WGU) fuel, and 
along with Britain agreed to receive the irradiated fuel for reprocess-
ing. The reactor, which was named Safari-1, went critical in 1965.
At the 1977 seminar in Johannesburg, Roux also acknowl-
edged that “much of the nuclear equipment installed at Pelindaba 
is of American origin, while even our nuclear philosophy, although 
unmistakably our own, owes much to the thinking of [American 
nuclear scientists].”16
By the mid-1960s, Pelindaba had a wide- range of facilities and 
equipment to satisfy the ambitions of its newly- trained nuclear re-
search scientists. According to Wynand de Villiers, who by 1967 was 
Director of the Reactor Development Division and later succeeded 
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Roux as the President of the AEB, the “R&D program had been 
firmly established.” The two most ambitious programs were an in-
digenous nuclear reactor and a uranium enrichment program.
URANIUM ENRICHMENT
By 1961, when the senior AEB scientists had returned from their 
overseas training, the future of enriching uranium locally was a 
frequent topic of debate.17 A major purpose of the research and de-
velopment program was to develop methods to process uranium 
into a form more advanced than yellow cake; enriched uranium was 
the ultimate goal of the AEB. The AEB believed that enriching do-
mestically produced uranium could be lucrative financially. Another, 
related motivation was a South African “can- do” mentality that did 
not want to be denied high- tech nuclear projects. Others suspect 
that the leaders of South Africa also saw enrichment as a path to 
nuclear weapons.
The scientists realized that building a gaseous diffusion plant 
would require an enormous capital investment and access to highly 
secret information; thus, it would be beyond South Africa’s financial 
and scientific capabilities. Building gas centrifuges, which were then 
under development in Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain, was 
similarly beyond South Africa’s reach at that time. Roux challenged 
his colleagues to find an enrichment method that would be substan-
tially smaller than the giant US gaseous diffusion plants and not 
require the extreme demands of gas centrifuges with their problems 
of vibration, sealing, and high- speed bearings.18
Wally L. Grant, then Chief Engineer of the AEB who would 
later became Director General of the AEB, put forward a proposal in 
1961 to evaluate the use of the vortex tube principle for the separa-
tion of uranium isotopes. The separating element is best likened to a 
“stationary walled centrifuge” based on the aerodynamic principle. 
As eventually developed, a gaseous mixture of uranium hexafluo-
ride and the carrier gas hydrogen enters the sides of the separating 
element at high speed and spins inside the cylinder, causing separa-
tion of the uranium isotopes.
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The South African scientists were well aware of the politically 
sensitive nature of uranium enrichment, which would likely have 
been perceived as a potential sign that South Africa was seeking nu-
clear weapons.19 As a result, the AEB went to great lengths to keep 
the existence of the project secret. The project was code- named the 
“Gas Cooling Project” and was divided into three separate compo-
nents, from which came another code- name the “XYZ project.”
The project was first housed in central Pretoria in a nondescript 
warehouse. Experimental equipment was assembled and operated 
in the rear portion “away from prying eyes,” and the front half 
comprised the workshop, which, “any casual enquirers were told, 
was manufacturing scientific equipment.”20 Later, the experimental 
work required stricter security and was transferred to the equally 
unobtrusive Shamrock Building in Pretoria before finally moving to 
Pelindaba.
The first separation of uranium occurred in November 1965, 
just in time for a visit by Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd, who was a 
staunch supporter of the project. By 1967 the scientists had demon-
strated the feasibility of the vortex- tube enrichment method in 
the laboratory. Although several problems remained, the AEB rec-
ommended that a pilot plant be constructed. Because of the cost 
involved in such an endeavor, the government undertook a lengthy, 
independent review of the project. In February 1969, the government 
approved the building of a pilot plant and additional research funds 
for the next five- year period. The plant, called the Y Plant, would 
be designed to make weapons- grade uranium, not just low enriched 
uranium.
PELINDUNA
According to de Villiers, another key goal of the initial research and 
development program at Pelindaba was the indigenous construction 
of a power reactor. By choosing a design specifically tailored to suit 
South Africa’s conditions, the AEB believed it could provide a central 
theme to the divergent research interests of the various disciplines 
practiced at Pelindaba and further stimulate the research groups to 
LAYING THE FOUNDATION
9
become familiar with nuclear science in practice. By doing so, the 
AEB hoped to build a center of excellence in nuclear science.21
In 1962 the AEB decided to pursue a natural uranium, heavy 
water moderated, sodium- cooled power reactor, which became 
known as Pelinduna (Pelindaba Deuterium Uranium Sodium (Na)). 
The same concept had been examined by the United States but not 
pursued. However, soon after Grant, the AEB’s Chief Engineer, re-
turned home from 17 months of overseas training in the United 
States, he proposed that the AEB pursue this reactor concept based 
on pressure tubes. He reasoned that this concept could significantly 
reduce power generating costs because the use of sodium as a coolant 
would transfer heat better and eliminate the need to build expensive 
pressure vessels, which were beyond the capability of South African 
industries to produce. Overall, the approach appealed to the AEB 
as an advanced reactor concept that South African industries could 
produce. Moreover, such a reactor project would encourage South 
African industries to improve their ability to work with nuclear- 
grade materials and their specialized manufacturing techniques.
The first step was to conduct a series of theoretical calculations 
describing the reactor system. The first calculations were done by 
hand, a time- consuming process with limited usefulness. Next, the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research computer facilities 
were used for the calculations, until the AEB built its own computer 
center at Pelindaba.
To obtain the first experimental data, Grant’s team built a 
subcritical model of the reactor system. These data improved the 
computer calculations, enabling good agreement between measured 
and calculated values and the development of more sophisticated 
mathematical models of the reactor system.
However, more data were needed. The next step was to build a 
critical facility to check operational values, such as temperature co-
efficients, power distribution, and control- rod values. Because of the 
high cost of such a facility, the AEB decided to use two percent en-
riched uranium fuel instead of natural uranium fuel. In this way, the 
reactor would need only four fuel elements instead of 19 elements, 
enabling a considerably smaller and cheaper facility. The critical as-
sembly, called Pelinduna 0/4, reached criticality in November 1967. 
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It depended on a US supply of 606 kilograms of two percent en-
riched uranium and 5.4 tonnes of heavy water.22 The operation of 
the criticality facility marked a major milestone in the development 
of reactor physics in South Africa.
Meanwhile, engineers were designing a prototype reactor and 
a full- scale power station. The prototype reactor was envisioned to 
be 30 MWth and use slightly enriched uranium fuel. A by- product 
of this reactor would have been plutonium. Although no significant 
work appears to have been done on creating a capability to separate 
plutonium at this time, South African nuclear engineers may have 
been thinking about such a capability. Later, in the late 1970s, the 
AEB would start to develop it.
Overall, by 1966 Pelindaba’s scientists and engineers had solved 
many, although by no means all, of the problems in designing and 
building the Pelinduna power reactor. However, its most outstand-
ing advantage, namely its high specific power, also meant that an 
economical reactor would need to produce about 1,000 megawatts 
of electricity using natural uranium fuel. This was a problem for 
the South African designers. In the mid-1960s, South Africa seemed 
unlikely to be able to integrate such a large unit into its electrical 
generating system until the 1980s. Although the power of an indi-
vidual reactor could have been reduced considerably by using one 
to two percent enriched fuel, South Africa did not then possess en-
richment facilities and the envisioned pilot enrichment plant would 
have been too small, requiring import of enriched uranium. How-
ever, the goal of the project was to develop a reactor independent of 
overseas fuel suppliers.23 The cost of the project was also becoming 
an issue, as the AEB realized that electrical power production by a 
heavy water moderated reactor would be more costly than by a light 
water reactor.
Another significant factor was the “phenomenal success of the 
uranium enrichment project.”24 The two projects had reached the 
point almost simultaneously where each required the construction 
of an expensive pilot plant. In the late 1960s, South Africa was un-
able to afford the construction of both plants. An enrichment plant 
seemed more able to deliver on the goal of increasing the worth of 
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South Africa’s plentiful uranium supply. As a result, the AEB can-
celled the Pelinduna project in 1967.
By coincidence, the name Pelinduna had a far different nontech-
nical and indigenous interpretation that ended up being prescient. 
From “Pelile Induna,” the meaning is “the chief is finished, the chief 
is dead.”25
Although the Pelinduna project was terminated in 1967, the 
critical facility continued to operate for a few more years. Before 
the enriched uranium was returned to the United States in 1971, the 
slightly irradiated fuel was sent to Britain for reprocessing.26
Needless to say, many problems remained unsolved when the 
Pelinduna project ended, but South Africa learned a great deal about 
reactor physics, nuclear reactors, and the manufacture of critical 
facilities. That foundation would be important in the nuclear explo-
sive program and a later reactor project whose main purpose was 
the production of plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons.
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
With the end of the Pelinduna project, South Africa decided secretly 
to use the expertise gained by the Reactor Development Division 
for the pursuit of nuclear explosives. In 1969 the AEB appointed 
an internal committee to investigate the economic and technical re-
quirements for nuclear explosives for civil applications. Referred to 
as peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), these nuclear devices were 
being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union for a va-
riety of civil purposes, such as creating harbors, mines, mountain 
passes, and gas exploitation. The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) which entered into force in 1968 allowed for non- nuclear 
weapons states to use PNEs under certain, highly constrained con-
ditions. Thus, one motivation for South Africa’s own PNE program 
would have been to match, albeit on a smaller scale, work that was 
being done then by the major nuclear powers.
The decision to develop PNEs combined the knowledge and ex-
perience gained in the Pelinduna reactor project with the potential 
offered by enriching uranium sufficiently for use in nuclear explo-
sives.27 This project also had the advantage of providing a means to 
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retain the specialists in the reactor development division. Moreover, 
according to Tielman de Waal, former managing director of Arms-
cor, in the 1960s “the idea to look into the feasibility of developing 
nuclear explosives for peaceful applications emerged as a scientific 
endeavor out of a technological ‘can- do’ mentality.”28
South Africa’s interest in PNEs was not secret at first. The AEB 
reported in its 1969 annual report that it was researching the use 
of nuclear explosives for earth- moving.29 The CIA stated, based on 
open literature, that during 1968 to 1969 at least one South African 
scientist was in the United States studying the application of PNEs.30 
This was likely Johann V. Retief, an AEB engineer in the PNE pro-
gram who published in 1971 a Stanford University technical report, 
Use of Nuclear Explosives for Water Resources Development in Arid 
Regions.31 In 1970 the Johannesburg Star reported the South African 
government was “keeping abreast of the latest developments in the 
use of nuclear explosives in civil engineering projects.”32
However, the bulk of the AEB’s work on nuclear explosives was 
secret, particularly its plans to develop and build them. Moreover, 
South Africa intended to explore developing a wide variety of types 
of nuclear explosives, which involved highly classified work. In its 
secret 1970 report, the internal AEB committee recommended the 
development of different types of peaceful nuclear devices:
• Gun- and implosion- type fission devices, referred to as 
type A. This category included also a boosted fission device 
called A* which involved a lithium-6, deuterium, tritium 
tablet at the center of the type A device;33
• A thermonuclear device with a fission detonator, called 
type B.
In March 1971, the Minister of Mines approved the first re-
search and development work on the type A devices. Two years 
later, the Minister also approved theoretical work on type B devices.
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ONLY A PEACEFUL PROGRAM IN THE 1950s AND 1960s?
Despite repeated denials by past and current South African nu-
clear officials, many outside experts and African National Congress 
(ANC) officials rejected the proposition that South Africa’s nuclear 
program was built only as a civil, scientific nuclear program.34 In par-
ticular, they rejected that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the South 
Africa leadership intended to build only PNEs for civil applications.
Officially, the key indicator of military intentions is the high 
level government decision to weaponize the nuclear devices, which 
later will be shown to date to 1977 and 1978; however, it is acknowl-
edged that defense ministry interest in the bomb happened earlier. 
The political scientist Peter Liberman, based on an interview with 
Grant, established that “defense people” were involved in 1975.35 A 
recently released official document confirms that participation was 
initiated by then Defense Minister P.W. Botha.36 He said that “as far 
back as 1975, I, as Minister of Defense, initiated dialogues related 
to the possibilities of bringing about nuclear weapons” in South 
Africa.”37
There is also some evidence that by the end of 1973, the leader-
ship of the AEB was starting to refer in private to nuclear weapons. 
In 1973 apparently as part of a process of recruiting a South Afri-
can physicist to come work at Pelindaba, Louw Alberts, then Vice 
President of the AEB, told him explicitly that South Africa had 
started a nuclear weapons program focused on developing gun- 
type, implosion- type, and thermonuclear weapons.38 While working 
at Pelindaba from 1974-1977, including contributing to the work on 
the nuclear devices, he was told consistently that this effort was a 
nuclear weapons program. He was also told of a budding nuclear 
strategy that South Africa would use the nuclear option when facing 
insurmountable odds requiring an act of supreme heroism, referred 
to as Kragdardigheit, in Afrikaans.
Although a nuclear weapons motivation can be established as 
far back as the early to mid-1970s, what about the 1960s? Documen-
tary evidence focusing on nuclear weapons prior to the early 1970s 
is currently lacking and almost all of the participants are no longer 
living, making confirmation difficult. However, critics of official 
declarations are skeptical that the South African government would 
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have supported the nuclear program so vigorously in the late 1950s 
and 1960s for only a civil rationale, particularly given South Africa’s 
growing international isolation. Instead, critics believe that another 
fundamental goal of the nuclear program was also acquiring the 
capability to make nuclear weapons. To these critics, the AEB was 
putting in place two paths to the bomb, one based on plutonium 
and the other based on weapons- grade uranium. Faced with budget 
constraints, the uranium enrichment pathway was selected as the 
way to produce nuclear explosive material.
Critics have presented as evidence statements made by South 
African officials during the 1960s. Below are listed several of these 
statements:
• Roux said in 1960 that South Africa was capable of pro-
ducing its own nuclear explosives if it was “prepared to 
isolate the best brains in the country and give them all the 
funds they needed.”39 Roux repeated his 1960 statement in 
1962, but added, “It is my sincere hope that we shall never 
be called upon to engage in this activity.”40
• Prime Minister Verwoerd stated during the inauguration 
ceremony for the Safari I reactor in 1965, that with respect 
to nuclear materials: “It is the duty of South Africa to con-
sider not only the military uses of the material, but also to 
do all in its power to direct its uses to peaceful purposes.”41
• Grant, speaking for the AEB in 1965, said: “On several 
occasions the Director- General [Roux] has indicated that 
South African scientists, in common with those from most 
developed countries, do have the technical ability to de-
velop nuclear weapon,” but he denied that any military 
research was being done in that area.42
• In 1965, Andries Visser, a member of the AEB, said: “We 
should have the bomb to prevent aggression from loud- 
mouthed Afro- Asiatic states…money is no problem. The 
capital for such a bomb is available.”43
• General H. J. Martin, the Army Chief of Staff, stated in 
the December 22, 1968 edition of the London Sunday Ex-




All of these statements are ambiguous about any underlying 
nuclear weapons purpose in the 1960s. However, these quotes show 
that the senior political and nuclear leadership of South Africa was 
well aware of the full potential of its nuclear program. This general 
awareness is confirmed by the extensive work done by Liberman.45 
He observed, “The South African leadership knew that a successful 
PNE program would generate a de facto nuclear weapons capa-
bility.”46 One has to conclude that the South African leaders of the 
nuclear program and the senior leadership also knew that a nuclear 
weapons capability depended on having a plutonium or enriched 
uranium pathway. They must have realized that the creation of such 
a pathway would take many years, far longer than the time needed 
to master the building of a relatively crude type A nuclear explosive 
device.
So, with regard to the 1960s, we are left with a series of pos-
sibilities. Three cases can be considered which vary based on the 
intentions of the nuclear and political leadership:
1. The first case is that the program had no explicit nuclear 
weapons component until the mid- to- late 1970s, and the 
founders, including the political leadership, had no inten-
tion of building nuclear weapons. In this case, the leaders 
wanted a large nuclear program for reasons of prestige, 
energy security, and adding value to South Africa’s large 
uranium resources. The extensive support of Prime Minis-
ters Verwoerd and B.J. Vorster of the enrichment program 
during the 1960s would have been without national secu-
rity motivations. Even the PNE program would have to be 
interpreted as one of only prestige, scientific prowess, and 
civil applications. The South African government has said 
essentially that this case is the true state of affairs.
2. The second case is that through the 1960s the political 
leadership wanted to develop the option to build nuclear 
weapons, but the scientists, perhaps including Roux, did 
not want to operationalize this capability or did not see nu-
clear weapons as necessary. The military was not interested 
in any case. In this scenario, the AEB would be committed 
to developing the wherewithal to produce weapons- grade 
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uranium or an indigenous reactor that could make pluto-
nium, but the scientists would intend to use these facilities 
and materials for civilian purposes. This case is at least 
plausible. Based on interviews with participants in the nu-
clear weapons program, many AEB scientists were against 
acquiring nuclear weapons. While many scientists or en-
gineers may have tolerated working on PNEs, they would 
have balked at working on a program that contemplated 
building nuclear weapons. Moreover, the South Africa nu-
clear program depended critically on foreign assistance. 
Thus, even if South Africa intended to obtain nuclear weap-
ons, it would benefit from keeping this ambition absolutely 
secret, or else risk undermining the support of Western sup-
pliers. Even in the 1960s, Western countries were unlikely 
to support giving South Africa major nuclear assistance if 
they believed that the AEB was putting together a program 
to build nuclear weapons. Even a PNE program would 
need to be pursued in secret to avoid a backlash as more 
countries lost interest in PNEs and increasingly viewed 
them as thinly- disguised nuclear weapons. However, the 
political leadership would have known that once the AEB 
developed the capability to make nuclear explosive materi-
als and nuclear explosives, the government could order the 
AEB or another agency to build nuclear weapons. Given 
that the AEB was a well- funded, centralized, and secretive 
organization, the government would have believed it could 
shift the purpose of the nuclear program relatively easily 
and quickly. From the political leadership’s perspective, 
South Africa would have lost little if the scientific leader-
ship viewed the program as civil only.
3. The third case is that both the political and nuclear leaders 
intended from the start of the program to obtain nuclear 
weapons in addition to a large civil nuclear program. In 
this case, strategic considerations of energy security and 
national security were at the heart of the program.
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ANC officials have supported the third case and, to a lesser 
extent, the second one. The official declarations center on the first 
case, while sometimes acknowledging the possibility of the second 
one.
On balance, neither the first nor third case seems compelling. The 
first case requires a belief that the nuclear leaders were remarkably 
naïve during the height of the Cold War and amidst rising interna-
tional isolation. The third case suggests a level of organization and 
effort that would have been expected to emerge in oral statements, 
intelligence records, or South African historical documents.
Case two would imply a level of deception on the part of South 
Africa’s nuclear and government leaders but it remains the most 
plausible scenario. It also recognizes Roux’ remarkable accom-
plishments and vision for South Africa. As pointed out by Johann 
Viljoen, who joined the nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and 
remained until the end, the second case recognizes Roux as some-
one who wanted South Africa to be seen as a first world power, 
who could have had the idea of a nuclear weapon in the back of his 
mind, perhaps even viewed such weapons as an exciting possibility 
for the future.47 However, he also likely did not want to make the 
decision to build the bomb. Granted, the AEB was going to develop 
a nuclear weapons capability. For Roux, the question to the national 
leadership would have been: do you want it? Until about 1975, the 
military was simply not that interested and the political leadership 
felt no pressure or need to decide to build nuclear weapons.
Case two also more clearly tracks the international perceptions 
of South Africa’s efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. 
This perception includes the growing view in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s that PNEs should be viewed as nuclear weapons, despite 
not strictly being so in the South African military sense, which prizes 
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To a small number of key scientists and engineers at the Atomic En-
ergy Board (AEB), the 1970s started with work on what they believed 
was a peaceful nuclear explosive (PNE). The goal was to complete 
the first “type A,” or gun- type device, when the Y Plant had finished 
making enough highly enriched uranium (HEU), planned originally 
for mid-1977. Once both efforts converged, the plan called for an 
underground test of the device. However, the actual date when the 
first device could be assembled would turn out to be two years later. 
Although the device development and test site construction were 
completed as planned, the production of enough HEU was delayed 
two years.
When the PNE program formally started in 1971, André Buys 
was a young engineer beginning his career at the AEB. He had re-
ceived funding for his university training from the AEB with the 
proviso that he would work for the AEB afterwards. In 1971 he was 
assigned to the PNE project at Pelindaba that was just taking shape, 
but as he worked in the program, Buys was increasingly troubled. 
He saw no reports that PNEs were viable economically or techni-
cally. He often asked his superiors what would be their purpose. 
His superiors told him that they would find a use for them and en-
couraged him to focus on this interesting scientific and engineering 
work. Whenever he asked if it was really a bomb program, he was 
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told no. Buys developed an impression that the AEB under Ampie 
Roux could easily obtain funds from the government to do what it 
judged important, and the AEB viewed the prospect of developing 
PNEs as an exciting technical challenge, one that could occupy the 
defunct Pelinduna reactor team. Yet developing an agreement of the 
purpose and scope of what would gradually become a full- blown 
nuclear weapons program would drive Buys throughout his career, 
first at the AEB and then as a leader of the nuclear weapons pro-
gram in the 1980s at the Armaments Corporation, or Armscor.
REACTOR DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
With the cancellation of the Pelinduna reactor project and the start 
of the PNE program, the Reactor Development Division was trans-
formed into an organization centered on the major tasks of building 
a nuclear explosive device, absent delivery system integration. Its pri-
mary task was developing a gun- type nuclear device, but in parallel, 
it started rudimentary work on implosion- type and thermonuclear 
devices.
The old names of the Division were preserved, serving as crude 
codenames for the new PNE work. In their authoritative book Ar-
mament and Disarmament: South the Africa’s Nuclear Weapons 
Experience, Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, and Jan van 
Loggerenberg, all of whom participated importantly in the former 
nuclear weapons program, describe the new responsibilities of the 
key groups for making PNEs in the transformed Reactor Develop-
ment Division:1
• Nuclear Engineering Group studied the possible civil ap-
plications of nuclear devices in South Africa. It established 
a rock mechanics laboratory to determine the effects of an 
underground explosion on the surrounding geology and to 
develop methods for plugging the test shaft so as to pre-
vent the release of radioactive elements. It also conducted 
experiments with conventional explosives to calibrate 
computer programs being developed to predict the effects 
of underground nuclear explosions.
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• Theoretical Reactor Physics Group developed computer 
codes for the design of nuclear devices, including neu-
tron data, criticality studies, and explosive yield estimates. 
Their work was based on earlier work on thermal reactor 
designs.
• Theoretical Nuclear Physics Group estimated pre- 
detonation probabilities and material properties at the 
extremely high temperatures and pressures of a nuclear 
explosion. This group also was responsible for theoretical 
designs of possible future thermonuclear devices.
• Experimental Reactor Physics Group, which was originally 
responsible for the Pelinduna critical facility, built a criti-
cal facility and a fast pulse reactor. It also developed the 
equipment for measuring the reactor’s dynamic properties, 
as well as planned for the collection of data at a possible 
fully instrumented nuclear explosion.
• Reactor Engineering Group was in charge of obtaining 
sensitive high pressure and temperature data unavaila-
ble in the open literature. It developed and operated the 
necessary equipment to acquire these data. It was also re-
sponsible for the engineering design of nuclear devices, as 
well as the manufacture and assembly of nuclear explosive 
devices.
• Electronic Engineering Group identified and then built 
or procured all the electronic equipment for the entire 
program.
• Process Metallurgy Group was responsible for uranium 
metallurgy, particularly in developing the methods to con-
vert HEU hexafluoride into metal, which is the chemical 
form most desirable for nuclear explosions.
• Physical Metallurgy Group developed and deployed meth-
ods to melt, cast, and machine enriched uranium into 
suitable geometries with tight specifications. It was also 
charged with producing all other metallic materials for the 
program.
• Nuclear Chemistry Group handled investigations into the 
production of thermonuclear materials.
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With an enrichment program expected to make a considerable 
amount of weapons- grade uranium (WGU), the PNE program de-
cided to first focus on making a gun- type nuclear weapon. This type 
of weapon requires a great deal of WGU but is generally viewed as 
easier to build than an implosion- type, which would require less 
than half the amount of WGU.
However, the Reactor Development Division did not have the 
experience to work with propellants or understand ballistics suffi-
ciently for the firing of a WGU plug down a barrel to mate with the 
rest of the WGU, achieving a supercritical reaction.2 There was also 
concern about the noise involved in repeatedly firing a gun- type de-
vice, albeit one with a surrogate material, at the Pelindaba site. By 
the early 1970s, this site housed a considerable number of personnel 
and visitors who did not know about the PNE program. As a result, 
the decision was made to build a temporary test and development 
facility at the National Institute for Defense Research (NIDR) of 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research at Somerset West 
Figure 2.1: A schematic of the facility at Somerset West involved in developing 
the gun- type nuclear device in the early 1970s. Credit: André Buys
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(later part of Somchem) (see figure 2.1). Located in the Cape Prov-
ince, this military facility was already involved in the development 
and manufacture of explosives and propellants, so a small research 
facility studying a gun- type device would not stick out as it would 
at Pelindaba. Moreover, this institute had the experience in making 
guns and propellants and sophisticated measuring equipment. Buys 
observed that the relatively small facility dedicated to developing a 
gun- type nuclear explosive was the least noticeable of the facilities 
at Somerset West.3
A small team of three engineers from the Reactor Development 
Division, including Buys, were sent in 1972 to this site to carry out 
research and development work on the mechanical and pyrotechni-
cal subsystems of a gun- type device. They started with a shortened 
naval gun to fire the projectiles.4 The NIDR staff aided the AEB 
personnel in developing expertise in both propellants and ballistics.
At the new site, South Africans worked on the mechanical and 
pyrotechnic subsystems for a gun- type device. The first experiment 
at the internal ballistics test facility was conducted in September 
1973. The team fired heavy (50 kilogram) tungsten projectiles from 
a bored- out four inch naval gun. Internal ballistics parameters 
were measured for a theoretical model for the device, according to 
the South African declaration to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).
Using this information, the team designed a scale model which, 
with a projectile constructed of tungsten, was tested at Somerset 
West in May 1974. This demonstrated that a nuclear explosive was 
feasible. The team tested, with extensive instrumentation, the first 
full- scale model of the gun- type device using a natural uranium 
projectile in 1976. This test proved the mechanical integrity of the 
design.
In designing the device, the AEB team at Somerset West faced 
several challenges, including achieving the repeatability of projec-
tive velocity and symmetry requirements when the projectile flies 
into the core.5 The latter meant that the end of the device had to be 
reinforced  — in essence it caught the plug fired down the tube. This 
unique approach was necessitated by the lack of a neutron initiator, 
a device that generates neutrons to start the chain reaction in the 
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supercritical material. South African devices were designed to use 
background, or stray, neutrons to initiate the chain reaction. Cal-
culations showed that the chain reaction would start within a few 
milliseconds after the HEU projectile merged into the fixed HEU 
core. Thus, for a nuclear explosion to occur, the shape of the as-
sembled highly enriched uranium had to be spherical for at least on 
order of milliseconds, one of the more challenging engineering feats 
the team had to overcome.
Because nuclear weapons information is generally classified, the 
South African program lacked key information about gun- type nu-
clear devices and other designs. Through research and development 
efforts, it learned certain classified information. However, accord-
ing to one of the participants, people in the South African program 
had the idea to monitor open source publications by top US nuclear 
weapons experts. After assembling a list of their names, South Afri-
cans searched their publications and realized that these experts were 
publishing highly useful nuclear weapons information piecemeal or 
couched within civil subjects.
In 1974 unable to answer certain pressing questions about the 
gun- type device, an engineer working on it at Somerset West went to 
the United States to attend a high explosive conference where lead-
ing US nuclear weapons experts were to deliver talks. Posing as an 
employee working on civil high explosives at the Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research, South Africa’s leading civilian scientific 
and technology research organizations, he had ample opportunities 
to ask detailed questions of the US nuclear weapons experts. He was 
pleased that these experts engaged in discussions with him in which 
they were frank and helpful.
However, South Africa later saw this type of approach as a se-
curity risk and discontinued it. The South Africans realized that the 
information could go the other way too. Asking certain questions 
could lead the US nuclear weapons experts to gain insights into 
what South Africa was actually working on.
For the personnel in the program, according to one leading 
member of the nuclear weapons program at the time, the view of 
the AEB was that the program could be kept secret only if the first 
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rule was: No contact with outsiders at all. Of course, in practice, 
this was not always possible.
PNE FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES AT PELINDABA
While the team progressed at Somerset West, other groups in the 
Reactor Development Division were working on other parts of the 
PNE program. One key question was where to house the growing 
number of people associated with the program while also keeping 
their work secret. The PNE program was growing to about 50-100 
Figure 2.2 Pelindaba staff recreation area, with baboons, in early 1994.
people, while the Pelindaba and Valindaba enrichment sites at the 
time had about 3,000 personnel. To keep the PNE program hidden 
from the other personnel at Pelindaba and Valindaba, and to pre-
vent foreign visitors who could be working for intelligence services 
from discovering the work, the AEB decided to remove the PNE 
program from the main site; however, they did not want to go too 
far away. So, the idea was to “be close but not too close,” according 
to Buys. In this way the program could easily still draw upon the 
infrastructure of the main site, including for any emergencies.
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In a valley on the southwestern side of the Pelindaba site was 
already a staff recreation center by the Crocodile River (see figure 
2.2). Thus, personnel were known to travel into the valley.
The decision was made to put the PNE facilities on the other 
side of this valley. Frank Pabian, a leading expert on South Afri-
ca’s nuclear programs, while a Senior Fellow at the Joint Research 
Center in Italy, pointed out that this valley was hidden by a ridge, 
consistent with concealment via “terrain masking.6
By the mid-1970s, a new series of non- descript buildings were 
being created for all major aspects of the planned PNE program. Fig-
ures 2.3 (a) and (b) show commercial satellite images of the major 
facilities involved in the PNE program in the valley below the main 
Pelindaba nuclear site, including:
• Building 5000, also known as (aka) Hall A
• Building 5100, aka Hall B
• Building 5200, aka Hall D
• Building 5300, aka Hall C
• F1 High Explosive Magazine
• F2 High Explosive Outdoor Test Site
Figure 2.3(a) Commercial satellite images showing the main facilities in the PNE 
program in the valley below the Pelindaba site.
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Figure 2.3(b) Commercial satellite image of the main 5000-series facilities  
in the PNE program.
Figure 2.4 Buildings 5100, 5200, and 5300 (barely visible) in the valley  
below the Pelindaba site.
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F1 and F2, which were further away from the main site, were 
a high explosive magazine and an outdoor high explosive test site, 
respectively. Both were used in the development of implosion- type 
nuclear devices. Figure 2.4 shows Buildings 5100, 5200, and 5300 in 
the valley below the main Pelindaba site. Figure 2.5 shows F2 in a 
commercial satellite image.
In parallel to the work at Somerset West, one of the first chal-
lenges was the development of a range of neutronic, thermodynamic, 
and hydrodynamic computer codes related to nuclear explosive de-
vices. According to a former member of the team, the PNE program 
drew upon a team of theoretical specialists at the main site. Sev-
eral members of the theoretical team had US trained in the United 
States and were nuclear physicists. However, some of the members 
were less than enthusiastic about working on nuclear explosives, 
Figure 2.5 The F2 outdoor high explosive building, visible near the  
center of the commercial satellite image.
Figure 2.6 Building 5100 and its front entrance as it appeared in 2002 during a 
visit by one of the authors.
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according to a former member. They saw the work as a distraction 
of the civil nuclear work they wanted to do at the main site.
The theoretical nuclear explosive work was based in the main 
PNE building, code named Building 5100 or Hall B (see figure 2.6).
Figure 2.7 shows a vault for classified documents in the second 
floor hallway in the design section of Building 5100. Members of 
Figure 2.7 Vault in design section of Building 5100.
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theoretical group in Building 5100 did basic research on compression, 
hydrodynamics, photon cross sections and neutron multiplication, 
according to a former member of the nuclear weapons program.
The program needed advanced computers for their calcula-
tions. To that end, it secretly ordered one from Europe. Later, the 
pattern was for a civil company to order computers abroad and the 
nuclear weapons experts would use them off- hours or remotely, ac-
cording to a former member of the nuclear weapons program.
Building 5100 also housed a small- scale light gas gun (referred 
to as a “six millimeter system,” by Armscor personnel) used to deter-
mine the equation of state of materials subject to high temperature 
and pressure, critical to the design of nuclear explosives. These es-
sential data for uranium and plutonium are classified but are critical 
to the theoretical models related to nuclear explosives.
Based on the prototype gas gun in Building 5100, the program 
built a full- scale, two- stage light gas gun in Building 5200 that was 
20 meters long (a “29 millimeter system”). Figure 2.8 shows the front 
of Building 5200 as it appeared in 2002, and its side entrance where 
heavy pieces could be brought into the building.
The program also needed to learn to make sensitive HEU com-
ponents for nuclear weapons, too sensitive to make at the main site. 
These parts were made in Building 5100 in a first floor workshop lo-
cated off the covered courtyard of the building and below the device 
design section on the second floor (see figure 2.9). The door was in a 
Figure 2.8 Building 5200, from front and side of the building. The side is closest 
to Building 5100, showing entrance for heavy items, as it looked in 2002. The 
first nuclear explosive device was assembled in this building.
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covered courtyard to allow vehicles to enter and unload outside the 
purview of overhead surveillance.
Once HEU was available, starting in 1978 and 1979, critical-
ity experiments were done in Building 5200, which also had vaults 
to store HEU. These straightforward experiments verified the neu-
tron multiplication factors of the two parts of the gun- type device 
separately, providing additional confidence that the gun- type design 
would work. The subcritical experiments used a neutron injector 
designed by physicists brought into the PNE program from the main 
site.
One advantage of a gun- type design is that the need for a full- 
scale test can be replaced by a certain type of criticality test that will 
experimentally verify theoretical models. This type of experiment 
is sometimes referred to as “tickling the dragon’s tail,” suggesting 
the danger inherent in the test. In essence, a simplified “dragon” 
machine, or pulsed fission reactor, involves a slug of highly enriched 
uranium sliding down a wire or track through a cylindrical annulus 
of highly enriched uranium, simulating in slow motion what occurs 
in firing a gun- type design. The United States conducted such exper-
iments in early 1945 at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project.
South Africa’s dragon experiment involved a pulse reactor in 
Building 5000, designed to verify its new nuclear device computer 
models. Figure 2.10 shows the inside and outside of the building 
Figure 2.9 The door led to the workshop that made HEU parts. The door was 
in a covered bay in Building 5100. In photo on right, the door is hidden by the 
small white building behind the auto.
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as of 1994, during a visit by one of the authors. Although ready by 
about 1975, it was not used until 1979 when enough HEU became 
available. This type of reactor goes critical after inserting a final rod 
of HEU into a larger HEU mass surrounded by a steel reflector. The 
pulse reactor was designed to use a tungsten reflector, but that re-
flector was not finished by the time of the test. The critical reaction 
is stopped by the heating of the core and springs that push apart the 
HEU pieces. Instruments measure the neutrons produced. The 1979 
experiment, according to a former senior official close to the IAEA, 
involved about 35 kilograms of 80 percent enriched uranium, imply-
ing a thick neutron reflector surrounded the HEU core.
These types of experiments can be risky. If a slug had become 
stuck in the US dragon machine, the highly enriched uranium would 
have become supercritical, causing a small nuclear explosion (on 
order of tens or hundreds of kilograms of TNT). Thus, any dragon- 
type reactor must be built with safety as a primary concern, and it 
must be operated carefully. South Africa apparently attempted to 
mitigate this danger in several ways. It built Building 5000 at the 
bottom of a depression surrounded by hills in an isolated portion 
of its main nuclear site (see figures 2.11 and 2.12). The control room 
was in Building 5100, which was almost three quarters of a kilome-
ter away and shielded from the reactor by a hill. After the dragon 
test, the reactor was never used again. The facility was shut down in 
the early 1980s.
Figure 2.10 Building 5000, where South Africa performed a dragon experiment. 
An overhead crane is visible in the right image. The images were taken in 1994, 
when no trace of the experiment remained.
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Johan Slabber, the former director of the Reactor Development 
Division, has spoken of a “mishap” in an experiment with the pulse 
reactor.7 In this case, the reactor was shut down just in time to pre-
vent a serious radiological accident from happening.
Figure 2.11 Building 5000 was isolated from the other facilities in a depression.
Figure 2.12 The control room of the reactor had been located on the first floor 
of Building 5000, facing the reactor. All the reactor equipment was emptied from 
the room, years before this picture was taken in 2002.
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Building 5000–This facility contained a pulse reactor for the experimental ver-
ification of theoretical computer models. In 1979 the reactor was used as a fast 
critical assembly in an experiment often referred to as “tickling the tail of the 
dragon” that proved the design of the gun-type device. The reactor was never 
again used as a pulse reactor and the facility was shut down in the early 1980s.
Building 5100–This building contained the control room for Building 5000, 
offices, research and development laboratories, and machining facilities for ura-
nium metal. At its height, about 100 people worked in the building, according to 
a former employee from the era.
Building 5200–This building housed a large, two-stage light gas gun. Criticality 
experiments using HEU were done in this building to verify the multiplication 
factors of the two parts of a nuclear explosive device, providing confidence that 
the gun-type design would work. The first nuclear explosive device was also as-
sembled in this building in 1979. Vehicles and cabling for the Kalahari test site 
were kept here, in essence because this building was the staging area in case of 
the decision to test.
Building 5300–This building was designed exclusively as a laboratory for high 
explosives. In the early stage of the South African nuclear weapons program, 
small quantities of high explosives were pressed and machined into shapes at 
this facility.
5000 SERIES BUILDINGS IN THE 1970s
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IMPLOSION- TYPE NUCLEAR DEVICE
The development of implosion technology was part of the PNE pro-
gram from its inception. Theoretical work started in the early 1970s. 
However, there was no significant pressure to finish a design, given 
the emphasis on the gun- type device.
For example, an implosion type device would have required a 
neutron initiator to start the chain reaction at a critical moment. 
Some work was done in the 1970s on an electronic accelerator type 
of initiator but the work did not progress very far.
Nonetheless, the AEB did build facilities to pursue high ex-
plosive technologies associated with implosion. Building 5300 was 
designed mainly as a laboratory for high explosives work related 
to implosion technology. As such, at this facility small quantities 
(about 50 grams) of high explosives were pressed and machined into 
shapes aimed at learning about the process of imploding a spherical 
core. It also produced high explosives for experiments to measure 
the impact of an explosion on rock as part of designing the nuclear 
test site. Figure 2.13 shows the front and side of the building. This 
narrow building contained a number of concrete bays for work with 
high explosives.
Small high explosive tests for an implosion design were done at 
an outdoor high explosive test facility called F2. Figure 2.14 shows 
the building that held the instrumentation, where the explosive 
tests would have been detonated in front of the building. When it 
Figure 2.13 Building 5300 had a number of small high explosive cells behind the 
outer doors. Image on right, pathway from Building 5100 to Building 5300.
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was used, its front concrete wall and the roof were covered in dirt. 
Nearby, a magazine, F1, stored high explosives for the program (see 
figure 2.15).
Figure 2.14(a) F2 outdoor high explosive test site, south of the 5000 buildings.
Figure 2.15 F1 Magazine that stored high explosives
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Figure 2.16 The two- story bay where lithium 6 separation was done in the 
1970s. Image was taken in 2002.
THERMONUCLEAR AND BOOSTED DEVICES
The 1971 decision to proceed with type a devices included approval 
to work on a “boosted” nuclear explosive, referred to as type A*. 
This device was envisioned to use a mixture of lithium, tritium, 
and deuterium inside the fission device that would dramatically in-
crease the overall explosive energy of the device. In August 1973, the 
Minister of Mining approved theoretical work on type B, or a ther-
monuclear device with a fission detonator, referred to as a two stage 
thermonuclear nuclear device.
Most of the focus of this early effort was on obtaining ther-
monuclear materials. In the early 1970s, the program started work 
on separating the isotope lithium 6 from natural lithium. Lithium 
6 becomes tritium after neutron irradiation and is often used in 
thermonuclear devices or as a target in a reactor to make tritium. 
The AEB started testing a process to separate lithium 6 based on a 
mercury exchange progress. This work was done in Building 5100. 
Figure 2.16 shows a two- story bay, located off the covered court-
yard where this work on lithium separation took place in the 1970s. 
A small amount of lithium 6 was produced in 1973.8 Later in 1983, 
work started on an atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) 
process to make lithium 6 that utilized copper vapor lasers.
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Building 5100 was also involved in separating small amounts of 
heavy water. Heavy water contains deuterium, which is also a ther-
monuclear material.
South Africa received a significant amount of tritium in a nu-
clear exchange with Israel where it provided natural uranium.9 South 
Africa received four full cylinders in 1977, which contained almost 
20 grams of tritium. Other than the initial taking of a small sam-
ple, the PNE program (or subsequent nuclear weapons effort) did 
not use any of this tritium in developing thermonuclear or boosted 
weapons. Nonetheless, in anticipation of using the tritium in the 
PNE program, the AEB built a tritium handling laboratory, called 
the Gas Laboratory, on the main site (Building P1600). It was com-
pleted in about 1981.
The actual work on thermonuclear or boosted weapons during 
the 1970s was minimal. The priority remained the development of a 
gun- type device.
INITIAL GUN- TYPE DESIGNS
By 1976 the AEB had completed the design of a full- size device that 
was 4.4 meters long, 0.61 meters in diameter, and weighed 3,450 
kilograms. The first device was designed to be tested underground 
in conjunction with extensive instrumentation to learn more about 
nuclear explosives.
As discussed later, in 1977 South Africa realized that a full- scale 
underground PNE test would be impractical. Yet, the program had 
also realized that such a test was not needed in any case. The Reac-
tor Development Division turned to designing a new, smaller design. 
The second device, finished in 1978, was two meters in length and 
0.360 meters in diameter, and it had a mass of 750 kilograms, or 
about half the size and almost one- fifth the weight of the first device. 
According to Slabber, in 1978 his team conducted a cold test of this 
design using natural uranium instead of highly enriched uranium.10
The program still did not have enough HEU and would need 
another year to accumulate the required amounts. After South Af-
rica did so in 1979, it completed the dragon test in Building 5000 
and final criticality tests in Building 5200. Afterwards, it assembled 
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its first nuclear explosive device in November 1979 in Building 5200 
using about 56 kilograms of about 80 percent HEU. The Y Plant 
was still not able to make weapons- grade, or 90 percent enriched, 
uranium. The theoretical group estimated that the explosive yield 
would be about six kilotons. This yield was somewhat less than half 
of the yield of the gun- type bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945 
but contained a similar amount of about 80 percent HEU.
The South African effort to build a working, gun- type device 
took about eight years to accomplish. The relatively long develop-
ment time, however, resulted primarily from the difficulty South 
Africa experienced in getting its uranium enrichment plant to pro-
duce sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium for its first 
nuclear explosive device. The actual time needed to develop and 
prove a gun- type device was considerably less. In fact, by the time 
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GETTING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
Following the government decision in 1969 to build a pilot uranium 
enrichment plant, the Atomic Energy Board had to dramatically 
scale up from an enrichment research program to an industrial pro-
gram.1 It had to find and hire many qualified personnel, accelerate 
the planning of the new plant, overcome engineering problems, en-
gage in massive procurements domestically and abroad, and start 
large- scale manufacturing operations for the components of the 
plant.
Although the enrichment project was shrouded in intense se-
crecy, the government decided that such a large construction project 
could not be hidden for long. In July 1970, then Prime Minister John 
Vorster announced in Parliament that South Africa intended to build 
a pilot enrichment plant based on a “process which is unique in its 
concept.”2 Many countries and experts skeptically greeted Vorster’s 
announcement, questioning South Africa’s ability to develop an en-
richment technology on its own.
Not until 1975, when senior South African nuclear officials 
presented a paper to a European Nuclear Conference in Paris, did 
South Africa provide partial information about its enrichment pro-
cess.3 However, the South Africans did not reveal details about the 
separating element until the late 1980s.4
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In his 1970 announcement, Vorster emphasized that the enrich-
ment plant was for peaceful purposes only. One goal of the project 
was to sell enriched uranium overseas, and Vorster invited any non- 
communist nation to collaborate in exploiting this new process for 
civilian, peaceful purposes.5
Vorster also stated South Africa’s willingness to place all its 
nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards subject to the following 
conditions:
• South Africa would in no way be limited in the promotion 
of the peaceful application of nuclear energy;
• South Africa would not run the risk that details of the new 
enrichment process might leak out as a result of the safe-
guards inspection system; and
• The safeguards system, while efficient, would be imple-
mented on such a reasonable basis as to avoid interference 
with the normal efficient operation of the particular 
industries.
While not an outright refusal to accept safeguards and the 
associated Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Vorster’s 
announcement appeared to signal that South Africa regarded its nu-
clear capabilities as a potential bargaining chip.6 It was “not willing 
to open up all of its activities to an international community that 
seemed increasingly hostile to the country and its racial policies.”7 
However, this conditionality also suggests that a nuclear weapons 
arsenal may not have been inevitable in 1970.
Still, Vorster did not mention that peaceful purposes included 
peaceful nuclear explosives or that the enrichment plant was being 
designed to make weapons- grade uranium in addition to low en-
riched uranium (LEU). LEU has the level of enrichment most often 
associated with overseas exports of enriched uranium and a civil 
purpose. Weapons- grade uranium is associated with nuclear weap-
ons. If Vorster had been more forthcoming, the international outcry 
could have been far more pointed.
This deliberate omission fooled many in the international com-
munity, who took Vorster’s announcement literally and assumed 
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wrongly that the Y Plant would not make weapons- grade uranium. 
The US government wrote to a Congressional oversight committee 
that as late as 1976 “all information available to us indicates that 
the South African enrichment plant is designed for and intended to 
produce only slightly enriched uranium.”8 Although this view was 
not a consensus view in the United States intelligence community, 
South Africa had created ambiguity about the purpose of its unsafe-
guarded nuclear facilities and its refusal to sign the NPT.
Over the following decade and half, many would use this am-
biguity to argue in public and policy debates that South Africa did 
not have nuclear weapons but only a capability to make them. As 
pointed out by Frank Pabian, the US expert on South Africa’s nuclear 
program, “Once a threshold proliferant nuclear state has access to 
sufficient stocks of weapons- grade fissile material to make nuclear 
weapons, and a strong case can be made that they have requisite 
motivation to build nuclear weapons, the South African exemplar 
shows the likelihood that they will build nuclear weapons (and are 
not simply interested in only acquiring a ‘capability’ to build them 
at some distant point in the future.”9
Y PLANT
One month after Vorster’s announcement, South Africa passed 
legislation to establish a corporation for uranium enrichment. In 
November, the state- owned Uranium Enrichment Corporation of 
South Africa Limited (UCOR) was created, and Wally Grant became 
its first Managing Director and Ampie Roux its first chairman of the 
Board. The AEB’s enrichment project staff was also transferred to 
UCOR.
A site adjacent to Pelindaba was selected as the site of the pilot 
enrichment plant, code named the Y Plant, and the ground for the 
plant was broken in November 1970. Figure 3.1 is a 1991 satellite 
image that shows the location of the Y Plant near the main Pelind-
aba site. Although the two sites were distinct, many services, such as 
security, transport, and library services, would be shared.
According to Newby- Fraser’s 1979 Chain Reaction, the name 
of the site was derived by someone asking: “What happens here?” 
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Others said: “This we do not talk about.” In a similar manner as the 
name Pelindaba was selected, the new site was named Valindaba, a 
conjunction of two words common to many of the roughly seventy 
languages indigenous to the southern tip of the African continent. 
Individually, the words are “vala” meaning “to close” and “indaba” 
meaning the council. Together, the meaning of these two words is 
the “council is closed.” By extension, Valindaba means “no talking 
about this.”
Newby- Fraser states that some cynically referred to the facil-
ity as “no comment.” Although this name did not last, he points 
out that the term is apt to describe the behavior of UCOR, which 
maintained extremely tight security over its activities. The 1970 law 
creating UCOR instructed the government to withhold from the 
public any information about the corporation and its activities that 
could be considered “contrary to public interest.”
Figure 3.1 A 1991 KVR-1000 satellite image showing the Y Plant; to its immedi-
ate left is the main Pelindaba nuclear site (unannotated). Also shown are several 
5000-series buildings. Source: www.isis- online.org and www.terraserver.
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AERODYNAMIC ENRICHMENT METHOD
The South African aerodynamic enrichment process separates 
uranium isotopes through centrifugal effects created by the rapid 
spinning motion of a mixture of uranium hexafluoride gas and 
hydrogen carrier gas in a small stationary tube. An example of a 
separating element shown to one of the authors in 1994 by a senior 
South African enrichment expert was about five centimeters long 
and about one centimeter in diameter. The expert explained that 
the gas mixture enters at a high speed through tiny holes in the side 
of the tube and spirals down the tube. When the mixture reaches 
the holes at the ends of the tube, its radius of curvature is reduced 
several- fold, increasing the separation of the uranium isotopes.10 
The heavy fraction, more concentrated in uranium 238, exits to the 
side. The light fraction, more concentrated in uranium 235, exits 
straight out at the end. Because each separating element can enrich 
uranium only slightly, several separating elements are combined into 
“stages,” several thousand of which are linked together by pipes and 
valves into a “cascade.”
The Y Plant was organized into five consecutive enrichment 
blocks and one “stripper” section, each containing many stages. The 
blocks were located in three large buildings, named C, D, and E 
(see figures 3.2 and 3.3). Natural uranium was fed into block 1 in 
building C. The enriched product from block 1 (less than 2 percent 
uranium 235) went by pipe to blocks 2 and 3 in building D for addi-
tional enrichment up to 10 percent uranium 235. From there, pipes 
carried the enriched material to blocks 4 and 5 in building E, which 
discharged the final enriched product containing greater than about 
80 percent uranium 235. Depleted uranium was discharged at the 
bottom of the stripper section in building C. Combined, all these 
blocks were referred to as one cascade, raising the enrichment level 
of the uranium from natural uranium, or about 0.7 percent, to 80 to 
90 percent or more.
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Figure 3.2 Y Plant, with many high stacks, with main Pelindaba site in back-
ground. The tall stacks were part of a hydrogen ventilation system aimed at 
minimizing the chance of an explosion of hydrogen gas used in the enrichment 
process lines. Photo Credit: Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Af-
rica Limited
Figure 3.3 Satellite image of the Y Plant, which closed in 1990. The December 
1991 image is from www.terraserver.com. Source www.isis- online.org
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According to Anthony Jackson, a chemical engineer and the 
leader of the team responsible for the design and commissioning 
of the Y Plant, the attainment of an industrial production level re-
quired years of trial and error.11 Learning to mass produce high 
precision separation elements and other key components for the en-
richment plant was time consuming and expensive. “Money was the 
real issue,” he added, because funding is necessary to “sort glitches 
out.” Because the plant was for a “strategic” purpose, he said that 
funding to sort out all the engineering and chemical problems was 
never an issue. However, the difficulties of getting the process to 
work cannot be understated. The South Africans had to cope with 
many technological surprises, which delayed and reduced the accu-
mulation of HEU.
In 1974 the commissioning of individual stages of the cascade 
started. By October of that year, initial enrichment started in block 
3 of building D. The rest of the blocks were commissioned gradually, 
as development work continued. The full cascade was licensed for 
operation in February 1977 and the blocks were coupled together 
to start the run up to the production of 80 percent enriched ura-
nium. After wide fluctuations in the enrichment level throughout 
the cascade during the first fifty days of operation, the enrichment 
level started to rise. After about 200 days of operation, the product 
reached 80 percent enrichment (see figure 3.4).
After start- up problems and the long equilibrium time of the 
plant, the first and relatively small withdrawal of HEU (80 percent 
enriched) at the product area occurred on January 30, 1978.12 A few 
kilograms of 35 percent enriched uranium had been withdrawn from 
a lower section of the cascade at the end of 1977.
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The Y Plant was designed to make roughly 100 kilograms of 
weapons- grade uranium per year and to have a nominal enrichment 
output of about 20,000 separative work units (SWU) per year.13 Un-
expected problems in the plant, however, restricted the enrichment 
level to about 80 percent during its first few years of operation and 
led to a production rate of only about half of its theoretical output.
By the end of August 1979, the plant had produced only about 
64 kilograms of 80 percent enriched uranium during a period of 1.66 
years. Nonetheless, this amount was enough for South Africa’s first 
nuclear explosive, which was completed in November 1979.
The relatively small quantity of HEU produced means that the 
1979 “flash” over the ocean south of South Africa picked up by the 
US Vela satellite could not have been a South African nuclear test. 
Figure 3.4 The graph, which is taken from the Y Plant’s operational records, 
shows the daily enrichment level at the end of each of the five blocks and the 
stripping section. The names of the blocks are on the right of the graph and the 
enrichment level is on the left side on a logarithmic scale. The wide fluctuation 
in enrichment level is visible during the first fifty days of operation. Source: 
South Africa.
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The lack of HEU does not exclude official South African participa-
tion in an Israeli test.
Getting this 64 kilograms of 80 percent HEU was expensive and 
required the development of a large cadre of skilled engineers and 
scientists. By 1975, the UCOR project employed 1,200 people, and 
South Africa had already spent about 100 million Rand ($150 mil-
lion in October 1974 dollars) on research and development on the 
enrichment program, excluding expenditures on the Y Plant.14 By 
1975, the cost of the Y Plant amounted to well over 50 million Rand 
($75 million in October 1974 dollars).15 A large proportion of the 
research and development funds was used to assist South African 
industrial firms to create the expertise and infrastructure necessary 
for the various sophisticated manufacturing tasks assigned to them.
About 235 different companies contributed their expertise and 
craftsmanship to the design and construction of the machines and 
instrumentation for the Y Plant.16 In the process, South African 
companies enhanced their skills and abilities greatly, including im-
porting significantly more sophisticated machine tools, equipment, 
and materials.
Sensitive work, including the manufacturing of the separation 
elements, the cleaning of all components, and the assembling of 
manufactured components, occurred at Valindaba. This work was 
conducted under tight security.
FOREIGN PROCUREMENT
Although South Africa has consistently said that the Y Plant was 
an indigenous effort, many key items for the plant were obtained 
from abroad. Foreign procurement was essential for the Y Plant 
to operate successfully without experiencing additional delays or 
complications.
This assessment is not meant to diminish the accomplishments 
of the South Africans, many of whom have bristled at the suggestion 
that the program was not indigenous. Although foreign assistance of 
many different forms was necessary, the Y Plant’s success depended 
heavily on the skill and initiative of South Africa’s scientists and 
technicians combined with the government’s willingness to provide 
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adequate resources and on- going support from the highest levels of 
government.
From the South African government’s perspective, it would 
have been prudent in many cases to acquire an item from abroad 
rather than make it. In addition, South Africa did not have the in-
dustrial base to make all the necessary machine tools, sophisticated 
equipment, and components. Thus, foreign procurement was nec-
essary for many key items. In its quest to build and operate the Y 
Plant, South Africa participated in a range of questionable or illegal 
imports.
During the early 1970s, however, export controls on nuclear or 
nuclear- related components were nonexistent or weak by today’s 
standards. As a result, few exports to South Africa were controlled. 
However, the growing anti- apartheid movement in the mid-1970s 
led Western governments to take action to limit nuclear exports to 
South Africa. This controversy also led to public revelations of many 
nuclear exports to South Africa.
The media at the time reported that South Africa acquired items 
for its uranium enrichment program from US, French, German, and 
Swiss companies.17 Important instrumentation for measuring isoto-
pic concentrations of uranium and compressors was imported from 
Germany. Valves and instrumentation for the enrichment plant were 
imported via circuitous routes, including Germany, according to a 
South African who was formerly a senior official in the enrichment 
program. Additionally, unsafeguarded uranium hexafluoride was 
imported from France, according to South African nuclear officials. 
This uranium hexafluoride was the first feed stock into the Y Plant.
In 1975 the US Senate’s Government Operations Committee in-
vestigated an export of industrial- process computers to the Y Plant 
from the Foxboro Corporation.18 Under a US Commerce Depart-
ment license, Foxboro exported two computers and spare parts 
during 1971 to 1973 for a price of about $2 million. The licenses 
were in the name of UCOR, the South African agency responsible 
for developing the enrichment facility, and the stated purpose on 
the license was “operation of experimental facilities and pilot plants 
for nuclear research and development.”19 According to a Foxboro 
executive interviewed by the committee, the company knew that 
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the computers were to be used for “some sort of uranium plant,” 
although the South Africans were generally secretive.20 Foxboro 
learned that the facility was a uranium enrichment plant during the 
installation of the computers despite South Africa restricting Fox-
boro personnel to the computer area of the plant and monitoring 
their activities closely.
According to a former member of the AEB and the nuclear 
weapons program, South Africa also arranged for foreign compa-
nies to build plants that would manufacture components for the 
enrichment plants. He said the Swiss companies Balzers and VAT 
built a factory in South Africa largely to make valves and pipes for 
the enrichment program.
Another important supplier to UCOR was the South African 
trading company Krisch Engineering (Pty) Ltd, which would later 
become an important cog in the proliferation network operated by 
the Pakistani A.Q. Khan. At the time, Krisch was the local agent for 
the German firms AEG Telefunken and Leybold Heraeus GmbH. It 
supplied important vacuum equipment to UCOR during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Krisch also arranged the manufacture of a highly 
specialized prototype valve at Leybold Hereaus for the South Afri-
can enrichment program.21
The enrichment program, however, was unable to get every-
thing it needed. For example, a senior member of the enrichment 
program said in a 1994 interview in South Africa that the program 
was thwarted in its efforts to obtain special seals for where the ro-
tating shaft enters a compressor. The seal must have extremely low 
leak rates that can prevent the ingress of oxygen, moisture, and oil, 
requiring specialized shaft sealing methods.22 Unable to acquire the 
necessary components overseas, they were forced to develop the seals 
themselves, encountering many difficult problems in the process.
BECKER NOZZLE PROCESS
Media reports and members of the African National Congress have 
asserted that the enrichment plant depended extensively on the jet- 
nozzle process developed by Erwin Becker and his colleagues at the 
Karlsruhe nuclear research center in Germany during the 1950s and 
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1960s. Roux responded to these types of critics: “While there may, in 
the very early days, have been common features, the UCOR process 
in its developed form is as far removed from any other enrichment 
process as the North Pole is from the South Pole.”23
Becker, however, challenged South Africa’s claim for uniqueness 
right after Roux and Grant delivered their paper at the 1975 Euro-
pean Nuclear Conference. Becker said at a press conference that 
he had collaborated closely with the South Africans insofar as they 
had been given the freedom of his research facilities at Karlsruhe.24 
South Africa did not return the courtesy, he noted. On a visit to Va-
lindaba in 1974, he was not allowed to see the separating element 
or the process equipment. Nonetheless, at the 1975 press conference 
Becker had to concede that not all the details of the two approaches 
are the same.25
In 1977 Becker reissued his allegation and went further. He said 
that Roux and other South African scientists had free access to his 
research and may have succeeded in adapting it.26
Both processes are based on the high performance stationary 
walled centrifuge. Becker’s group had avoided using the term “cen-
trifuge” to avoid potential problems with German classification 
rules that in 1960 had been amended to make all work on gas cen-
trifuges secret.
The Becker and UCOR processes do differ, however. A widely 
discussed difference is that UCOR developed an ingenious cascade 
technique, the “helikon” process, which, in combination with the 
separation element, can be considered a unique process.27 However, 
the helikon technique was not deployed in the Y Plant, but in the 
later semi- commercial Z Plant at Valindaba.
Waldo Stumpf, the head of the Atomic Energy Corporation in 
the late 1980s and 1990s, which was the immediate successor to the 
AEB, said in an interview in 1994 that the Germans never solved the 
problems posed by the mixture of uranium hexafluoride gas and 
hydrogen gas, which posed many unique challenges in successfully 
operating the Y Plant. He said that the Becker- nozzle plant that 
Germany sold to Brazil in 1975 was going to use helium instead of 
hydrogen. One of the problems posed by hydrogen is that it is ex-
plosive in the presence of oxygen. With so much hydrogen in the 
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process gas, the risk of explosion existed within the cascade piping 
and equipment. South Africa had to institute a variety of measures 
to keep air out of the cascade and ensure proper ventilation of any 
hydrogen that escaped the cascade into the atmosphere. The tall 
stacks visible at the Y Plant are part of that hydrogen ventilation 
system (see figure 3.2).
STEAG
Another controversial issue is the nature of UCOR cooperation 
with the German company Steag AG on a joint uranium enrichment 
endeavor between 1973 and 1976. Steag was a German energy group 
that controlled the patent rights to Becker’s jet- nozzle process. Start-
ing in 1970, Steag worked to develop the Becker nozzle technology 
for export and its application in commercial enrichment plants.28 
In 1974, Steag built an advanced prototype stage using the Becker 
nozzle, where all the major components were designed to facilitate 
serial production for a commercial- scale enrichment facility.
Its collaboration with South Africa followed Vorster’s 1970 an-
nouncement of South Africa’s willingness to cooperate with any 
non- communist country in exploiting its new enrichment process. 
Vorster’s goal was to build a larger uranium enrichment plant in 
addition to the Y Plant. In this larger plant, South Africa intended 
to enrich its domestic uranium and sell it overseas, realizing its long 
term goal of deriving greater economic value from the uranium it 
mined.
South Africa understood it could not build a commercial- size 
enrichment plant alone. It needed partners to share the financial risk 
and extend the guaranteed market for enriched uranium. In addition, 
the demands for manpower and manufacturing resources would be 
beyond South Africa’s capabilities, and South Africa would need to 
rely heavily on the overseas partners in meeting these demands.29 
For overseas collaborators, the benefits would include financial re-
wards, fruitful scientific and technological collaboration, and an 
ensured supply of enriched uranium. The last benefit was appealing 
to several countries that wanted to lessen their then dependence on 
Russian and US enriched uranium supplies.
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Despite high initial expectations, in 1976 Steag ended its collabo-
ration with UCOR, citing disagreements over financial arrangements 
and the sharing of risks in building a commercial enrichment plant 
in South Africa. For example, South Africa insisted that Steag was to 
be financially responsible for any failures in supplies of equipment 
caused by the worsening international political situation, i.e. grow-
ing pressure to impose economic sanctions on South Africa because 
of its apartheid policy.30
South Africa maintains that in the end the two sides conducted 
only joint feasibility studies on a plant that would produce several 
million separative work units per year.31 The goal was to compare 
the South African and German processes to determine which system 
was more feasible technically and more viable financially as part of 
deciding what type of plant to build. Chain Reaction maintained the 
study showed that the South African process could form the basis of 
a competitive enrichment plant.32
The Anti- Apartheid Movement of Germany charged that the 
collaboration was far more extensive. These charges were laid out 
in the 1978 book Nuclear Axis by Barbara Rogers and Zdenek 
Červenka. Based on a set of secret documents obtained by the Anti- 
Apartheid Movement of Germany from the South African embassy 
in Bonn in 1975, Nuclear Axis argues that South Africa received 
the jet- nozzle process from Steag during this collaboration and this 
transfer essentially became the UCOR process. The authors claim 
that the process announced by Vorster in 1970 was not the aerody-
namic process, and failed in any case soon afterwards.
The documents show that Steag and the West German gov-
ernment wanted to establish an extensive collaboration with South 
Africa on an enrichment plant, despite growing public and interna-
tional opposition to any kind of nuclear and military cooperation 
with South Africa. But the documents provide only indirect support 
for the authors’ charges that Steag supplied South Africa with its se-
cret jet- nozzle process. The documents indicate that Steag intended 
to grant UCOR an option for a sublicense for the manufacture of 
the jet- nozzle process. Because the South Africans viewed obtaining 
this sublicense an “essential pre- condition” for the start of a com-
parative economic study, Nuclear Axis concluded incorrectly that 
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the comparative study was actually a technology transfer of the jet- 
nozzle process that would form the heart of the UCOR process.33
The West German government challenged the claims in the Nu-
clear Axis and denied that any technology transfer took place. It 
also appears that the reason the West German government did not 
allow a transfer appears to have been in response to increasing pub-
lic and international opposition to nuclear cooperation with South 
Africa rather than opposition to building a plant overseas. In late 
1973, several members of the West German Cabinet opposed Steag’s 
proposal for a joint comparative study for a uranium enrichment 
plant, fearing the harsh reactions of other African states.34 Although 
the proposal did not include anything about actually building an en-
richment plant, one member of the cabinet believed that the whole 
operation made sense only if the plant was built, a step he opposed.35 
The insistence on including a sub- license for manufacturing the jet 
nozzle in the proposal strengthened this cabinet minister’s belief that 
they intended to build a plant in South Africa.
Despite the lack of support from the West German Cabinet, 
Steag and UCOR launched in early 1974 a joint comparative eco-
nomic feasibility study between the Karlsruhe jet- nozzle process and 
the South African process. However, without German government 
backing Steag could not obtain funding for an enrichment plant.
Although Nuclear Axis’s claims of Steag providing the jet nozzle 
process to South Africa are not supported by the available informa-
tion, German and other European companies provided key nuclear 
or nuclear- related assistance to South Africa’s enrichment endeav-
ors. One former South African nuclear official said that UCOR’s 
expectations of its collaboration with Steag were clear. While at-
tending briefings on the enrichment cooperation with West German 
companies and officials, he learned that South Africa expected that 
German companies would provide the technology to make a com-
mercial plant work. How much this collaboration helped operate 
the Y Plant is unclear, especially given the differences in this plant 
and the planned commercial- scale plant. Nevertheless, the collabo-




During its cooperation with German companies and labora-
tories in the 1970s, South Africa may have gained access to both 
unclassified and secret information about the Becker nozzle process, 
key suppliers, and methods of overcoming operational problems in 
operating a cascade. Such information may have helped South Afri-
can scientists overcome their problems in building, equipping, and 
operating the Y Plant. Improvements in the separation elements in 
the mid-1970s, for example, may have resulted from such contacts.
SEMI- COMMERCIAL PLANT, OR Z PLANT
In 1975, despite the lack of clear support from Steag, South Africa 
decided to build a larger enrichment plant, which South African offi-
cials estimated would have a capacity of 5 million SWU per year. But 
without foreign partners, South Africa subsequently reduced the size 
of the plant. In the end, South Africa built a semi- commercial plant 
with a capacity of 300,000 SWU per year, large enough to provide 
LEU to two light water reactors that it ordered from France in 1976. 
The Z Plant, built next door to the Y Plant, exploited new methods, 
such as the helikon technique, which reduced its cost and improved 
its efficiency compared to the Y Plant. According to Jackson, the 
motivation was strategic, in the sense that South Africa’s growing 
isolation made it more difficult to buy enriched uranium on the in-
ternational market.
Construction on this larger plant began in 1979, and com-
missioning with uranium hexafluoride started in 1984. Because of 
problems resulting from insufficient prototype experience, enriched 
uranium production did not begin until 1988.36 Afterwards, how-
ever, operation was not continuous. Problems with uninterruptable 
power systems and a special cooling system associated with ura-
nium hexafluoride condensers led to the plant operating only about 
two months in 1990.
This plant produced 3.25 per cent enriched uranium, via batch 
recycling, for the twin Koeberg power reactors, which required 
about two- thirds of its optimum annual production of 300,000 
SWU. Any spare separative capacity was intended to be sold on the 
world market.37
GETTING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
61
From 1988 until mid-1993, the semi- commercial plant produced 
734,000 SWU, with 95 per cent supplied to the Koeberg reactors and 
the other 5 percent supplied to foreign customers.38 The total out-
put for these years corresponds to the production of about 189,000 
kilograms of 3.25 enriched uranium at a tails assay of 0.3 percent. 
The average annual output during each of these five years was about 
150,000 SWU per year, or about 38,000 kilograms per year of 3.25 
per cent enriched uranium.
The enrichment process remained highly energy intensive and 
was not competitive with overseas producers, particularly in the 
oversupplied world enrichment market that existed in the early 
1990s. With little prospect of economic viability, the Z Plant ceased 
operation on March 31, 1995.
PROBLEMS IN THE Y PLANT
South Africa’s efforts to find an international partner may have failed 
but they served to improve the enrichment program’s knowledge of 
the aerodynamic method and opened doors to a variety of foreign 
high- tech goods that it needed to acquire for the Y Plant and later 
the Z Plant. This overseas assistance was critical to the success of the 
Y Plant, which was very much a pilot plant struggling to operate.
As the Y Plant fought to operate in the 1970s, it experienced 
many inefficiencies and problems. These problems remained hidden 
for years, emerging only after South Africa signed the NPT in 1991 
and instituted a more transparent policy.
The plant’s problems reached their peak during August 1979, 
which the Y plant workers call “chaos day.” This unexpected event 
ended the production of 80 percent HEU for 23 months, until July 
1981.
Chaos day resulted from greater than normal chlorine im-
purities in locally produced uranium hexafluoride feed, which in 
turn caused a massive chemical reaction in the uranium gas and 
the hydrogen carrier gas. According to Jackson, the result was solid 
uranium depositing on the inside of the cascade, reducing the out-
put of the top end of the plant to less than 10 percent instead of 80 
percent enriched uranium. The 23-month renovation included the 
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replacement of all the old separating elements whose holes had be-
come blocked. After restart and the reestablishment of equilibrium 
operation, the plant finally started producing HEU (but still only 80 
percent enriched) at the end of July 1981.
Chaos day was the surprise finale of a rash of problems in the 
Y Plant that had occurred after it started enriching uranium in 1974. 
These problems, some of which defied explanation, significantly 
complicated the plant’s startup and then reduced its enriched ura-
nium output. During this initial period, HEU output was only half 
of what was expected.
The first type of problem was due to inefficient mechanical 
processes in the Y Plant cascade, which stretched throughout the 
blocks, which led to the enriched and depleted streams combining 
again after leaving the separator elements, commonly called “mix-
ing.” The Y Plant did not use the more advanced helikon technique, 
which significantly reduced mixing in the semi- commercial plant. 
It used a “Pelsakon backpump cycle” which, according to Jackson, 
did not work as well as expected, and resulted in a lower separative 
work output than expected.39 Initially, the mixing loss in the back-
pump phase of the cycle was assumed to be 10 percent. In practice, 
however, mixing losses were considerably higher.
The plant also suffered from an unexpected loss of separating 
capacity. The cascade was unavailable more than expected. Impu-
rities, particularly nitrogen, leaked into the process gas, causing 
additional losses. Over time, the separating elements did not work 
as designed because of blockages and other problems.
The third loss mechanism involved catalytic chemical reac-
tions between uranium hexafluoride and hydrogen gases.40 During 
the first several years of operation of the Y Plant, project personnel 
spent a great deal of time trying to reduce the loss of enriched ura-
nium from chemical reactions. In 1977 South African officials stated: 
“Detailed studies in the laboratory backed by extensive plant expe-
rience have given the background information on the conditions to 
be maintained if uranium hexafluoride losses are to be kept below 
acceptable limits.”41
Starting in the late 1960s, the enrichment project realized from 
open scientific literature that the reaction of uranium hexafluoride 
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and hydrogen could cause the formation of solid uranium products 
and hydrofluoric acid (HF). However, the available public literature 
suggested that the reaction should occur only above a temperature 
of 125 centigrade, which was well above the maximum temperature 
in the Y Plant.
Yet, laboratory experiments in the early 1970s showed that the 
reaction would occur at much lower temperatures in systems simu-
lating the Y Plant cascade. These systems, which were more complex 
than those described in the open literature also contained teflon fil-
ters, which looked like top hats and were used to filter dust from 
the rings of rotary compressors, some of which were quite large. 
The filters ensured that dust did not plug or otherwise damage the 
separating elements. After 500 to 4,000 hours, these systems exhib-
ited a catastrophic catalytic reaction, where the reaction rate rose 
dramatically and HF concentrations increased rapidly. In terms of 
uranium hexafluoride gas concentration, after a slow decrease in 
the concentration, the gas concentration at the filter would quickly 
drop toward zero, signaling in essence the plugging of the filter by 
reaction products. On dismantling the test systems, the operators 
discovered that reaction products, which were a form of uranium 
tetrafluoride, were formed uniformly throughout the teflon filters.
Based on knowledge gained in the 1980s, the South African 
researchers concluded that this catalytic behavior resulted from 
chlorine contamination on the metal surfaces and in the teflon filter 
material. During the 1970s, without this knowledge, the plant oper-
ators solved the problem empirically. They polished the aluminum 
surfaces and conditioned the systems with HF and uranium hexa-
fluoride. These steps increased the “incubation” period from 500 to 
4,000-10,000 hours. The operators also learned that by replacing the 
filters, longer periods of stable plant operation could be achieved.
For example, the first block 3 prototype stage (located in build-
ing D and called “Maverick”) experienced this catastrophic loss rate 
after 500 hours. Operators stabilized Maverick’s operation by re-
placing its teflon filters.
Subsequently, almost all the stages of block 3 which was the 
first one constructed, exhibited this catastrophic loss behavior with 
incubation periods between 1,000 and 4,000 hours. Replacing the 
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filters and cleaning key equipment stabilized these stages. Because 
operators had learned to chemically clean the metal components, 
the stages in the other blocks rarely had catastrophic reactions after 
such short incubation periods.
However, losses from chemical reactions continued. According 
to Jackson, the plant experienced inexorable losses that were appar-
ently a function of the effective surface area of the cascade, where 
the filters had a much higher effective surface area than pipes and 
other metal components.
From cascade day 200 until cascade day 733 (chaos day), for ex-
ample, the plant withdrew only about half of the expected amount 
of 80 percent HEU (64 kilograms discharged vs. 130 kilograms ex-
pected). About 85 percent of this difference could be attributed to 
losses stemming from a range of chemical reactions and other losses 
of uranium material.42 The chemical losses included catastrophic re-
actions on filters, non- catastrophic reactions on filters, and to losses 
during decommissioning and maintenance of stages. As of the early 
1990s, no satisfactory mechanism was identified to explain the rest 
of the losses.
An unusual phenomenon occurred at the top end of the cascade, 
where the catastrophic reaction in the filters led to small greenish 
black agglomerations within the filter rather than a uniform dis-
tribution as in the lower blocks.43 South African scientists did not 
identify the uranium products on these filters, and they could not 
reproduce this phenomena in the laboratory using natural uranium. 
They concluded that the most probable reason for the agglomera-
tions was a combination of radiation chemistry effects associated 
with the higher radiation from HEU and the higher concentration 
of impurities at the top end of the cascade. In total, during this ini-
tial period prior to chaos day, about 13.5 kilograms of uranium 235 
were estimated to have ended in these agglomerations in the filters 
in blocks 4 and 5, of which about 85 percent was in block 5.44 This 
loss accounted for almost 30 percent of the total losses in uranium 
235 experienced during this initial period leading up to chaos day.
Because of the relatively large amount of high quality HEU ma-
terial deposited on filters in blocks 4 and 5, South Africa instituted 
a recovery program. Because these blocks contained only about 15 
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percent of the teflon filters, in the plant, the vast majority of the 
filters were stored without recovery. In total, these discarded filters 
contained a significant amount of enriched uranium that would ul-
timately take years to accurately measure.
Given all this experience with unexpected chemical reactions, 
why did chaos day occur? Why did the operators use untested do-
mestically produced uranium hexafluoride? According to Jackson, 
although they did not know at that time that chlorine was the cat-
alytic agent, he and others argued against using the new material. 
However, they were overruled.
After the August 1979 crash, the plant operators learned that 
a similar event could be prevented by using only high purity ura-
nium hexafluoride and managing the reaction problem carefully. 
The conversion plant that turned yellowcake into uranium hexa-
fluoride removed trace impurities at the end of the process rather 
than near its beginning. The uranium hexafluoride was sampled 
for impurities and any material not meeting rigorous specifications 
was recycled back through the purification process. Operators care-
fully measured the enrichment levels in the blocks and monitored 
the uranium buildup on the filters with a unique, highly collimated 
gamma- radiation detector. The result was that the operators could 
recognize when a filter was becoming overloaded with uranium and 
needed to be replaced with a fresh one before the catalytic reactions 
could get out of hand. In this way, the operators avoided another 
chaos day and reduced the losses from chemical reactions.
An inadvertent result of this careful record keeping was that the 
daily operating records were both detailed and maintained over the 
whole life of the plant. Later, chapter 10 will discuss how fortunate 
it was for the IAEA’s verification effort in the early 1990s that South 
Africa preserved these records, particularly given the uranium losses 
in the Y Plant and the lack of accurate records about the amount of 




With the resumption of 80 percent HEU production in July 1981, 
the Y Plant started to significantly increase its output. It also started 
to make weapons- grade uranium, or uranium enriched over 90 per-
cent, in late 1982. HEU production was further increased with the 
installation of improved enrichment separating elements.
Until the Y Plant shut down on February 15, 1990, it produced 
in total about 990 kilograms of HEU with an average enrichment 
of 68 percent, according to South Africa’s March 1994 completeness 
report to the IAEA. Table 3.1 shows the forms of this HEU and some 
information about its use. Table 3.2 lists the amount of HEU South 
Africa assigned to its major programs by 1991.45
The South African nuclear weapons program received about 
478 kilograms of HEU (average enrichment about 87.4 percent). Of 
this amount, about 88 kilograms ended up in scrap and were recy-
cled, and about 6 kilograms were lost.
The other major program to which South Africa assigned 
HEU prior to the closure of the Y Plant was the US- supplied, 20 
megawatt- thermal (MWth) Safari-1 reactor, located at Pelindaba. 
This program was assigned about 215 kilograms of HEU (average 
enrichment 46 percent by September 1991). About 85 kilograms of 
this HEU had been sent to the Safari reactor. About four kilograms 
of this HEU were lost during the processing of the fuel. The rest was 
stored.
Almost 170 kilograms of HEU were used to blend up stocks 
of low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in domestic power reac-
tors. Of this amount, 92 kilograms were 90 percent enriched. This 
blending operation was done in the late 1980s, when South Africa 
had developed an excess of HEU for its nuclear weapons program. 
The second blending operation used HEU with an average enrich-
ment of 28 percent that was drained from the Y Plant cascade after 
shutdown.
When South Africa signed the NPT in 1991, it had an HEU in-
ventory of over 800 kilograms with an average enrichment of about 
70 percent (see Table 3.1). The vast bulk of this HEU was not irradi-
ated and was in readily usable forms.
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TABLE 3.1: HEU PRODUCTION IN THE Y PLANT, IN KILOGRAMS
HEU Produced in Y Plant HEU U235
% U235 
(average)
Shipped as uranium hexafluoride 
for further processing
515 437 85%
Shipped in the form of uranium 
bearing process filters for recovery
144 60 42%
Shipped in the form of uranium 
bearing powder for recovery
93 39 42%
Used for upgrading (blending) im-
ported low enriched uranium (LEU)
92 83 90%
Used for upgrading (blending) 
domestic LEU
77 28 36%
Other(a) 72 30 42%
Total 993 677 68%
(a) This category includes HEU in additional scrap, cold traps, powders, and 
filters, and recalculated or re-estimated HEU quantities not included in the 
initial declaration given to the IAEA in 1991 but added prior to March 1994. 
A fraction of this HEU is difficult to recover economically into a usable form 
and is likely considered waste. Adjustments in the total HEU stock made after 
1994 or 1995 are not included but are less than 100 kg.
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TABLE 3.2: HEU ASSIGNED TO MAJOR PROGRAMS, SEPTEMBER 1991, IN KG(a)
Major Programs HEU U 235
%U 235
(average)
Nuclear Weapons Program 478 418 87.4%(b)
Safari Reactor Fuel Program    
 Sent to Safari 83 38 46%
 Stored elsewhere 130 60 46%
 Subtotal 213 98 46%
Protea (zero power reactor) 5 2.3 46%
Blending 169 111 66%
 Total 865 629 73%
(a) The difference between the amount of HEU produced by the Y Plant and 
the quantity assigned to major programs is 128 kilograms. Most of this ma-
terial was stored. Small amounts of HEU in this category were used in other 
programs and about 10 kilograms were classified as lost during processing. 
South Africa stated in 1991 that the Y Plant produced about 921 kilograms 
of HEU, which implies that about 55 kilograms of usable or recoverable 
HEU were not assigned to major programs. The other 70 kilograms of HEU 
were recovered, identified, or measured after the Y Plant closed.
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EMERGENCE OF A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
The 1970s witnessed a steady movement in the South African gov-
ernment to deciding to create deliverable nuclear weapons. This 
movement was motivated primarily by South Africa’s worsening 
security situation in Southern Africa, growing isolation internation-
ally, and the opportunities offered by a steadily growing nuclear 
weapons capability. The process was greatly accelerated by the dis-
covery and international condemnation of South Africa’s nuclear 
test site in 1977.
KALAHARI NUCLEAR TEST SITE
In 1970 PNE program leaders told senior government officials that 
a full- scale test would be necessary to be certain that the nuclear 
device design would work. Since PNEs were planned, a full- scale 
underground test also made sense as a way to better understand 
the effects of a nuclear explosive. As a result, the government ap-
proved the construction of an underground test site that needed to 
be ready by 1977, when it was originally believed there would be 
enough highly enriched uranium.
In 1973 as work progressed on the gun- type device at the Pe-
lindaba and Somerset West sites, the AEB started intensively looking 
for a suitable test site to conduct underground nuclear tests. In 1974 
an acceptable remote site under the control of the military north of 
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Upington in Upper Cape Province was selected. Additional land was 
purchased to expand the size of the test site, which was named the 
Vastrap site. The military controlled and developed the site, since 
any AEB presence at such a remote site would immediately raise 
suspicions.
By 1976 the first test shaft was drilled to a depth of 385 meters 
and 0.9 meters in diameter. The shaft was drilled by a renovated 
mining drill. A second shaft with a depth of 216 meters was finished 
in 1977. As scheduled, all facilities at Vastrap were ready by the mid-
dle of 1977. South African officials thought that they had made the 
conspicuous drilling equipment to look like it was part of creating 
an underground military munitions depot.1
In mid-1977, the AEB produced a gun- type device without an 
HEU core. The device was large — 4.4 meters long, 0.61 meters in 
diameter, and weighed 3,450 kilograms. It was so large in part to 
accommodate numerous scientific and engineering studies, some 
of which would have taken place in side tunnels off the vertical 
shafts, according to a former senior member of the nuclear weapons 
program.
As discussed earlier, the Y Plant was operating by this time, 
but it had not yet produced enough weapons- grade uranium for a 
device. As has happened in nuclear weapons programs in other na-
tions, the development of the devices outpaced the production of the 
fissile material.
A “cold test,” namely a test of an identical nuclear explosive 
device, except with a core made out of depleted or natural uranium 
instead of HEU, was planned for August 1977. The test was to be a 
fully instrumented underground test, albeit one without a nuclear 
explosive yield. Its major purpose was to test the logistical plans for 
an actual detonation. All the instrumentation trailers, instrumenta-
tion cables, and all other equipment were installed by early August.2 
However, the mock device had not yet been delivered from Pelind-
aba, although it was being readied for shipment to the site.
How that test was detected in 1977 has been well publicized. The 
Soviet Union was closely watching South Africa’s growing nuclear 
capabilities. It had placed a spy high in the South African Defense 
Force (SADF), Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, commander of the 
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Simonstown Naval Base near Cape Town. The naval barrel for the 
initial tests at Somerset West came from this naval base, according 
to a former member of the effort at Somerset West. Gerhardt was 
arrested as a Soviet spy in 1982 and went to prison. In an interview 
after his release, he said that the Soviets had expressed their con-
cern about South Africa’s nuclear program to the United States a 
year earlier.3 A Russian contact told him that the Soviet Union and 
the United States met about the South African weapons program in 
1976. During this meeting, the Soviets presented evidence of South 
Africa’s nuclear program and asked for US cooperation in stopping 
it. Gerhardt said that one of several options mentioned by the Rus-
sians was a preemptive military strike on the Y Plant. He said the 
United States rejected that option.
By the summer of 1977, Soviet intelligence detected test prepa-
rations and, in early August, alerted the United States. Although the 
South Africans were trying to conceal their activities at the test site, 
they admitted later that certain aspects were distinctive to a nuclear 
test and could not be camouflaged.4 US intelligence quickly con-
firmed the existence of the test site. The Washington Post quoted a 
US official: “I’d say we were 99 percent certain that the construction 
was preparation for an atomic test.”5 All the major powers assumed 
that South Africa was preparing for a full- scale nuclear test, evi-
dently unaware that it still did not have enough HEU.
During August 1977, the Western nations pressed South Africa 
not to test. The United States presented some of its evidence about 
the test site to the South African government. An August 19, 1977 
letter from the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to R.F. Botha, Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, provided the geographic coordinates of the 
test site and key features of the test site, based on imagery.6 Accord-
ing to the letter, the site consisted of:
• A drill rig and associated facilities;
• A square lattice tower in a cleared area enclosed by a wall, 
about one kilometer from the drill rig;
• An area, about 3 kilometers from the square tower, con-
taining a pad; this area is connected to the tower area by 
power or communications lines;
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• A secured housing area 15 kilometers from the tower area, 
containing approximately ten buildings; and
• A hard- surface airstrip approximately 1,600 meters long 
and three kilometers from the housing area. In addition, 
the entire area is surrounded by an outer patrol road.
The French foreign minister warned on August 22 of grave con-
sequences for French- South African relations. Although he did not 
elaborate, his statement implied that France was willing to cancel 
its recent contract to provide South Africa with the Koeberg nuclear 
power reactors.
The international reaction startled the South African govern-
ment. It had led itself to believe that its testing program would not 
“lead to excessive international reaction,” according to J. W. de Vil-
liers, the past President and Chairman of the Board of the AEB.7 
This belief was based on the muted reaction to India’s 1974 nuclear 
explosive test.
One of the biggest surprises was that the United States insisted 
on inspecting the Kalahari site, causing panic in the PNE program.8 
To prevent such an inspection revealing the activities at the site, the 
program launched “a crash program to dismount and remove crit-
ical equipment that could not be explained for military use.”9 The 
site was cleared within a few days and the two test shafts sealed. 
Ironically, an inspection did not take place. However, according to 
three former leaders of the nuclear weapons program mentioned 
earlier, Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, and Jan van Loggeren-
berg, “It was now obvious that the testing of nuclear devices for civil 
applications could no longer be executed even in secret.” 10 Any hope 
for a civil PNE program ended that August. By this time, however, 
the PNE program had gained enough knowledge to realize that a 
full- scale test was not necessary to prove the design, as it had be-
lieved in 1970.
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GROWING MILITARY INTEREST AND PERCEIVED THREAT
In parallel to the test site preparations, the mid-1970s witnessed the 
military’s increased interest in the nuclear program. As discussed, 
P.W. Botha, the then Defense Minister, said that he started secret dis-
cussions about obtaining nuclear weapons in 1975 and had further 
conversations in 1976, during which the need for tactical weapons 
came to the forefront.”11 In 1976 the South African air force publicly 
announced that Buccaneer bombers had practiced nuclear weapon 
delivery techniques, characterizing one exercise as employing “com-
puterized techniques to deliver nuclear bombs and escape the effect 
of the resulting explosion.”12 In July 1977, right before the discovery 
of the test site, Botha ordered the development of national strategic 
guidelines for nuclear weapons.13
A number of factors appear to have motivated this increased 
military interest, including the government’s growing perceived 
threat to apartheid South Africa posed by Angola and Mozambique, 
which were receiving Soviet backing; pressure on Namibia (which 
was then controlled by South Africa) by black African nationalists; 
and diminishing military confidence in the Atomic Energy Board’s 
handling of the PNE program.
The South African government’s security situation was seriously 
aggravated following Portugal’s hasty departure from Mozam-
bique and Angola in 1974-1975.14 In 1975 the Russian and Cuban 
militaries intervened in Angola and helped to install a Marxist- 
oriented regime with close ties to Mozambique, Zambia, and two 
anti- apartheid movements, the South West African People’s Orga-
nization (SWAPO) and the ANC. Pretoria feared that these former 
colonies would become staging areas for a direct Soviet- backed in-
vasion, perhaps involving both Cuban and black African military 
forces. The stage was set for military clashes across southern Africa 
that would last until 1988.
Regardless of the merits of South Africa’s position at the time, 
South African government officials often expressed bitterness and 
disillusionment with the actions of the US government following the 
withdrawal of Portugal from Angola. At the time, South Africa saw 
itself as aligned with the West against what it perceived to be com-
munist expansion in southern Africa, and in 1975, had intervened 
CHAPTER 4
78
militarily in Angola with covert support from the US Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA). Meanwhile, the US Senate, in the wake of 
investigations into controversial CIA activities and critical media 
reports revealing the covert Angolan aid, voted to ban US military 
aid to any Angolan party.15
South African leaders felt betrayed. According to Chester 
Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
“Pretoria blasted what it saw to be Western flakiness, if not perfidy, 
and pulled out of Angola [in 1976] after cutting a side deal” with 
Angola.16 The Angolan episode, according to Crocker, had a trau-
matic effect in South Africa, prompting a “sentiment of revenge for 
past humiliation and an abiding suspicion of Western diplomacy.”17
The South African military, in particular, reportedly felt strongly 
betrayed by the sudden halting of US covert assistance during the 
Angolan crisis.18 The shift in US policy against what South Africa 
viewed as a well- orchestrated communist threat, strengthened the 
hand of those who believed that South Africa needed nuclear weap-
ons to protect its security. To Pretoria, South Africa was standing 
virtually alone against a “total onslaught” by black insurgents and 
radical black African states supported by the Soviet Union and its 
allies.19
The hostile international reaction to the August 1977 disclosure 
by the Soviet Union and the United States that South Africa was 
preparing to conduct a nuclear explosive test in the Kalahari Des-
ert shifted the focus of the PNE program and further contributed 
to the push for a military nuclear program. Although members of 
the PNE program worried that the discovery of the test site would 
lead to the cancellation of the entire program, the government de-
cided to delay the test for an undetermined period and continue the 
refinement, miniaturization, and transportability of the existing nu-
clear device.20 It began to see a nuclear test as a way to demonstrate 
a political and military message to further South Africa’s national 
security goals. South Africa’s political leadership tended to have a 
confrontational attitude to resolving political conflicts, according to 
a former senior member of the nuclear weapons program.
Soon after the test site was closed, Johan Slabber, the leader 
of the nuclear explosive program, was ordered to design a smaller, 
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lighter device.21 According to Slabber, he and his colleagues received 
an order to develop a device that could be tested in 24 hours after re-
ceiving notice.22 The implication was that a redesigned device would 
be small enough to be weaponized. Despite not knowing the exact 
intentions of the leadership, the team was reportedly energized by 
this order and stopped thinking just in terms of a peaceful nuclear 
explosive program 23 The team finished a smaller device in 1978 that 
was about half the size and weighed about one- fifth less of the first 
device (see figure 4.1).
The initial rationale for a smaller device was to allow for its 
rapid transportation to the test site and its detonation underground. 
Thus, the reaction to the international pressure was not to con-
vince South Africa to forgo testing, but to be able to test successfully 
before the international community could intervene to stop it. In 
essence, the government wanted to control the initial military and 
political message of a test.
Figure 4.1 Comparison of the relative size of the two nuclear test devices devel-
oped by South Africa in the 1970s. Source: André Buys
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The only data collected from the test would be the device’s 
explosive yield and radioactive releases.24 The heavy gear over the 
shafts, the instrumentation cable trenches, and the instrumentation 
site were eliminated.25
The yield of the second device was lower than the first one.26 
This reduction in yield may have resulted from its miniaturization.
If a test had occurred in the 1970s (and 1980s), it may have re-
leased a substantial amount of radiation into the atmosphere, based 
on a recently declassified South African document. This document 
uses the codename Gardenia for the combination of this first device 
and the placement and control systems, characterizing the test as 
“dirty.”27 What this means is not clear in the document, although the 
document discusses that backfilling the shafts was not possible, im-
plying that the radioactive material would be blown out the top of a 
shaft. Moreover, the South African decision makers in 1987 wanted 
to replace this device with a new one and a renovated test shaft that 
would be “capable of being used for a refilled clean underground 
demonstration test.” Moreover, the document states: “The Gardenia 
system was engineered for an OPEN (caps in original) underground 
test explosion. This means that there would be a considerable radio-
active release into the atmosphere during such a test.” The level of 
expected radioactive releases is not quantified in the document, and 
may have been relatively small. By the 1980s, when the document 
was prepared, any venting from the test site would likely be viewed 
as worrisome. However, the document appears to contradict that 
benign assessment.
Looking back, it would not be surprising to conclude that the 
PNE program was less sensitive about potential radioactive fallout 
from its use of nuclear explosives than nuclear programs today, or 
even a decade later. After all, if the program had ever deployed a 
nuclear explosive to make, for example, a mine, the ensuing blasts 
would have released a large amount of radioactive materials into 
the environment. In fact, such expected releases were a key reason 
PNE programs were cancelled worldwide.
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GROWING PUBLIC AWARENESS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
The revelations about the test site exposed to the South African 
public and the rest of the world what was thought to be a secret 
program. This awareness led to widespread debate about what was 
generally perceived as a South African nuclear weapons program, 
although the government publicly and diplomatically denied the ex-
istence of any such program. This public and international debate 
served the purpose of creating ambiguity, and this ambiguity be-
came one of the nuclear weapon program’s cornerstones.
In South Africa, the exposure led to increased public and aca-
demic discussions about the potential role of South African nuclear 
weapons, albeit with disclaimers that the exact status of the nu-
clear weapons program was unknown. For example, analyses of the 
relative pros and cons of building nuclear weapons by M. Hough 
and Denis Venter, two South African political scientists, tended to 
conclude that nuclear weapons offered limited strategic and few po-
litical advantages.28 In their view, the possession of nuclear weapons 
could provoke a strong Russian reaction. On the other hand, if South 
Africa’s conventional superiority eroded and the military situation 
on South Africa’s borders intensified, a South African bomb could 
help equalize any conventional imbalance against South Africa. Be-
cause such a possibility appeared unlikely in the foreseeable future, 
however, these authors opposed a South African nuclear weapon. 
Nevertheless, they also argued that South Africa should keep its op-
tions open and not sign the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.29
In one of the best known articles of that time, Dr. Lukas Daniel 
Barnard, then a professor at the University of the Orange Free State 
and later head of the National Intelligence Service argued that South 
Africa should acquire nuclear weapons.30 Barnard concluded that 
South Africa could no longer depend on the West for its security. 
Citing Western opposition to apartheid and weak leadership, he said 
that it would be wise to obtain nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons 
would not add significantly to South Africa’s international isolation 
but could bolster its security, both as a back up to the country’s 
conventional forces and as a deterrent to invasion. Because the de-
terrence value of nuclear weapons depended on the perception of 
that capability, Barnard advocated that South Africa build nuclear 
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weapons and ensure that the world knew that it had them. More-
over, since South Africa could be expected to face a growing threat 
to its security, it should build the weapons immediately, because it 
probably would be too late to build them when a “nuclear crisis 
really lands on our doorstep.” Even a small nuclear arsenal would 
suffice, as the French “force de frappe” demonstrated: “Even mighty 
nuclear powers are only too aware of the phenomenal destructive 
power of a single nuclear warhead in industrial heartlands or urban 
centers.” While key officials may have shared Barnard’s views of the 
need for nuclear weapons, Botha in particular did not believe open-
ness would serve South Africa’s interests.
As support for nuclear weapons was growing among South 
Africa’s white elite and military, the international community was 
becoming increasingly alarmed by the revelations. In response, the 
United Nations took additional steps to impose sanctions on South 
Africa.
In November 1977, the UN Security Council approved unani-
mously a resolution to make mandatory a military arms embargo 
on South Africa that had been voluntary since 1963.31 While citing 
apartheid as a reason for this action, this resolution also expressed 
“grave concern that South Africa is at the threshold of producing 
nuclear weapons” and declared that all states “shall refrain from 
any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and develop-
ment of nuclear weapons.” One year later, the UN General Assembly 
recommended that the Security Council impose an oil embargo on 
South Africa, which depends heavily on oil imports. Although the 
Security Council refused, the General Assembly endorsed a volun-
tary oil embargo in 1979.
Despite opposition from many nations, including the United 
States, Japan, and Canada, the IAEA Board of Governors in June 
1977 voted to remove South Africa from the list of candidates for 
the Board and replace it with Egypt. Two years later, South Africa 
was denied participation in the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy’s (IAEA’s) General Assembly. Both actions resulted from South 
Africa’s apartheid policies and its refusal to submit all of its nuclear 
facilities to IAEA inspection.
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There were a range of efforts in the mid- to- late 1970s to deny 
South Africa sensitive nuclear goods. Most significantly, the United 
States cut off nuclear assistance for the Safari-1 research reactor in 
1976 and enrichment services for the Koeberg nuclear power reac-
tors in 1978 32
According to Waldo Stumpf, the former head of the Atomic 
Energy Corporation (the successor organization to the AEB), the 
cutoff of US nuclear assistance in the 1970s was viewed very neg-
atively since these specific reactors already were subject to IAEA 
safeguards.33 The cutoff of US and other countries’ nuclear aid did 
not disrupt the nuclear explosive effort, however. These actions 
were perceived within the South African government as motivated 
primarily by opposition to apartheid, reinforcing the view within 
the government that South Africa had little to gain from stopping its 
nuclear weapons program or joining the NPT, unless it first ended 
apartheid and made other fundamental domestic changes. More im-
portantly, according to Tielman de Waal, former managing director 
of Armscor, “These circumstances led to the conviction that in the 
event of a direct threat to its territorial integrity, the Government 
would not be able to rely on international assistance. The option 
of developing a nuclear deterrent became increasingly attractive.”34 
The military embargo also empowered those in South Africa that 
wanted to intensify indigenous military industries and couple those 
efforts with an active sanctions busting program to acquire neces-
sary goods aboard.
THE DECISION TO CREATE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
The South African government’s shift to a more formal military em-
phasis occurred in 1977 and 1978. In 1977 the government ordered 
the creation of national strategic guidelines, as mentioned above, 
which were first discussed by the government in August 1977; how-
ever, they were not approved formally until April 1978.35
The growing militarization of the nuclear device coincided with 
a change in government. In September 1978, Prime Minister Vor-
ster resigned because of a financial scandal, and he was replaced by 
P.W. (Pieter Willem) Botha, who had been Defense Minister since 
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1966, a portfolio he maintained for two years after becoming head 
of government. Botha was a proud nationalist who had presided 
over the build- up and modernization of the South African Defense 
Forces and the growing Armscor military- industrial complex that 
supported it.
According to a declassified 1979 CIA assessment, he had:
Advocated more than any other Cabinet officer the military 
components of South Africa’s strategy for coping with possi-
ble external threats. He has regarded the West as unwilling to 
support South Africa against foreign threats that he has per-
ceived to be growing. Moreover, he has probably sympathized 
with views that nuclear weapons might ultimately be needed. 
However, he probably has not foreseen any imminent military 
requirement for nuclear weapons or any political advantages to 
disclosing particular elements of South African nuclear weapons 
capabilities at this time [1979].36
Botha was a strong supporter of building nuclear weapons but 
also of not revealing them. In October 1978, one month after taking 
office, Botha appointed a cabinet committee to oversee the military 
aspects of nuclear devices that quickly decided that Armscor, the 
Defense Force, and the AEB should work together and prepare a 
program to start a nuclear weapons program.37 Armscor officials 
state that the resulting “Action Committee,” chaired by a senior de-
fense official and composed of Armscor, the Defense Force, and the 
AEB, recommended future plans for producing nuclear weapons, 
based on the AEB designs.38
Faced with an enormous challenge, the Action Committee es-
tablished several working groups to evaluate in detail the needs of a 
military nuclear program. One group developed a national nuclear 
strategy, which is discussed in chapter 6. Other working groups fo-
cused on:39
• The test site and possible tests;
• Security;
• The integration of the work forces of the three different 
institutions;
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• Safety issues; and
• Possible delivery systems for the nuclear devices.
Botha approved the Action Committee’s proposal of the in-
tended weapons and facilities on July 4, 1979.40 The nuclear weapons 
program was codenamed Project Festival.
Armscor believed it could do this task more effectively and eco-
nomically than the AEB. Armscor officials viewed the AEB program 
as essentially a scientific exercise. The AEB for its part did not be-
lieve it had a mandate to weaponize the devices, the critical new 
mandate. As a result, the government assigned Armscor the task of 
turning the device into weapon systems.41 Its subsidiary Kentron, 
which made advanced weapons and missiles, took responsibility for 
building the nuclear weapons.
Significantly, Armscor believed that a nuclear weapon was a 
combination of the nuclear device and a delivery system. According 
to senior Armscor officials, they did not refer to the nuclear device 
as a nuclear weapon.
The decision to make nuclear weapons required the three 
groups to coordinate, and fulfill specific responsibilities:
• Armscor would make the deliverable nuclear devices, fo-
cusing initially on the development and production of a 
number of deliverable gun- type devices. It also conducted 
studies of implosion and thermonuclear technology, in-
cluding “boosted” devices.
• The Atomic Energy Board would provide the nuclear 
explosive materials health physics support, theoretical 
studies, and contribute to the development of more ad-
vanced nuclear weapons technologies. The AEB was 
also given the new responsibility for evaluating methods 
to produce and recover plutonium and tritium and pro-
duce lithium used in making tritium and in thermonuclear 
weapons. The Atomic Energy Corporation focused on the 
design of a 150-megawatt pressurized- water research and 
development reactor to be built at Gouriqua, near Mossel-
bay in the Cape Province, to make plutonium and tritium. 
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It also planned to build a facility at Pelindaba to handle tri-
tium, a difficult to handle radioactive material. In essence, 
the Reactor Development Division returned to its original 
mandate of building a reactor. Only this time, it was to 
support a nuclear weapons effort.
• The South African Defense Force was responsible for 
providing the delivery vehicles, logistical arrangements, 
communications, and the deployment of the nuclear weap-
ons. In practice, this task went to the Air Force, which was 
developing a television- guided long- range glide bomb, 
called the h3 and later the Raptor, which would become the 
delivery system for the nuclear device. The Air Force devel-
oped special logistics facilities at its bases for the storage, 
handling, maintenance, and support of nuclear weapons.42
Representatives of the SADF, AEB, and Armscor coordinated 
their efforts through a senior level management committee, most 
likely the Action Committee or its successor. The government 
controlled the entire nuclear weapons program through a special 
Committee of Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister and later the 
State President.
This shift to Armscor’s making of the nuclear devices saw the 
phase out of the AEB’s PNE program and the closure of most of its 
buildings and activities. Most of the PNE personnel went back to 
civil nuclear pursuits at the main Pelindaba site or joined the new 
reactor project. One exception was that building 5100 continued to 
house the nuclear weapons program’s small theoretical group until 
1988 or 1989.
The transfer of the program to Armscor in essence “froze” the 
design of the nuclear core of the gun- type device. Armscor concen-
trated on turning the device into a qualified military weapon at a 
new facility to be called Circle, the name perhaps signifying South 
Africa “circling the wagons.”
EMERGENCE OF A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
87
NOTES
1. Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, and Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament 
and Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: 
Network Publishers, 2003), p. 41.
2. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 41.
3. Interview with Dieter Gerhardt, March 9, 1994.
4. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 42.
5. Murray Marder and Don Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S. 
African A- Test,” The Washington Post, August 28, 1977, p. Al.
6. Letter from US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to South African Minister of 
Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha, August 19, 1977. Letter available in Nic von Wielligh 
and Lydia von Wielligh- Steyn, The Bomb (Pretoria: Litera Publications, 2015) 
and at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114153
7. Quoted in Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their 
Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 9-10.
8. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 42. For the US request to inspect the 
site, see August 19th letter from Vance to Botha, op. cit.
9. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 42.
10. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 42.
11. Prime Minister P.W. Botha, Draft Speech for the Opening of Kentron Circle, 
May 4, 1981, in Afrikaans. Original in Nic von Wielligh and Lydia von Wielligh- 
Steyn, Die Bom (South Africa: Litera Puasies, 2014), Appendix, translated by 
Schreiber Translations, Inc. for Institute for Science and International Security, 
July 7, 2015.
12. Quoted in Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear 
Security Policies and Programs, National Intelligence Estimate, October 5, 1984, 
declassified version.
13. Draft Speech for the Opening of Kentron Circle, op. cit.
14. The Portuguese military seized power in Lisbon in April 1974 and decided 
to abandon Portugal's colonies, Angola and Mozambique, after more than a 
decade of failing to subdue indigenous nationalist forces.
15. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 417.
16. Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 1992), p. 50.
CHAPTER 4
88
17. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, op. cit., p. 56.
18. Interviews with former members of the South African nuclear weapons 
program, February 1994.
19. Director of Central Intelligence, Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security 
Policies, op. cit.
20. Draft Speech for the Opening of Kentron Circle, op. cit.
21. Interview with a senior official close to the IAEA knowledgeable about 
Slabber’s and other South Africans statements to the IAEA in 1993 following 
President de Klerk’s announcement.
22. Timothy McDonnell, “International Conference: the Historical Dimensions 
of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program” (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson 
Center, January 4, 2013). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international- 
conference- the- historical- dimensions- south- africas- nuclear- weapons- program
23. Interview with a senior official close to the IAEA knowledgeable about 
Slabber’s and other South Africans statements, op. cit.
24. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 43.
25. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 42
26. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 41.
27. Presentation to Witvlei Committee: Kramat Capability: Current Status 
and Further Developments, by Lt. Gen. F.E.C. van den Berg, Chairman, 
Coordinating Sub- Committee, September 3, 1987, in Afrikaans, Original in Die 
Bom, op. cit.
28. Denis Venter, “South Africa and the International Controversy Surrounding 
its Nuclear Capability,” Politikon, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1978; and M. Hough, 
“Deterrence and Deterrence Interaction with Reference to the South African 
Situation,” Politikon, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1978.
29. This type of opposition to signing the NPT was also expressed in a secret 
May 14, 1981 memorandum from the South African embassy in Washington, 
D.C., which was leaked to the US- based non- governmental organization 
Trans Africa: “It must be realized that South Africa is threatened by the USSR 
and its associates and by certain African countries with Soviet support and 
encouragement. South Africa has no hope of any assistance from the UN in 
case of attack. On the contrary, it is continually being threatened with action 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. While this state of 
affairs continues, South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the 
NPT and thus set the minds of its would- be attackers at rest, allowing them to 
proceed freely with their plans against us.”
EMERGENCE OF A MILITARY NUCLEAR PROGRAM
89
30. Lukas Daniel Barnard, “Die Afskrikkingstrategie van Kernwapens” (“The 
Deterrent Strategy of Nuclear Weapons”), Journal for Contemporary History 
and International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2, Sept 1977, pp. 74-97 (translated into 
English).
31. UN Security Council, “The Question of South Africa,” S/RES/418 (1977), 
November 7, 1977.
32. During the Reagan administration, certain limited nuclear assistance 
occurred.
33. Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” undated, p. 
9. An edited version of this paper is in Kathleen C. Bailey, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Costs versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and 
Distributers, 1994), pp. 63-81.
34. Tielman de Waal, “South Africa's Past Nuclear Program” (paper presented at 
a press briefing in South Africa, April 6, 1995).
35. Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” op. cit.; and Interviews 
with former members of the nuclear weapons program.
36. Director of Central Intelligence, The 22 September 1979 Event, Interagency 
Intelligence Memorandum, December 1979, Declassified version obtained 
through Freedom of Information Act by Natural Resources Defense Council and 
released July 10, 1990.
37. Armaments and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 43.
38. Armscor officials, personal interviews 1994 and 1995; and Reiss, Bridled 
Ambition, op. cit., p. 9. These discussions involved only senior officials. The AEB 
personnel involved in the nuclear explosive program were told of the formal 
shift to a military emphasis in November 1978. See also Draft Speech for the 
Opening of Kentron Circle, op. cit. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 43.
39. Armscor officials, personal interviews 1994 and 1995; and Reiss, Bridled 
Ambition, op. cit., p. 9. These discussions involved only senior officials. The AEB 
personnel involved in the nuclear explosive program were told of the formal 
shift to a military emphasis in November 1978. See also Draft Speech for the 
Opening of Kentron Circle, op. cit. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., p. 43.
40. Draft Speech for the Opening of Kentron Circle, op. cit.
41. Interview with a former member of nuclear weapons program, Spring 1994.
42. Armament and Disarmament, op. cit., pp. 74-80. The authors describe the 
South African nuclear weapons program more broadly and include other SADF 
units, in particular the ballistic missile units. As will be discussed later, South 




At the commissioning of the Kentron Circle facility on May 4, 1981, 
Prime Minister P.W. Botha told the highly secretive and selective 
crowd: “The time has come when the South African “Plowshare” 
must be forged into a sword, for the battle that awaits.”1 Circle was 
to be South Africa’s own nuclear weapons research, development, 
and manufacturing facility dedicated to the creation of nuclear 
weapon systems. The facility was under the control of the defense 
establishment, which wanted fully weaponized, deliverable nuclear 
weapons.
Botha delivered his speech by the new high security vault in-
side the Circle building, designed to securely store nuclear weapons. 
According to a senior official present at the commissioning, in front 
of him was arrayed nuclear weapons components and a prototype 
mock- up of a warhead for a sophisticated glide bomb under devel-
opment by Armscor.
Botha likened Circle to Los Alamos and Livermore National 
Laboratories, centers of US nuclear weapons research and devel-
opment. In practical terms, however, Circle functioned more like 
Sandia National Laboratories. It concentrated on refining the parts 
of the nuclear weapon that are outside the central nuclear core or 
pit, and ensured warhead reliability, safety, and security.
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Botha told the audience that a nuclear weapon is “primarily a 
political weapons system, not a military system.” It is a weapon of 
“inducement, persuasion, and compulsion in the hands of the lead-
ers of the world,” he added. “This political weapon opens a new 
possibility,” namely “the option for the RSA to stipulate its birth-
right at the negotiating table of the Greats, with nuclear deterrence 
strategy as its foundation.”2 At the end of his speech, Botha pre-
sented a commemorative plaque which reportedly read: “For all 
South Africans.”3
Botha was followed by André Buys, Circle’s first Plant Man-
ager. Buys’ task was to describe all the sensitive items in front of the 
esteemed audience, which included several cabinet ministers. Off- 
script for such a momentous occasion, he also raised doubts about 
whether South Africa’s nuclear program had an adequate nuclear 
strategy. Implicit in his comments was the need for more thorough 
guidance on the type and number of nuclear weapons that needed to 
be built and how they would be used in a crisis. Afterwards, at the 
reception, Buys said that Botha ignored him but F.W. de Klerk, who 
attended as Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, came up to him 
and said that he liked what Buys had said. Buys was struck with a 
suspicion that there could be a split at the highest level of govern-
ment about the nuclear weapons program.
THE CIRCLE FACILITY
Armscor built the Kentron Circle facility utilizing a design by a 
leader of the AEB PNE team. The Circle facility, located about 15 
kilometers east of Pelindaba, essentially duplicated under one roof, 
most of the development and manufacturing capabilities in the val-
ley below Pelindaba. However, Armscor did not duplicate the AEB’s 
facilities to conduct criticality or dragon experiments. The focus was 
on making deliverable nuclear weapons utilizing a core developed at 
the AEB in the late 1970s.
Circle was built in 1980 and occupied in 1981. The facility com-
prised the Circle building itself, a nearby environmental test facility 
that was involved in ensuring that nuclear weapons could withstand 
deployment on aircraft and delivery to the target, and a magazine 
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for storing high explosives and propellants that had been disguised 
externally to hide its purpose, according to a former senior leader of 
the nuclear weapons program. Figure 5.1 shows the Circle complex 
in a commercial satellite image. Figure 5.2 shows the Circle building, 
as it appeared after the program was cancelled. Standing in the main 
entrance, figure 5.3 shows a central bay of the building.
Figure 5.1 Commercial satellite image of the Circle Complex. Visible is the main 




Figure 5.2 Main Circle building, with its main entrance visible.
Figure 5.3 Looking from the main entrance into the central bay of the Circle 
building in 2002 after building renovations following end of nuclear weapons 
program. The original personnel portal for the facility is on left.
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Circle facility was built deep within Armscor’s Gerotek site, 
which was being built at the same time (see figure 5.4). This site was 
designed to test vehicles at high speeds and on various types of road 
surfaces and grades.
A high priority was maintaining the secrecy of the nuclear 
weapons program, particularly the existence of the Circle com-
plex. According to a former senior member of the program, officials 
thought it too risky to build Circle at a nuclear or armaments man-
ufacturing site. They concluded that it must be sited on its own and 
that it should not be easily accessible to outsiders. Upon reflection, 
Gerotek seemed like a good choice. If someone asked about the 
Circle buildings, they could be identified as defense industries work-
shops. Such a question did arise in fact in the mid-1980s, when an 
American was in a test vehicle on the high speed track and asked 
about the Circle building.
Figure 5.4 The Gerotek site where the Circle facility was located. A high speed 
test track can be seen in the center of the photo. The Circle facility is on the hill-
side above the track.
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The turn- off to the Circle facility, marked only with a sign that 
said “Workshop,” is several minutes’ drive inside Gerotek’s main 
gate. Figure 5.5 shows the non- descript turnoff to Circle taken in 
2002. (The workshop sign had been removed by the time this pic-
ture was taken.) The entire site is hilly. On the hillsides can be seen 
graded tracks for testing military vehicles.
Initially, Circle was to be an underground facility. An embank-
ment was constructed around part of the facility, according to a 
former leader of the program. The satellite image in figure 5.1 and 
figure 5.6 show the berm and how the facility was dug into the hill-
side. However, this plan was quickly abandoned as too expensive.
Nonetheless, the berm remained as the only external clue to the 
potential importance of the building and blocked prying eyes from 
seeing the building from a nearby road deep within the Gerotek 
compound. Figure 5.7 shows a view of the Circle building from the 
bridge over the test track; only the top portion is visible.
Figure 5.5 Road inside Gerotek right before the turnoff to the Circle facility 
(first left). Test tracks can be seen in the distance on the hillside.
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Figure 5.6 Main entrance of the Circle building, as viewed from the top of a 
berm. Photo credit: Armscor




The exterior of the Circle building is nondescript. Advena’s 
managers blocked proposals to place sophisticated communications 
on the roof to avoid a “signature” that might attract the attention of 
intelligence agencies.
Armscor imposed a more stringent security regime on the per-
sonnel in the program than the AEB had exercised in the 1970s. 
Circle employees acted as if they could be observed by satellites. 
Employees going between Circle and Pelindaba took special precau-
tions to prevent anyone from following them or uncleared Pelindaba 
employees from seeing them enter or leave the road from the mili-
tary vehicle testing facility.4
A number of AEB personnel were transferred to Circle along 
with key manufacturing equipment. According to a leader of the 
Armscor program, others at the AEB, such as the leader of the PNE 
program and designer of Circle, remained active in providing tech-
nical advice for several years after the transfer of the program to 
Armscor. Armscor also had to recruit new engineering talent. Ac-
cording to a leader of the Armscor nuclear program, technical 
capabilities were of critical importance; however, so was recruiting 
people who were responsible and mild- mannered. He said that they 
wanted to avoid fanatics.
The AEB remained responsible for supplying highly enriched 
uranium. It also continued theoretical nuclear weapons work.5
The nuclear weapons program’s main office was at the Kentron 
headquarters, near Pretoria and staffed jointly by Armscor and Air 
Force personnel.6 It was under high security and access was care-
fully controlled. To prevent eavesdropping, a wire mesh was put 
around the office during one weekend when everyone was gone. The 
purpose of the office was unknown to others in the building; they 
just knew it was a cover for something. Given the extensive overseas 
smuggling and other secret activities undertaken by Armscor, the of-




Inside the Circle building are two floors with a total of 8,000 square 
meters of floor space. The lower floor was dedicated to developing and 
making nuclear devices. Offices and conference rooms were located on 
the second floor.
The site was designed in particular to carry out further develop-
ment and routine manufacturing of gun- type nuclear weapons. The 
building was also capable of conducting research and development of 
implosion- type nuclear weapons.
The first floor of the Circle building had conventional work-
shops for making mechanical and electrical equipment for a gun- type 
weapon; storage rooms; uranium casting and machining workshops 
for gun- type weapons; a large vault; integration rooms where portions 
of the devices were assembled; and eight thick- walled “cells” for test-
ing internal ballistics, propellants, igniters, and small quantities of high 
explosives for self- destruct mechanisms. An explosive test chamber 
located in one of the cells could handle up to 2.5 kilograms of high ex-
plosive. It was used to conduct many plane- wave high explosive tests 
and detonator experiments with shaped charges related to implosion 
designs and to develop high- speed instrumentation necessary for de-
veloping these designs. Another cell contained the “pig sty,” a wooden 
enclosure where projectile tests were done for the gun- type device.
In anticipation of an accident with high explosives, which in the 
worst case risked blowing off the roof and exposing the facility, the 
designers put a “plenum” or large room above the high explosive cells 
on the second floor. In an accident, this room would serve to dissipate 
the overpressure from an explosion, preventing the collapse of the roof 
or the walls. Holes at one end of the room would allow the explosion 
to vent. From the outside, the holes were disguised as ventilation ducts 
(see figure 5.8).
In the early 1980s, the program employed about 100 people, of 
which only about 40 were directly involved in the weapons program. 
Only 20 actually built the devices. The rest were involved in adminis-
trative support and security. Figure 5.9 shows Circle’s organizational 
structure. By the time the program was canceled in 1989, the work 




Figure 5.8 Fake ventilation ducts (left) hid holes in the walls of the second story 
plenum (right photo at back; light can be seen through these holes) designed to 
minimize damage in an accidental explosion in internal high explosive test cell. 
The holes would have served to dissipate any overpressure from an accident in 
an indoors high explosive facility. In photo on right, one of the orange blast cov-
ers over an explosive cell has been removed. These blast covers are secured by 
special bolts that are designed to break in an explosion and also reduce the de-
structive force of an accidental blast.




Armscor approached the problem of building nuclear weapons 
very differently than the AEB, which was reorganized as the Atomic 
Energy Corporation (AEC) in 1982. Comprised principally of engi-
neers and employed by the military, Armscor’s philosophy differed 
from that of the AEC, which was essentially a civilian scientific 
organization.
Armscor considered the AEB’s November 1979 device to be 
an unqualified design that could not meet the rigid safety, security, 
and reliability specifications then under development by Circle engi-
neers. Moreover, the first device was not deliverable.
The AEB device was transferred to Circle. Prior to the move, it 
had been temporarily stored in an abandoned coal mine at Witbank, 
a former military ammunitions depot. Armscor modified the device 
slightly, including re- plating the metal HEU components in 1982, 
according to South Africa’s declaration to the IAEA. The device was 
renamed Melba, and it lacked many of the safety measures of later 
devices.
Armscor implemented a capability to conduct a nuclear explo-
sive test more rapidly than the period of time required for the 1977 
test. It developed methods for quickly transporting the device to 
the Kalahari test site and placing it down the hole. The latter in-
volved special trucks with winch equipment rather than stationary 
equipment of the type used in 1977. Necessary equipment was kept 
ready at the Circle complex. According to an Armscor official, even 
the explosive yield would have been estimated only through seismic 
methods. Instrumentation would mainly be limited to that necessary 
for assessing any radioactive fallout risks to the public from the pos-
sible accidental release of material during the explosion. Although 
speed was desired, the time required to prepare the Melba test de-
vice and conduct a test would likely have been measured in days. 
Although a 24 hour deployment was the goal, Armscor officials cast 
doubt on its ability to test so quickly.
To establish an initial credible deterrent, Armscor man-
ufactured its first device in 1981 and 1982, which it considered a 
“pre- qualification” model. The HEU components had been made 
at the AEC, however. The yield was six kilotons, implying that, like 
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Melba, it contained 80 percent HEU.7 According to an Armscor offi-
cial, it was capable of being dropped from a plane. This device gave 
South Africa a way to carry out its initial nuclear strategy, which 
required deliverability, albeit primitive at this stage. It was initially 
named Hobo, but later renamed Cabot.
Armscor’s goal was to produce warheads for delivery by stand- 
off weapons launched from Buccaneer bombers. The stand- off 
weapon was the video- controlled Raptor, or h3, glide bomb with 
flip- out wings (figures 5.10 and 5.11). This highly accurate weapon 
was developed as a smart weapon for conventional use at the Ken-
tron facility at Irene, Pretoria. The range was about 60 kilometers, 
and it could be delivered with one meter accuracy.
In a nuclear mode, one or two Raptors would be mounted on 
the innermost pilings under the Buccaneer’s wing. The two outer 
pilings were for a control pod for the weapon and an anti- electronic 
warfare pod.
After firing a Raptor, the aircraft pilot and navigator would 
continuously communicate with the warhead (figure 5.12). The Rap-
tor would travel to the target and then dive in its final approach. 
A height sensor would detonate the warhead above ground as an 
airburst to reduce the amount of radioactive fallout. However, the 
warhead was not armed when it started its dive. The pilot had to 
send a signal to arm the device before the pre- determined height of 
Figure 5.10 South Africa’s 1980s nuclear delivery system, the Raptor 1, or h3, 
Glide Bomb with inertial and optical guidance. Source: Armscor
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Figure 5.11 Buccaneer with the non- nuclear Raptor 1 (h3) on the inner pylons 
(wings folded in). The h3-Comms Pod is on the starboard outer pylon and an 
ECM pod is on the port outer pylon. In nuclear strike mode, the outer pylons 
would have a control pod for the nuclear weapons and an electronic warfare 
pod. Source: Armscor, Marais
Figure 5.12 Raptor II firing procedure, which is more advanced than Raptor 1 
but similar, showing how glide bomb is delivered to a target. Source: Armscor
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detonation was reached. If no signal were received by then, the war-
head would self- destruct.
Key to Armscor’s development of nuclear weapons was reli-
ability, safety, and security.8 The system engineering department at 
Circle developed very strict qualification specifications. In addition, 
extraordinary secrecy requirements forced Circle to make many 
items in- house. As a result, according to Armscor, design refinement 
and re- qualification of the hardware took several years.
Many difficulties were encountered in the early years at Circle. 
Some of the development and production problems concerned the 
density of the neutron reflectors and the plating of uranium com-
ponents with nickel. The latter was solved only after trying many 
approaches. The neutron reflector was made using tungsten- copper, 
and many problems were confronted in building this part, which 
required a high density. Density affects the explosive yield of a nu-
clear device, according to a former senior official close to the IAEA 
knowledgeable about the South African program. In addition, much 
effort was invested in the reliability of arming and safing devices.
Ultimately, however, Armscor’s production models were highly 
reliable – they had redundancy built into the system whenever pos-
sible, and they were thoroughly qualified in terms of their internal 
ballistics and mechanical arming and safing operations.
Each nuclear device was divided into two sections, a front and 
back. With the HEU distributed between the two halves in subcrit-
ical quantities, the design minimized the possibility of accidental 
detonation or unauthorized use. Both halves had to be assembled 
together to have a nuclear explosion. In essence, the separation of 
the halves was South Africa’s key control philosophy.
The front end contained the bulk of the HEU, the neutron tam-
per, and the heavy steel mechanism to catch the projectile and ensure 
it was properly seated. It did not contain electronics or safety sys-
tems in order to avoid the need for periodic maintenance. The front 
end also did not have any components typically associated with 
starting the chain reaction in the supercritical material. A unique 
feature of South Africa’s gun- type design was that it did not use a 
neutron initiator. The devices were designed to use background, or 
stray, neutrons to initiate the chain reaction. Calculations showed 
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that the chain reaction would start within a few milliseconds after 
the HEU projectile hit the fixed HEU component. However, a down-
side is that the front end had to catch and hold the HEU projectile 
long enough for a stray neutron to start the chain reaction. Ensuring 
that one piece would fit into another and stay put required careful 
design. The front end had a relatively heavy damping component 
and a way to stop the projectile from bouncing back. With these 
design features, once a front end was built and tested, it required 
no maintenance and could remain stored in the vault. The ability 
to permanently store the front end was an important part of South 
Africa’s control philosophy to ensure that a weapon could not be 
assembled unless authorized by the State President.
The back end contained the HEU plug, the propellant, the ignit-
ors, the fusing and firing circuits, and self- destruct mechanisms. The 
back section needed maintenance by Circle personnel, requiring its 
periodic removal from the vault.
According to an Armscor official, a front and back end were 
never worked on simultaneously. Each section was kept in a sepa-
rate vault inside the main vault. Moreover, a single person could not 
open a vault where each half was stored.
Figure 5.13 shows the outer doors of the vault at Circle, as they 
appeared after the program had ended and the area had been mod-
ified. Inside the main vault are ten separate vaults on two levels 
(figure 5.14). A back and front half would not be stored in the same 
vault.
The inner and outer vault doors were equipped with a range 
of locks and control panels restricting access. Figure 5.15 shows the 
outer vault doors closed.
The vault had an inner control panel that controls the ten inner 
doors (figure 5.16). A keypad can be seen. A control panel was also 
in the plant manager’s office on the second floor of Circle. He had 
video surveillance of the vault and had to approve access to the 
vault. The doors of the inner vault had two locks (figure 5.17).
To prevent an unauthorized assembly of a whole weapon, while 
allowing periodic maintenance of the back half, the removal of the 
front end from an inner vault was tightly controlled under the au-
thority of the State President. The front half could not be removed 
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Figure 5.13 Outer doors of the high security vault at Circle, showing the inner 
vaults as they appeared on a visit by one of the authors in August 2002. The 
outer wooden doors were added after the end of the nuclear weapons program 
as part of a strategy (later abandoned) to deny the existence of the nuclear 
weapons program (see chapter 9).
Figure 5.14 The inner vaults. Source: Armscor
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Figure 5.15 Closed outer vault door and close up
Figure 5.16 Control panel inside the main vault for the inner vault doors.
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from the vault without specific orders from the President, via two 
separate military and civilian chains of command.9 Wide represen-
tation helped ensure that no one government entity could assemble 
the weapons itself. For removal, the President would give an order 
to both the Minister of Defense and Minister of Minerals and En-
ergy Affairs, who in turn would order the Chairperson of the AEC 
and the Chief of South African Defense Force to delegate their rep-
resentatives, who would each possess a code. Both codes would be 
necessary to insert into an inner vault to retrieve a front end.
The removal of the back end was easier but still required four 
people with different codes, according to a senior Armscor official. 
All four would have to be on- site. No one person had all four neces-
sary codes. The four people had to include a military representative, 
someone from the Atomic Energy Corporation, and a senior Arms-
cor official.
The President exercised one additional positive control prior to 
the delivery of an assembled weapon by the South African Air Force 
(or its detonation at the Kalahari test site), according to a former 
leader of the nuclear weapons program. Air force bases were well 
Figure 5.17 A closed inner vault door that shows two locks
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equipped to handle the nuclear weapons. They had special logistics 
facilities and equipment for the storage, control, handling, main-
tenance, and support of nuclear weapons.10 The warhead halves 
would be bolted together only on the “flight line.”11 To allow the as-
sembling of a front and back half in the field, Circle built and stored 
a special portable assembly jig; however prior to the warhead’s de-
livery, the President had to send an affirmative instruction to the air 
force base in possession of the weapon.
The HEU was also tightly controlled. At the beginning of each 
work day, the HEU scheduled for use in a manufacturing area was 
carefully weighed to the nearest 0.1 gram before being checked out 
of the vault. At the end of each day, the material was removed from 
the processing and manufacturing areas and weighed to a similar 
precision before being returned to the vault. HEU was not stored in 
process lines.
Circle personnel needed top secret security clearances. Only 
native- born South African citizens with no other citizenship could 
receive the necessary security clearance. Contact with people out-
side the program was tightly controlled and movement into and 
from the Circle complex was carefully orchestrated to avoid pro-
gram personnel being seen.
SAFETY
Circle engineers carefully studied failure modes and effects and 
conducted theoretical nuclear criticality analysis under a range of 
postulated storage, delivery, and accident scenarios. According to 
Armscor, the devices exceeded safety requirements for this type of 
device, and “subsystems were subjected to strenuous tests to insure 
that reliability and safety criteria were met.” Some of this care was 
dictated by the reliance of the design on a relatively large amount 
of HEU. The devices had enough HEU so that they were near crit-
ical if fully assembled. One former senior member of the program 
said that a wet hand inserted between the two parts of an assembled 




A common safety concern with gun- type devices is that the pro-
pellant will accidentally fire, sending the projectile into the fixed 
end, causing a nuclear explosion. Another danger is that the pro-
jectile will accidentally slide down the barrel. At a minimum, this 
would ensure a criticality accident, risking workers and contaminat-
ing the adjacent area.
To prevent such accidents, each device had mechanical safing 
mechanisms. One blocked the projectile from reaching the other 
end. The first attempt did not work adequately; in the mid-1980s, 
one model was tested by dropping it and igniting the propellant, but 
the safety system did not prevent the projectile from reaching the 
core. It took a year and a half to fix the problem, and later versions 
performed well. The basic idea of the safety system was that when 
the device was disarmed, the barrel opening did not line up with the 
opening of the stationary HEU target in the front part of the device. 
When the device was armed for detonation, the barrel would rotate 
so that the openings would line up.
Another related safety system dissipated the pressure caused by 
the propellant firing, reducing the speed of the projectile. Holes in 
the barrel were left open to disperse the pressure generated by the 
propellant’s accidental firing. The holes were closed only after the 
device was armed.
As a fail- safe, the devices were outfitted with a non- nuclear self- 
destruct mechanism. This mechanism was located in the back end.
Arming of the device would have occurred only seconds before 
detonation. If a positive signal to arm the device was not received 
from the Buccaneer aircraft, the warhead would have automatically 
self- destructed.
Transport containers were carefully constructed with safety in 
mind. Air- transport containers, such as those used to transport a 
device to the Kalahari test site, were designed to survive an aircraft 
crash and fire, according to a former senior official of the program.
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1985 GOVERNMENT DECISION TO LIMIT PROGRAM
As Armscor was developing its ability to build deliverable warheads 
for the Raptor in the early 1980s, the South African government de-
cided to put limits on the nuclear weapons program in September 
1985. According to a then- senior nuclear official, President Botha 
recognized that the cost of the weapons program could escalate sig-
nificantly. The government’s rationale for limiting the program was 
a worsening economic crisis. However, the cost and effort to main-
tain South Africa’s conventional military capabilities and to procure 
advanced weaponry in the mid-1980s, according to a declassified 
CIA National Intelligence Estimate, “strongly suggest that [in the 
mid-1980s] a nuclear weapon is far down on the military’s shopping 
list.”12 One Armscor official said that the nuclear weapons program 
was “always very poor.”13
The government decided to take ten steps:14
• Order the manufacture of a maximum of only seven gun- 
type, type A, warheads with a yield of 5-20 kilotons;
• Carry out engineering development of implosion type 
warheads;
• Carry out limited research and development of boosted 
gun- type warheads (type A*) with a yield of about 100 
kilotons;
• Continue theoretical work on all other types of nuclear ex-
plosives including thermonuclear designs (B types);
• Continue efforts to integrate the payload to the long- 
distance carrier, a phrase for a ballistic missile.
• The production of plutonium warheads to be discontin-
ued, but expertise developed with lab- scale production 
must be preserved, with the emphasis on fission element 
and transuranium element research. Only a limited pro-
gram is envisioned;
• Limit the production of lithium 6 to a fixed quantity (about 
40 kilograms), which must be stored for future use;
• Stop work on plutonium- based nuclear weapons, but 
maintain existing know- how.
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• The Gouriqua reactor project is continued for civil pur-
poses and to keep open option for the future production of 
plutonium and tritium, if necessary. However, the AEC was 
unable to sustain the program with its own funds. The AEC 
tried unsuccessfully to turn the reactor into a test facility 
for pressurized- water reactor fuel, but the program ended 
in 1989 or 1990. The Gouriqua site was never developed 
beyond some rudimentary civil engineering preparations;
• With a view of cost savings, limit production of HEU in 
the Y Plant to enough for seven weapons and a prudent 
reserve stock.
PRODUCING MORE DEVICES
However, these 1985 limits did not have much impact on the day- 
to- day operations then on- going at Circle. With such stringent 
reliability, safety, and security specifications, weapon production had 
been slow and only two nuclear devices weapons had been made by 
the time the program was limited to a total of seven devices.
In 1985, the Circle engineers were mainly focused on develop-
ing pre- production gun- type models, referred to as the 300 series. 
They were built to test the reliability of various components, to in-
tegrate the nuclear core into a bomb casing, and to conduct tests 
with delivery systems. A total of six devices in this series were built. 
Most were used for testing. Only two in this series were eventually 
armed with HEU.
• Model 301 was incomplete and used for flame tests
• Model 302 was complete and used for practicing the inte-
gration of the full device and for several firing tests
• Models 303 and 304 were used for flight tests
• Model 305 was a complete device built as a spare device 
for flight tests. However, its quality was sufficient to allow 
it be provided with HEU. Later, the HEU was removed and 
transferred to Model 502 in 1988. Afterwards, model 305 
was used for training.
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• Model 306 was the final one built in the 300 series; its qual-
ity was sufficient to upgrade to an active device in 1988 
and 1989.
There exists evidence of model numbers greater than 306, such 
as 308 and 309, but these models were not completed, according to 
South Africa’s declarations to the IAEA. They refer to subsystems 
that were at different stages of development.
Model 305 was fitted with HEU in the fall of 1986, bringing the 
number of nuclear devices to three. Later, HEU was put in model 
306. Only model 306 remained fitted with HEU at the end of the 
program in 1989. Model 305’s HEU had been moved to a produc-
tion model, and the model minus HEU was being used as a training 
model.
Circle started to finally produce production models, named the 
500 series, in 1987 and 1988. These were originally codenamed Bak-
ker but later called Hamerkop, or hammerhead in English. Like the 
300 series models, they were all guided glide bombs for the Rap-
tor long range weapon. They had a yield of 20 kilotons and used 
about 56 kilograms of weapons- grade uranium in their cores. Table 
5.1 shows the schedule of builds into 1989, when the program was 
cancelled.
By 1989 Armscor had mastered the routine manufacture of 
gun- type nuclear weapons able to meet Armscor’s rigorous safety, 
security, and reliability specifications.15 Most of the weapons were 
manufactured after 1987. One Circle employee said that 1987-1989 
was a period of considerable stress for employees at Circle.
Up until the program was cancelled in 1989, a total of eight 
nuclear devices with HEU were made, and two were retired. At the 
end, there were four 500 series devices. As mentioned above, another 
device was incomplete at the end of the program; the core and some 
non- nuclear components for this device were finished. This was to 
be a production model.
By 1989 according to an Armscor official, the annual operating 
expenditures were about 20 to 25 million rand, or approximately 
125-160 million rand in April 2016.16 The latter is equivalent to about 
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$8.5 to 11 million at an April 1, 2016 exchange rate. In the early 
1980s, the annual budget was about 10 million rand, or several mil-
lion dollars a year.













Manufactured at Pelindaba, 
moved to Circle in 1982 and 
HEU core was replated; after-




N.A.(2) December 1982 Shaped HEU components made 
at Pelindaba, but rest of device 
made at Circle; Unknown when 
device renamed.
305 Rear September 1986 Upgraded pre-production model; 
HEU removed and reused in 
502(3)
Front November 1986
306 Rear June 1988 Upgraded, pre-production model
Front June 1989
501 Rear August 1987 Production model
Front June 1988
502 Rear November 1988 Production model; HEU from 
305
Front October 1988
503 Rear November 1988 Production model
Front March 1989
504 Rear March 1989 Production model; HEU from 
Cabot
Front March 1989




1. Unless otherwise noted, devices were made at Circle and 
were deliverable by aircraft.
2. Information not available on whether it had a front and 
back end.
3. Model 305 continued to exist as a training model without 
HEU.
4. A total of eight active devices were built. One device was 
dismantled and the other placed on an inactive status as 
a training model. Thus, at end of program, there were six 
active devices, one active device under construction, and at 
least one device that was, at least, originally qualified to be 
armed with HEU.
MAKING THE DEVICES
Armscor developed a sophisticated manufacturing system to make 
gun- type nuclear weapons. Despite its sophistication, most of the 
manufacturing steps were straightforward. As can be seen in fig-
ure 5.9, the manufacturing operations were under the engineering, 
technology development, and operations sections, which reported 
directly to the plant manager.
A former senior nuclear weapons official stated in 1994 that 
South Africa realized that it could develop a nuclear arsenal without 
significantly running afoul of international export control efforts, 
which were considerably weaker than today. In the 1980s, much of 
the equipment could be bought on the open market without much 
scrutiny. Once bought, it was sometimes copied as necessary.
The process of making a nuclear weapon started with the re-
ceipt of HEU metal billets from the AEC (formerly the AEB). After 
measuring its mass and enrichment level, the HEU was placed in the 
high security vault.
The first manufacturing step was to cast the HEU metal into the 
rough shape of a nuclear weapons component. The South African 
design did not cast HEU hemispheres but several sections that were 
later joined together to make the final HEU pieces, or apparently 
rings, for the gun- type design. A mold was prepared and on the day 
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Figure 5.18 A view of the metallurgy or “uranium” area in Circle, after the 
removal of the walls and equipment. The outer vault doors are visible in the 
background.
of the casting, the necessary amount of HEU was carefully checked 
out of the vault. The operators melted the HEU in a German- made 
Degussa vacuum furnace and poured it into the mold. Circle de-
pended on two vacuum furnaces. The first was bought abroad in 
the 1970s. The second was made by South Africa. The latter was a 
backup that could be used if the first furnace broke. The backup fur-
nace had not been used by the end of the program.
The casting operations occurred in the metallurgy room. Fig-
ures 5.18 and 5.19 show different views of this area as it appeared in 
2002 after the room had been emptied, the walls and original floor 
removed, and the area thoroughly decontaminated following the 
end of the program in 1989. After inspection and material account-
ing, the molded metal was placed back in the vault. The casting area 
was also decontaminated.
The next step in the process was to machine a casted piece 
or section of the HEU core. Lathes outfitted with special fittings 
machined each uranium casting. One lathe was used to machine 
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Figure 5.19 A view of the metallurgy or “uranium” area in Circle, after the re-
moval of the equipment and walls. The barrels and boxes are unrelated to the 
nuclear weapons program.
the HEU components and another one machined the depleted ura-
nium components. The latter were not used in actual weapons but in 
models. Easing their manufacture, the components were in segments 
that were alloyed together later into the final HEU core component. 
The lathes were in inert cabinets with hoods. The room that con-
tained this equipment can be seen in figure 5.20. These lathes were 
not sophisticated, lacking numerical control. The weapon program 
depended on using a clever design for the HEU components and 
good machinists to compensate for the simplicity of the lathes. The 
machining areas were well filtered and any liquid material was col-
lected in a pit and pumped into a cart. Material containing HEU, 
including in liquid solvents, cut- offs, and shavings, was carefully 




The machining area was in a closed room adjacent to the met-
allurgy room (see figure 5.20). It contained two lathes, hoods, and 
ventilation equipment.
After retrieval from the vault, each HEU section was plated 
with nickel to protect it against oxidation or corrosion. Afterwards, 
each section was returned to the vault.
The casting and machining operations generated scrap and nu-
clear waste, which were sent to the Atomic Energy Corporation for 
recovery or disposal. The shipments were sent at night to minimize 
detection.
There were many non- nuclear parts that had to be procured 
from outside suppliers or made on- site. A Master Record Index 
(MRI) contained all the necessary drawings and specifications. 
Many non- sensitive parts were procured from outside the organi-
zation. These electronic and standard parts and components were 
purchased externally through an open tender system.
Sensitive parts were manufactured at Circle. It made certain 
electronic parts, including firing circuits, PC boards, and certain elec-
trical devices that initiate a mechanical action (“electro- mechanical 
devices”); the barrels; the tampers; the metal damper or stopper 
pieces; and stainless steel sleeves or shields surrounding the tamper. 
In addition, it made the ignitors for the propellant and the pro-
pellants. Some of these items were made in a workshop (see figure 
5.21) that was right off the center bay of the building. Equipment 
Figure 5.20 Two views of the machining area of the Circle plant in 2002. On 
right photo, boxes are unrelated to nuclear weapons program. Photo on the 
right is from inside the machining room looking into the metallurgy area.
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Figure 5.21 The former workshop in 2002 after it was emptied of equipment fol-
lowing the end of the nuclear weapons program.
included two and three dimensional milling machine tools, inspec-
tion equipment, ball mills, lathes, and furnaces. At the end of the 
program, a five- axis Takisawa MAC- V2 milling machine had been 
procured for Circle, although its purpose is unknown. There was 
also a gauging shop in Circle that could provide accurate instru-
mentation for measuring weapon components and produce shapes 
or reference components used to check manufactured items. When 
entering the building, a large store room was directly left of the cen-
tral bay of Circle (western side) for raw materials and spare parts 
(see figure 5.3).
The tamper of the device, made from tungsten, was sensitive 
and difficult to make. It was composed of orange peel shapes glued 
together into a shell. The raw material was tungsten powder, which 
was ground in a ball mill, placed in a rubber bag, and pressed in a 
cold isotopic press (CIP). The CIP was made in South Africa. After 
inspection, the solidified powder was heated, or sintered, in a special 
oven that had been purchased from Degussa- Durferrit. Afterwards, 
the pieces were machined and glued together. Tamper (and steel 
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shield) elements were made for the HEU plug as well. Figure 5.22 
shows the oven and control panel.
The parts and subcomponents had to be integrated, or assem-
bled into a front or rear section of the nuclear device. To ensure 
adequate security, a front and rear end were never integrated simul-
taneously. Figure 5.23 is a simplified schematic of the integration 
process.
A special part of the integration process was called the “burn- in” 
which was done at the nearby environment test facility. Testing at 
this facility was necessary to ensure that the nuclear weapons could 
withstand being transported and launched.
Figure 5.24 and 5.25 show opposite ends of the environmen-
tal test facility, which was built into the hillside. It had doors on 
each end to allow vehicles to drive through the building. Figure 
5.26 shows the facility from the bridge over the oval high speed test 
track. The facility was made out of concrete since it was designed to 
handle high explosives (up to 30 kilograms).
Figure 5.22 Vacuum induction furnace in Circle workshop that had earlier 
been used to sinter the tamper subcomponents. The furnace was manufac-




Figure 5.23 Schematic of steps in assembling a front or rear end of a nuclear 
device, where enr. is enrichment, H/Sec is high security, MRI is Master Record 
Index, and accor is accordance. Source: Armscor
Figure 5.24 Environmental test building from side opposite the Circle building.
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After manufacturing in the Circle facility, a front or back end 
would be sent to the environmental testing facility for burn in (fig-
ure 5.27). It would be shaken, and put in a humidity cabinet and an 
environmental oven. The testing evaluated the effect on the weapon 
as it was cycled through temperatures and changes in air pressure.
Inside the test facility, one set of tests ensured that the warhead 
would survive the considerable vibrations encountered on take- off, 
particularly when it is mounted under an aircraft wing. For such 
Figure 5.25 Environmental test building, the end closest to the Circle building.
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Figure 5.26 Environmental test building in the distance as viewed from the 
bridge over the oval test track (see figure 5.4). The Circle building (not visible) is 
to its left.
tests, the facility had both a large and small vibration table. They 
were capable of generating random and large periodic vibrations. 
The vibration table needed cooling so cooling towers were built 
behind the building. Armscor had difficulty buying the vibrators, es-
pecially the large one, according to a former senior Armscor official, 
since they are only used by the military. According to a former senior 
member of the program, “Their purchase was quite a headache.”
The building was also equipped with a 200g centrifuge. It 
also had two climate testing chambers, at least one of which could 
simulate humidity and altitude up to 50,000 feet, at 99 percent rel-
ative humidity, and achieve temperatures from -60 to +130 degrees 
centigrade.
After the testing was complete, the half would be returned to the 
vault at the Circle building. In the case of the front ends, once burn 
in had occurred, they would not come out again for maintenance.
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Overall, Armscor was creating a small but formidable nuclear weap-
ons arsenal at Circle. The weapons program had benefited from 
Armscor’s independent development of a highly accurate standoff 
weapon to build a credible nuclear weapon system. Its emphasis on 
reliability and safety ensured that the South African defense forces 
would have confidence in this weapon system, if it ever had to be 
deployed. South Africa’s development of a ballistic missile in the late 
1980s would motivate the next phase of its nuclear weapons produc-
tion ambitions.
However, key personnel in the nuclear weapons program be-
lieved that the nuclear strategy needed further refinement. André 
Buys, who had risen in stature in the weapons complex, obtained 
a mandate in the early 1980s to lead a team in creating a more so-
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CHAPTER 6
NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND ARSENAL EXPANSION
South Africa’s formal nuclear strategy evolved throughout the late 
1970s and early 1980s. According to a former member of the nuclear 
weapons program, an adequate strategy was not formulated when 
Armscor took over the program. Although the basic strategy was 
approved in 1978, he said that this strategy was only sufficient to 
support the decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. By 1986 how-
ever, a policy document approved by the then Minister of Defense 
Magnus Malan laid out South Africa’s detailed strategy for nuclear 
weapons.
The strategy was not based on war- fighting, but rather was 
intended as a political strategy designed to force Western powers, 
particularly the United States, to assist South Africa against an over-
whelming military threat to its territory, or what was referred to in 
strategy documents as finding itself with “its back against the wall.” 
The most widely feared threat envisioned Soviet- backed forces over-
running South African forces in Angola and invading South Africa 
itself. If South Africa possessed nuclear weapons, planners reasoned 
the United States and its allies would step in between the two war-
ring sides and end the conflict.1 This strategy, sometimes referred 
to as a catalytic strategy, assumed that the United States would not 
allow a nuclear war to occur, or allow any country to detonate a 
single nuclear weapon. The assumption was based on a US fear that 
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the use of a nuclear weapon would set a precedent, and make it 
easier for the next country to decide to build or use nuclear weap-
ons. South Africa may also have reasoned that any demonstration 
of its nuclear weapons could cause the Soviet Union to threaten the 
United States with a nuclear confrontation unless South Africa was 
adequately constrained, which in turn would motivate the United 
States to seek an end to the conflict.
In addition, nuclear weapons, according to Prime Minister P.W. 
Botha in his 1981 speech opening the Circle facility, would “give the 
RSA [Republic of South Africa] the capability to manage the (super-
power) conflict from a power base of nuclear strategy, rather than a 
power base of black politics.” This statement also indicated the re-
sentment held by the political leadership against Western sanctions 
over its apartheid policies and a desire to change those negotiating 
and power dynamics. Nuclear weapons would allow South Africa 
to shift the conversation from its internal affairs to security interests 
if needed. Botha stated: “Nuclear is primarily a political weapons 
system, not a military system.”2
Unlike any other nuclear strategy, South Africa’s strategy envi-
sioned no actual operational use of nuclear weapons. It was designed 
to be a bluff. However, the challenge was to ensure that if the strat-
egy was exercised, South Africa was perceived as having the means 
and resolve to use nuclear weapons militarily. The goal was to deter 
aggression, not to be involved in a nuclear war that South Africa 
could not survive.
1978 BASIC STRATEGY
In his 1981 Kentron Circle speech, Prime Minister Botha announced 
that he first ordered the development of the nation’s nuclear strat-
egy in July 1977 when he was Defense Minister.3 He and the State 
Security Council approved the basic strategy, or “national strategic 
guidelines for nuclear weapons,” in April 1978. Within one month 
after Botha become prime minister in late September 1978, he au-
thorized the creation of a high- level action committee to further 
develop guidance for the planning of the nuclear weapons program, 
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as discussed in Chapter 4. This group oversaw the production of the 
first nuclear strategy.
The April 1978 strategy document has never been publicly re-
leased or published. The American political scientist Peter Liberman, 
however, details its initial development. He cites interviews with 
André Buys, who after being the Plant Manager at Circle moved to 
a more senior position in Armscor. Buys stated that under Botha’s 
Defense Minister title, which he held simultaneously until 1980 after 
becoming Prime Minister, Botha asked close advisor and South Af-
rican Defense Force chief of staff for planning, Army Brig. John 
Huyser, to prepare a memorandum laying out the potential elements 
of a nuclear strategy. Huyser returned a six to eight page discussion 
memo laying out the following options: 1) secret development, 2) 
covert disclosure, and 3) overt disclosure. Huyser recommended the 
third option, “openly joining the nuclear club.” Botha approved the 
document but wrote on the memo that “any disclosure should be 
delayed “until we are ready” and it required government approval. 
Liberman states that Buys told him the document “did not specify 
numbers or types of weapons, which left the AEB still uncertain 
about whether a demonstration capability was sufficient.”4
The government eventually approved sometime around 1978 an 
actual range of nuclear weapons to be developed along with turning 
Huyser’s options memo into a linear, three- phase strategy:5
• Five to six nuclear weapons would be “kept on the shelf,” 
or developed;
• Should the RSA find itself in a “back against the wall” 
situation:
• the existence of the RSA’s nuclear weapons would be 
conveyed to Western countries (primarily the USA) in 
a covert manner; if this does not alleviate affairs,
• an underground test will be performed to demon-
strate the RSA’s capability, and
• finally, an above- ground test, if the threat persists.
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Armscor would have overall responsibility for the nuclear de-
terrent’s development, and the South African Defense Force and 
AEB would cooperate, according to Botha, on:
…Identify[ing] in which manner the production of suitable nu-
clear weapons can be brought about for SA [South Africa] – this 
with consideration for the developments made by the AEB con-
cerning peaceful use of explosive nuclear material, and, after 
approval of said proposal, to truly implement the suggestions. 
This Committee proceeded to their task…in such a way that 
I was able to approve the proposed outline of the intended 
weapon and establishment of certain facilities, the so- called 
Project Festival, already on July 4, 1979.6
An important aspect of the nuclear strategy was to maintain 
uncertainty about the program. Protecting uncertainty required the 
government to ensure that nuclear weapons activities remained se-
cret. As a result, Armscor imposed a more stringent security regime 
on the program than the AEB had exercised in the 1970s.
Tasked with planning in the early 1980s, key Armscor officials 
felt they lacked adequate guidance about the circumstances in which 
the strategy would be implemented and the number and type of 
nuclear weapons required. For example, the original 1978 decision 
that talked about five to six gun- type devices on the shelf had little 
justification. Moreover, from an engineering standpoint, Armscor 
needed to know whether to actually make five or six weapons. Buys 
complained that Huyser’s memo, for example, “was not very con-
cise” and they “often had difficulties in interpreting it.”7 To Buys, the 
existing strategy was inadequate.
In 1983, while still Plant Manager of Circle, Buys received ap-
proval to chair a working group of eight to ten people based at 
Armscor to develop more detailed guidance on when to move from 
one phase of the strategy to the next. Since the three- phase strategy 
moved linearly from disclosure of the bomb’s existence to demon-
stration, Armscor officials were concerned that the guidance was 
too vague and needed to show prescriptively what had to occur be-
fore moving to the next phase. They did not want the phase three 
testing of nuclear weapons to take place, for example, quickly or 
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without considering the consequences of moving past earlier stages. 
Nor did they want an irrational politician to be in control of hasty 
or ad hoc decision making in a crisis situation. It was unclear what 
Botha’s plan for overt disclosure “when ready” meant and whether 
that needed to happen.
Each escalatory step should be small, according to Buys, start-
ing with low- key steps.8 The aim should be to stop as early in the 
escalatory process as possible, he added.
Buys’ working group contacted many people, read many 
nuclear strategy references, and studied the strategies of other coun-
tries. The group “met monthly for a year, conducting war games, 
reviewing the nuclear strategy literature, and selectively consulting 
experts, politicians, and even a leading South African theologian.”9 
In the end, by 1985, the working group believed that their strategy, 
summarized into a 10-20 page document, was different from other 
nuclear weapon states in that it did not envision the use of nuclear 
weapons in an offensive mode.
While the working group was developing its more detailed 
strategy, an Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee, chaired by then- retitled 
State President Botha10 and attended by Armscor Chairman Com-
mander P.G. Marais, Minister of Defense General M.A. Malan, 
Director General of the Mineral and Energy Affairs Ministry Dr. 
L. Alberts, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Corporation Dr. 
J.W.L. de Villiers, reconfirmed the 1978 three phase strategy. South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons would be made known to Western coun-
tries, primarily the United States, and then if needed, escalated to 
conveying their presence via underground or above ground nuclear 
tests.11 The document stated that the strategy specifically excluded 
the “operational application of nuclear weapons.” We were unable 
to determine if the 1978 document had a similar statement. More-
over, the document also said that any decision to implement the 
strategy will be authorized solely by the State President.
The main purpose of the 1985 Cabinet meeting was to limit the 
size of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. It ordered the man-
ufacture of a maximum of seven gun- type devices. However, this 
represents an increase from the numbers in the 1978 strategy docu-
ment. Rather than build five or six gun- type devices, as was ordered 
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in 1978, the Committee decided to build seven of them, while com-
mitting to developing more advanced weapons, as discussed earlier 
in the Circle chapter. The main cutbacks were in the production of 
nuclear materials, which tend to be the most costly part of produc-
ing nuclear weapons.
The more detailed, Armscor- developed South African “deter-
rent” strategy was adopted in November 1986 and was still based 
on three escalating, step- wise phases but with additional guidance. 
The updated strategy document, in essence, provided a roadmap 
for identifying the requirements for progressing through successive 
phases. Because South Africa could not return to an earlier phase, the 
document described more criteria and the factors that would lead 
South Africa to enter the next phase. The document, Buys said, also 
contained specific language that any actual use of nuclear weapons 
should never happen. It would be suicidal, given the Soviet Union’s 
vast ability to strike with nuclear weapons.
According to the strategy document, the first phase, “strategic 
uncertainty,” would include the South African nuclear capability nei-
ther being acknowledged nor denied “as long as the military threat 
remained remote.”12 The intention, according to Buys, was to create 
worry in the world.13 South African politicians, with their periodic 
leaks, he added, created that uncertainty without any guidance.
Phase two, or “the covert condition phase,” applied if the coun-
try were threatened militarily by Soviet or Soviet- backed forces. At 
that time, the government would covertly acknowledge the existence 
of its nuclear weapons to leading Western governments, particularly 
to the United States and perhaps Britain, and ask for their interven-
tion to end the war. For example, it would state that it has a few 
nuclear weapons and cannot stand up to the Soviet Union’s conven-
tional forces. In interviews, Buys called this phase “arm twisting” 
of the major powers. Moving to this phase required South Africa to 
possess deliverable nuclear weapons so that the powers would be-
lieve that the implied threat was credible.
If phase two failed to persuade the international community to 
provide assistance against a military attack and South Africa was 
starting to lose a war, the government would move to phase three, 
or the “overt deterrent phase.” This phase, which included a series 
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of successive steps, intended to force the intervention of the United 
States and others to stop a war. The first step would be the public 
announcement of having nuclear weapons and an appeal for West-
ern government aid. If that failed, South Africa would demonstrate 
its capability with an underground test. Next, South Africa could 
invite outside experts to look at the arsenal. The next step would 
be to demonstrate long- range delivery capability. Others have said 
that such a demonstration could have involved flying a Buccaneer 
bomber 1,000 kilometers south of South Africa and launching a nu-
clear weapon on a Raptor that detonated in the atmosphere.14 If 
nothing had worked, the last step threatened “application on the 
battlefield,” which could be employed as self- defense against an im-
pending conventional military attack.15
According to Buys as cited by Liberman, actual battlefield use 
was hotly debated internally. Many members of the committee, in-
cluding Buys, felt it would have been suicidal to threaten use of 
nuclear weapons even if South Africa were on the verge of being de-
feated militarily by the Soviet Union.16 Buys noted: “Others would 
argue differently, they would say fight to the bitter end…But there 
was no strategy for that.”17 Moreover, some officials who were con-
cerned about the battlefield use provision worried in particular that 
the leadership may be unpredictable enough to use nuclear weapons 
even without a clear, imminent military threat. In the end, no oper-
ational use remained fundamental to the strategy.
Buys’ strategy document has not survived. All copies were 
destroyed as part of South Africa’s dismantlement of its nuclear 
weapons program. Buys said in an interview that security officials 
even came to his office and took his copy. However, a declassified Sep-
tember 1987 document contains an outline of the new strategy that 
confirms what Buys has said. In this document, “Kramat [nuclear 
weapons] Capability: Current Status and Further Developments,” a 
subcommittee called the Weapons System Working Group (WSWG) 
submitted a set of nuclear weapons recommendations to the Witvlei 
Control Committee (known by its Afrikaans acronym WBK), which 
was a senior coordinating body for the nuclear weapons program.18 
The exact role and membership of the Witvlei Committee, which 
also translates as a strategy council, remains unclear. Buys called it 
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a committee that dealt with budgets and coordination. The chair of 
the Witvlei Committee also briefed the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee 
chaired by the State President prior to its 1985 decision to limit the 
nuclear weapons program.19 Therefore, its role appears critical in 
the decision making about nuclear weapons.
The recommendations in the “Kramat Capability” document 
will be discussed soon, but the memo contained a summary of the 
new strategy. Kramat is a code word for nuclear weapons. The memo 
specifically states that the updated nuclear strategy was “approved 
by the Minister of Defense on November 24, 1986.”20 According to 
Buys, he briefed President Botha on the new strategy. In the meeting, 
Buys recommended never to use nuclear weapons, and he said that 
Botha did not object. He was not aware of whether Botha or the 
Cabinet approved the new strategy document, which had the status 
of a defense policy document.21
According to this Kramat Capability document, the South Afri-
can escalating, three- phase “deterrent” strategy included:
• During the strategic uncertainty phase, the existence of the 
KRAMAT [nuclear] capability will be denied.
• During the covert condition phase, the KRAMAT capa-
bility will be covertly revealed as a means of inducement, 
persuasion, and coercion.
• During the overt deterrent phase, the following actions will 
be considered:
• Overt announcement.
• Display of force.
• Demonstration (underground or atmospheric test 
explosion).
• Threatened use.
• Battlefield application as DETERRENT (caps in orig-
inal) against conventional assault forces.
• No strategic application foreseen, only the threat of 
use.
The document continued, “In order to carry out this strategy 
with credibility, the following weapon systems are required”:
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• Air- launched weapon for atmospheric demonstration test 
and use in battle.
• Explosive device for underground demonstration test.
• Long- range ballistic missile for threat of strategic use.
By this time, the air- launched weapon, namely the Raptor dis-
cussed in chapter 5, was fully developed and being outfitted with 
nuclear warheads. However, the nuclear test site had not been vis-
ited since 1977, when it was hastily shutdown, and the two deep 
shafts were sealed. Ensuring that a test was possible became an ur-
gent priority. Moreover, although the ballistic missile was still many 
years from deployment, it was envisioned by 1987 as a critical nu-
clear weapons system that would require new warheads. The 500 
series production gun- type models were not suitable for use on bal-
listic missiles, in part because of the safing mechanisms.
NUCLEAR TEST SITE
According to Buys, in late 1986 or early 1987, Armscor was told to 
“make sure that the capability to actually execute the strategy is 
in place.”22 The most urgent priority was ensuring that an under-
ground nuclear test could be carried out.
The Weapons System Working Group report mentioned above 
offers some insight into the thinking about the nuclear test. Although 
the request for the inspection of the test shafts had occurred prior 
to the working group’s Kramat report, the working group included 
this issue in its nuclear weapons assessment and made recommen-
dations about how to proceed. The concern was that the deeper of 
the shafts may have become blocked by an obstruction and that the 
Melba test device, built in 1979, was obsolete. The group was also 
worried that the combined system, codenamed Gardenia/Melba and 
composed of the Melba device with placement and control systems, 
while in working order, was no longer reliable and would take 21 
days to prepare for deployment. A test under the then existing condi-
tions was also considered as an “open” underground test explosion 
that would discharge a considerable amount of radioactive mate-
rial into the atmosphere, apparently because the shafts could not be 
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backfilled after placement of the device deep in the shaft (see also 
chapter 4). The Group recommended the development of a new test 
device, codenamed Modulus, accompanied with new placement and 
control equipment to be finished by about 1991. The group said, “It 
must be possible to use the Modulus device for a back- filled “clean” 
underground demonstration test.” In addition, it recommended an 
inspection of the test shafts to determine their condition. However, 
it said that the inspection should happen “in a manner that will not 
attract international attention to the test site.” If this is not possible, 
the group was so worried about renewed detection of activity at 
the site that it recommended that “an alternative test site must be 
sought.”
Armscor visited the site in 1988, according to a former senior 
member of the nuclear weapons program. The lag time between the 
timing of the decision to reopen the shaft and the actual reopening 
resulted from the time to draw up plans, conduct trials at Circle, and 
obtain the necessary equipment and supplies.
With no intention to send a signal to the United States or the 
Soviet Union that they were reopening a shaft, possibly triggering 
worry about an impending nuclear test, Armscor investigated the 
test shafts clandestinely. To that end Armscor built a hangar, which 
it called a “shade,” over a test shaft, placed dummy military ve-
hicles near around the site, and conducted target shooting during 
construction to provide a plausible cover for the operation. They 
opened the shaft, emptied the water within, and tested the shaft’s 
integrity. As will be discussed later, despite all these precautions, this 
activity was likely noticed by the United States.
BALLISTIC MISSILES
The most dramatic shift in carrying out the new strategy was the de-
cision to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The plans for 
building a nuclear warhead for a ballistic missile grew out of South 
Africa’s evolving security situation and its cooperation with Israel 
on rocket technology. South Africa’s space program had the lead in 
developing a space launch vehicle in cooperation with Israel. The 
main purpose of the program was to contribute to South Africa’s 
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overall industrial development and launch low orbit reconnais-
sance satellites. South Africa’s military viewed its lack of strategic 
reconnaissance as a major weakness in confronting the front line 
states militarily. That the launching rocket could be adapted to carry 
conventional and nuclear warheads was an added benefit and an 
opportunity. There is very little difference between a satellite launch 
rocket and a surface- to- surface rocket.23
Compared to aircraft, ballistic missiles offered South Africa a 
more reliable nuclear weapons delivery system able to deeply pen-
etrate into Southern Africa. , According to a former leader of the 
nuclear weapons program, South Africa wanted a missile with a 
range of 2,500-3,000 kilometers, longer than the range of the Israeli 
rockets that formed the basis of the cooperation. The goal was to 
be able to strike Luanda, the capitol of Angola, and points further 
north. Another motivation for a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile is 
that the Buccaneer bombers, which had been procured from Brit-
ain in 1965, were nearing the end of their operational lifetime. Only 
three were licensed to carry nuclear weapons by the late 1980s, ac-
cording to this same official. The French- supplied Mirage aircraft 
could also be modified to carry nuclear weapons, but it did not have 
the range needed to carry out South Africa’s nuclear strategy. There 
were also increasing concerns about the ability of South Africa’s air-
craft to penetrate enemy airspace in the future. With international 
sanctions in place, South Africa was unlikely to be able to buy a 
long- range, modern bomber or afford the domestic development 
of one. Thus, the development of a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile 
emerged as a feasible South African priority, given Israel’s willing-
ness to supply rockets.
The rocket of choice to carry a nuclear payload was the RSA-3 
missile, which was a three- stage rocket under development by the 
late 1980s. By then South Africa had constructed a range of facilities 
to develop, build, and test this and other rockets.24
The new strategy emphasized the need for credible nuclear 
weapons, which led to the choice of the Raptor and ballistic missiles 
as the delivery systems of choice. It also led the military to conduct a 




PLANS FOR INCREASING THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS
The 1985 Cabinet decision discussed in chapter 5 set a limit of seven 
nuclear weapons and called for a feasibility study in respect to 
implosion- type warheads. However, the new nuclear strategy stim-
ulated a new discussion of this limit. Moreover, in April 1986, the 
SADF’s Air Force was appointed as “user of the nuclear and missile 
programme and went through several processes in the course” of 
1986 and 1987 to determine the needs of the SADF.25 Its plans called 
for doubling the number of nuclear weapons needed.
Again the Weapons System Working Group document offers 
insight into this decision. This group was instructed by the Witvlei 
Control Committee in April 1987 to determine a desired number of 
missiles and nuclear warheads from a strategic and operational point 
of view. It reported under the recommendation section that the view 
of the SADF was that a minimum of 14 Kramat payloads would 
be required, after taking into account the strategic and operational 
requirements and financial constraints.26 The specific recommenda-
tions were:
• One Modulus device
• Ten gun- type warheads that will be operationally inter-
changeable between aircraft- deliverable and intermediate 
range missile- deliverable weaponry.
• Three boosted (A*) for the same type of missiles. (“This 
choice results in a better balance between circular error 
probabilities of ballistic missiles and payload yield.”).
The working group also had a series of technological develop-
ment recommendations, including:
• Continuing the development of the implosion technology 
and do theoretical studies on the other nuclear technologies.
• Implosion technology is still at an early stage of develop-
ment and the switch to implosion- type warheads will be 
possible only after year 2000, if the user [Air Force] decided 
to update the missiles with these warheads. (Implosion 
and other types of warheads may be better suited to new 
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generation of lighter and smaller weapon systems that may 
become available in the future.)
TABLE 6.1 1987 CODENAMES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Kramat Nuclear Warhead
Modulus “Clean” underground test device
Gardenia System of placement shafts and “dirty” underground test 
device
Melba “Dirty underground test device
Cabot Formerly Hobo (dumb weapon), see chapter 5
Hamerkop Formerly Bakker or 500 series (smart weapon), see chapter 5
Husky Intermediate range ballistic missile system
Ostra Warhead on Husky
Another recommendation was to keep the Y Plant in operation 
longer than envisioned in the 1985 Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee de-
cision. The group notes, however, that if there was a need for more 
warheads, switching to implosion warheads could be used to double 
the number of warheads with existing amounts of highly enriched 
uranium. (An implosion- type warhead needs about half the amount 
of HEU as a gun- type device.)
The total projected cost of all these recommendations was 
about 800 million rand from 1981 to 2006, of which about 265 mil-
lion rand had been spent by 1986. Most of the monies already spent 
had been allocated to make HEU. During the next 20 years, annual 
average nuclear weaponization costs, excluding missile costs, were 
estimated at about 20 million rand per year. The average annual cost 
to make HEU and thermonuclear materials was estimated at almost 
7 million rand per year. The latter average is misleading because in 
all likelihood most, if not all, of the HEU would be produced during 
the first several years of this 20 year period.
The level of government approval for these plans is not clear 
in the declassified documents. However, an April 1988 declassified 
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document regarding the Air Force’s “Dunhill Program” produced 
by the SADF’s Air Force planning division shows that these recom-
mendations were approved by the Minister of Defense in August 
1987.27 The recommendations were sent to the Witvlei Control 
Committee in September 1987. It is unclear if the WBK committee 
approved them, or if the President or the Ad Hoc Cabinet Commit-
tee approved them. However, what was called a Reduced Witvlei 
Committee approved them in June 1987, under what was called 
“Program Olympic.”28
The 1988 Dunhill document implies that the AEC may have 
resisted some of the recommendations. De Villiers, the Chair of 
the Atomic Energy Corporation, did not want to make the nuclear 
materials without explicit orders from the Minister of Economic 
Affairs and Technology.29 By implication, this action may have re-
quired Cabinet level approval for this recommendation, instead of 
just that of the Minister of Defense.
At the time, the AEC was focusing on producing low enriched 
uranium for the Koeberg nuclear power reactors. Once the Z Plant 
was finished, it would have taken over this responsibility. The AEC 
viewed the production of LEU as a national security priority, how-
ever, so until that plant was running, it had started using the Y Plant 
to make LEU and blending down stocks of weapons- grade uranium 
to LEU for the Koeberg reactors. There could have been another, 
more mundane reason. The budgets for the military and the AEC 
were separate, possibly leading de Villiers to want to ensure that the 
necessary funds would be there to make the additional weapons- 
grade uranium.
Overall, however, these decisions shaped South Africa’s plans 
for nuclear weapons. It is natural to ask what had happened in the 
years 1986 and 1987 that motivated this push for an improved, more 
threatening nuclear arsenal.
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TENSIONS MOUNT
By 1987 the war in Angola, which had raged for almost a genera-
tion, had become South Africa’s equivalent of the Vietnam War. The 
South Africa Defense Force and its ally UNITA were not able to win 
the war, although they achieved significant battlefield victories over 
their enemy. Out of fear of sparking direct Soviet intervention, the 
South African government was constrained from outright defeating 
its enemies and seize Angola, assuming that such a victory was in-
deed possible.
After the late 1987 defeat of a major Soviet- Angolan offensive, 
Cuba decided to escalate its own involvement in the civil war and 
send an additional 15,000 troops to Angola, bringing the total to 
about 50,000.30 By early 1988, the Cuban and Angolan forces had 
started to advance into southwestern Angola near the Namibian 
border. By late May they had created a new southern front that ran 
approximately 250 miles and was heavily defended with tanks and 
artillery, late- model fighter aircraft, and sophisticated air defenses.31 
According to Chester Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs who had a major hand in ultimately resolving 
the tense standoff, although international peace talks had started in 
London, Fidel Castro “spoke mainly the language of war and mil-
itary intimidation.”32 In Crocker’s view, Castro “publicly dared the 
South African leadership to run the risk of a ‘serious defeat’ if they 
tangled with him, and claimed that he had refused to give Preto-
ria a guarantee that he would not cross into Namibian territory.”33 
Yet, interpreting Castro’s true intentions during the first half of 1988 
was difficult for South Africa and the Western negotiators. Was he 
headed for a military invasion of Namibia or was he seeking a way 
to negotiate an honorable exit from Angola?
Although hindsight has shown that Castro indeed was trying 
to drive South Africa to the negotiating table and never intended to 
invade Namibia, at the time South Africa was not so sure of Cuba’s 
intention and took several military counteractions that only esca-
lated the crisis. By late May 1988, heavier military units had been 
deployed in northern Namibia. In early June, the South African gov-
ernment called up its 140,000-man Citizen Force, the backbone of its 
conventional forces.34 Tensions along the Angolan/Namibian border 
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escalated throughout June, finally resulting in heavy exchanges on 
June 27. Rarely since 1975 had South African and Cuban forces con-
fronted each other so directly.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the nuclear 
test site was being readied and the South African air force was in-
terested in upgrading its nuclear forces. In the minds of the South 
African leadership, Buys recalled, the war was reaching a “semi- 
conventional state,” implying in his statement that South African 
nuclear weapons could be needed. A common interpretation of the 
military situation had concluded that if the Soviet Union decided to 
win the war in Angola, South Africa could not have stopped it with 
conventional military forces. Another senior official in the nuclear 
weapons program similarly recalled that during the “Cuban crisis,” 
Circle employees were “under a lot of stress” to produce nuclear 
weapons.
There is also a question whether in light of the increased threat, 
the leadership of South Africa was also thinking of escalating its 
nuclear posture. Buys said in an interview in February 1994 that 
the decision to reopen a shaft in the Kalahari Desert was a conse-
quence of developments in Angola, although the intent was to do 
so without being discovered by foreign intelligence services. Despite 
Armscor’s precautions, however, was this activity noticed by foreign 
intelligence services, and did South African political leaders exploit 
any such detection to send a signal to the world’s powers?
Frank Pabian, a leading expert on South Africa’s nuclear pro-
gram, thinks South Africa did so.35 He believes that the United States 
and probably Russia detected renewed activity at the site. In a recent 
report, Pabian states that South Africa’s Foreign Minister Pik Botha 
told an interviewer that he was approached about the test site by 
the US ambassador, who showed him images of the shade over the 
test shaft.36 In Pabian’s view, the building activity over the test shaft 
had “intentionally or not, provided a means for South Africa to send 
a signal that a nuclear test was possible.”37 That signal may have 
been exploited by Pik Botha, according to Pabian, to demonstrate 
a nuclear deterrent capability in the event that Cuba and Angola 
attempted a surprise conventional military assault against Namibia 
after South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola by September 1, 1988.38 
NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND ARSENAL EXPANSION
145
To support his interpretation, Pabian points out that eight days after 
South Africa agreed to withdraw its troops, Pik Botha suddenly an-
nounced at a press conference in Vienna that South Africa had the 
“capability to make” a nuclear weapon “should [it] want to,” but he 
refused to elaborate on that statement.39 The Foreign Minister may 
have intended, perhaps on his own, to send a strong signal about 
South Africa’s nuclear capabilities to Russia and the United States, 
figuring they were already worried about the test site activity.
Although tensions were decreasing by August 1988, the govern-
ment had already made decisions to improve its nuclear weapons 
and possibly increase their number in parallel to the development 
of a more sophisticated nuclear strategy. To develop the capability 
to build these new weapons, the government decided to build a new 
facility close to the Circle facility that would make the advanced 
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CHAPTER 7
ADVENA CENTRAL LABORATORIES
The 1987 decision to improve the quality and possibly the quantity 
of nuclear weapons opened the next phase of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons program. In a difficult economic time, monies were found 
to renovate and expand South Africa’s capability to make nuclear 
weapons. The new complex was more spacious and capable, and 
a far nicer work environment than the Circle facility. The Circle 
building, located about five minutes from the new complex by car, 
became known as the “old building.” As the inhabitants of Circle 
did not like this name for the old building, they decided to call it the 
“Castle,” since its physical appearance to a certain extent resembled 
a castle.
The new facility cost about 36 million rand (about $15 million 
in 2016 dollars). Its codename was Advena Central Laboratories. 
The name’s genesis is unknown, but Advena in Latin means the for-
eigner or stranger. Figure 7.1 shows two of the site’s main buildings. 
Figure 7.2 is a commercial satellite image of the site taken after the 
nuclear weapons program ended.
The occupation of the new Advena facilities started during 
1988, and the process of commissioning was still underway when 
the nuclear weapons program was terminated in the fall of 1989. 
Once Advena was completed, the Circle building would have been 
used for the maintenance of the existing gun- type nuclear weapons. 
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Advena would have concentrated on new types of weapons. After 
the program was cancelled, Armscor commercialized the facility, as 
will be discussed later.
Figure 7.1 The entrance to the main building of Advena Central Laboratories. 
On right image, the integration building is in the foreground and the main 
building is behind. The wide wing of the main building on the left of the main 
building holds the clean room. A double fence is visible on right of the photo. 
Photo Credit: Armscor and Albright
Figure 7.2 Google Earth commercial satellite image of Advena Central Laborato-




The decision to build new facilities was motivated first by the 
decision to build the next generation of nuclear weapons. The 
government had mandated the development of implosion- type war-
heads, the continuation of theoretical work on all types of nuclear 
explosives including boosted and thermonuclear designs, and most 
importantly, the integration of a nuclear warhead onto a ballistic 
missile. The new site was designed by Armscor to be able to carry 
out these missions.
The development of a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile had 
emerged in the late 1980s as a feasible South African priority—one 
that was expected to drive Advena’s first decade of operation. For 
ballistic missile warheads, Armscor planned to upgrade the 500-se-
ries gun- type nuclear weapons. Armscor said it planned to “replace 
the seven cannon- type devices with seven up graded devices, when 
they reached the end of their estimated life by the year 2000.”1 To 
that end, Advena planned to conduct nuclear- weapons development 
work on advanced gun- type and implosion- type devices able to fit 
on a ballistic missile. The site was designed with sophisticated capa-
bilities in high explosives, ultra- high- speed diagnostics, theoretical 
calculations, metallurgy, high- speed electronics, and environmental 
and reliability testing.
Although Advena had many capabilities for advanced nuclear 
weapons work, its rate of weapons production would have been 
modest. Each year, it could have produced no more than about two 
to three weapons.
Advena Central Laboratories was built so that it could both de-
velop and produce implosion- type devices. A key part of that effort 
was mastering high explosives. The new facilities could test larger 
amounts of high explosives than Circle, and these new capabilities 
allowed for an expansion of its development and evaluation of im-
plosion technologies.
Moreover, Advena was also embedded with other capabilities 
to support the missile program. It was diversifying into conventional 




Despite the commitment to boosted and thermonuclear weap-
ons development, Advena did not have a capability to handle 
tritium. Although South Africa had acquired tritium from Israel in 
the 1970s, and the AEC made lithium 6, Advena’s lack of tritium ca-
pability suggests that boosted and thermonuclear weapons were not 
an Armscor priority beyond theoretical studies, as will be discussed 
below.
In addition, the new complex could house a larger staff. The nu-
clear weapons program had outgrown the Circle building. The labor 
force had increased from 100 to 300, and more space was needed. 
Workers expressed frustration with the small spaces in the Circle 
building. They expressed relief that the new buildings were better 
lighted than Circle, which had no windows and felt claustropho-
bic. Although cognizant of the risk of observation from satellites or 
other methods, the designers of the main building created a design 
with many windows and views of gardens (see figure 7.3).
Figure 7.3 Landscaped areas between two of the wings of the main building.
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In addition, the Circle building was designed so that only proj-
ect participants could enter the building. The new site, however, 
allowed visitors without divulging the true purpose of the program.
The site also had a more modern feel. Inside the entrance was a 
mural (see figure 7.4) containing many South African symbols with 
the phrase “Explore future technology today” written in Afrikaans 
on the top and English on the bottom. The symbols are far more 
relevant to aerospace engineers than nuclear engineers, which may 
reflect that the former dominated this nuclear weapons program 
and were increasingly comfortable in that role.





The most notable new building at Advena was the integration and 
test facility (see figures 7.1 and 7.5). Finished in June 1989, it was 
designed for advanced weapons assembly and integration with de-
livery systems, in particular ballistic missiles. Its significance to those 
at the site is revealed in its nickname. This building was known as 
“Ararat,” a Biblical reference to the sacred land or mountain where 
Noah’s ark rested after the Great Flood subsided.
It had a long central bay with a large door at each end and 
rooms on either side of the bay. Its design allowed for a ballistic mis-
sile on a TEL to be driven into the building. Rooms on the side of 
the central bay were to produce reentry vehicles, balance warheads, 
cast and machine HEU, and store HEU, warheads, and reentry ve-
hicles. Figure 7.6 shows the large central bay and a side room as it 
appeared in 2002, after the program ended. One of the large doors is 
visible in the background.
Figure 7.5 The integration building as viewed from the main building.
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The high security storage vaults were located near one end of 
the central bay at the end of a series of production rooms (see fig-
ures 7.7 (a) and (b). The new storage vaults contained space suitable 
for one small reentry body, according to Armscor.
A critical part of developing a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile 
is the re- entry vehicle, which holds the warhead. It must be able to 
withstand re- entry to the earth’s atmosphere and is challenging to 
build. This task became more challenging because Armscor decided 
that the reentry vehicle would need to reenter the atmosphere at 
a high speed in order to thwart possible countermeasures against 
the warhead. The integration building was being outfitted with 
Figure 7.6 On left, the large central bay where a ballistic missile could enter and 
be loaded with a nuclear warhead. On right, one of several adjacent rooms for 
warhead manufacturing. The high security storage vaults were on the right side 
of the bay and near the far outer door. The CNC machines in the photos are not 
associated with the nuclear weapons program.
Figure 7.7(a) The outer high security vault doors in the Integration Building, 
with a view of the inner vaults.
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the necessary equipment, including balancing and mass property 
machines.
Work was progressing on learning how to balance warheads. 
The task was further complicated because Armscor decided to avoid 
buying sophisticated balancing equipment abroad out of fear that 
seeking such goods would tip off foreign intelligence agencies that 
South Africa was trying to mate nuclear warheads to a ballistic 
missile. The domestic production of adequate equipment proved 
difficult. Moreover, Advena had little knowledge about what would 
constitute adequate balancing of a warhead or a reentry vehicle. It 
thus expected to spend a considerable amount of time developing 
both the necessary theoretical and practical expertise.
Seeking foreign help was not completely avoided, however. Per-
sonnel in the nuclear weapons program developed questions about 
the re- entry vehicle that South Africa’ space launch experts could 
not answer. One of the South African nuclear weapons personnel 
went to Israel and got the answer from unwitting Israeli experts by 
couching the questions in a satellite discussion. Based on an agree-
ment at the head of government level, South Africa and Israel had 
agreed not to discuss nuclear weapons, only space launch- related 
issues. Whether this particular visit was sanctioned by Armscor is 
unknown.





The main building had offices, labs, and a variety of support facili-
ties, including a library, cafeteria, and an auditorium. Completed in 
February 1989, the main building had about 100 offices or rooms. 
The main building was known as Uitsig, or good view, in Afrikaans.
The building had a range of laboratory and small- scale indus-
trial capabilities. Unlike the Circle building, it had a “clean room” 
for more advanced manufacturing, including more sophisticated 
electronics manufacturing. Figure 7.8 shows the clean room a few 
years after the program ended. This facility is the long, wide wing of 
the main building visible in figures 7.1 and 7.2. Figure 7.9 shows the 
entrance to the electro- mechanical area in the main building.
The main building, like Circle, contained a range of equipment 
related to making nuclear weapons components. For example, in 
one room in the early 1990s (see figure 7.10) there was an Italian- 
supplied precision coordinate measurement machine used to ensure 
Figure 7.8 Clean room in main building in early 1990s. Photo source: Armscor
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that manufactured items met specifications. This same type of ma-
chine, the DEA Iota 2204, can be seen in operation an online video.2 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors reported finding 
nuclear weapons component gauges near this machine when they 
inspected Advena in 1993. These are essentially exact models of a 
nuclear weapons component, and they asked South Africa to de-
stroy them. Earlier, this DEA machine may have been in one of the 
bunkers in the high explosive manufacturing area, according to a 
former member of the nuclear weapons program who saw a coordi-
nate measuring machine there (see below).
Armscor decided to create its own nuclear weapons theoretical 
group at Advena. Some of its members moved to Advena from the 
AEC’s program still housed in building 5100 below the main site 
at Pelindaba. By the late 1980s, four or five people remained in the 
AEC theoretical group and were involved in nuclear weapon simu-
lations and investigations of basis processes in a nuclear explosion, 
including neutronics and nuclear physics. However, they were not 
involved in designing nuclear devices. After the opening of Advena 
and the creation of an in- house theoretical group in 1989, the AEC 
ended its theoretical work on nuclear weapons, in essence ending 
the last vestiges of the Reactor Development Division. Figure 7.11 
shows some of their offices at Advena, as they appeared during a 
visit in 2002. Those who moved from the AEC to Advena believed 
they had moved nearer to the center of the weapons program.
Figure 7.9 Entrance to the electro-mechanical area in the main building, with a 
high security vault inside the room in left image.
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Figure 7.10 A DEA machine in Advena main building in early 1990s. Right 
image, as the area appeared in 2002 after machine removed. Source: Advena 
Central Laboratories advertising brochure from the early 1990s and Albright.
Figure 7.11 Wing that housed the nuclear weapons theoretical group. The par-
titions had been removed and the room converted to another purpose. A large 
vault was at the other end of this wing (not shown).
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Armscor and the AEC acquired various computer codes abroad 
and then applied them to the weapons program. These included 
codes for calculating two dimensional shaped charges. However, 
the weapons program in general was satisfied with one dimensional 
integrated neutron and hydrodynamic codes. The weapons- specific 
computer codes, which had been created over many years, were at 
the AEC until May 1988, when they were transferred to Advena 
with the closure of the Reactor Development Division.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE TEST FACILITY
The high explosive test facility, which was completed in July 1991, 
was a small building licensed to withstand the blast of up to 10 ki-
lograms of TNT while measuring blast phenomena (see figure 7.12). 
It was intended to develop the shaped charges of an implosion- type 
nuclear device. It was known as Toiings, or tatters, in Afrikaans.
The core of the building is a test chamber with thick concrete 
walls lined with wooden beams that prevented shrapnel from chip-
ping the concrete walls. Figures 7.13 (a) and (b) show the inside 
of the blast chamber, where shaped charges were tested, and the 
three- tonne blast door. Portals are visible through which flash x- ray 
machines and fast cameras record the blast. Figure 7.14 shows the 
room with the pedestals that held this equipment and the portals. 
The facility housed a 450 keV flash x- ray, possibly of U.S.-origin, 
and a streak camera (100-1000 ns/mm).
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Figure 7.12 The high explosive test facility, with integration building in back-
ground. Lightening arresters are visible.
Figure 7.13(a) The inside of the high explosive test cell, able to conduct tests of 
up to 10 kilograms of high explosives. The tests would be conducted in the sand 
pit. Open and closed portals are visible.
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In contrast, the indoor high explosive test cells in the Circle 
building could handle only 2.5 kilograms of high explosives. Figure 
7.15 shows the blast door to Circle’s ballistic testing area, which had 
eight small cells, each of which had a blast cover on top of it. Based 
on looking at the circular blast cover of a single cell in figure 7.15, 
Circle’s blast cells appear significantly smaller than the test chamber 
at the Advena site.
To successfully import high speed cameras for implosion- 
related testing, Armscor knew that it would need to deceive a foreign 
supplier, which would never approve an export to South Africa’s nu-
clear weapons program.3 At the time, South Africa could buy such 
cameras for a civil industry. So, in at least one case, Armscor used a 
mining company as a front. Armscor invested funds to create a high 
explosive facility at the mining company so that this facility could 
plausibly argue that it needed a fast camera. The camera was bought 
using a false end user certificate of this mining company. Once re-
ceived, it was diverted to Armscor. At some point, the exporter visited 
Figure 7.14 The inside of the high explosive test facility showing where the flash 
x-ray and streak camera had been positioned on pedestals behind the portals. 
The photo was taken in 2002 after the facility had been repurposed to a class-
room on nature conservation for former South African military personnel.
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the mining company to check that the camera was there. However, 
the exporter gave the mining company typically two weeks advance 
notice of their visit, reflecting the time needed to receive a visa. Two 
weeks was more than enough time to move the camera back to the 
mining company, so that it could be seen by the supplier. After the 
supplier left, it was moved back to Armscor.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE PROCESSING FACILITY
The high explosive manufacturing facility, finished in September 
1989, was composed of six bunkers, a control building, and an ad-
ministrative office involved in high explosives processing, storing, 
testing, and manufacture. The general assembly bunker (G6) was li-
censed to handle up to 200 kilograms of high explosives. The facility 
was known among the workers as Knopppiesaagte, or valley with 
bulges, in Afrikaans (figures 7.16-7.20).
Just before the end of the program, Advena illicitly acquired an 
explosion- proof five axis computer- numerically controlled milling 
machine from Japan (Ikegai) to machine precisely high explosive 
lens in the manufacturing bunkers. The precise shaping was judged 
necessary for the small implosion device Armscor was developing 
for its ballistic missiles.
Figure 7.15 In left image, the heavy, electrically controlled sliding blast door to 
the test cell area at the Circle building (closed). On right image, orange blast 
covers cover the high explosive test cells in the western end of the Circle build-
ing. Each cell was considerably smaller than the blast test cell at Advena.
ADVENA CENTRAL LABORATORIES
165
Figure 7.16 High Explosive Manufacturing Site
Figure 7.16 High Explosive Manufacturing Site
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Figure 7.18 Entrance to bunker G2 from outer perimeter road.
Figure 7.19 Top photo, bunker G6 looking in direction of G2. Lightening arrest-
ers are visible. Bottom photo, inside bunker G6. The cars are unrelated to the 




The South African nuclear weapons program remained focused on 
developing and then improving deliverable gun- type devices. Since 
its start, however, members of the program had studied and devel-
oped advanced nuclear weapons, and South Africa had a long list 
of them in which it expressed interest. Nevertheless, as the program 
evolved, implosion- type nuclear devices received the most atten-
tion followed by the use of thermonuclear materials to “boost” 
the explosive yield of a fission weapon. Several advanced weapons 
concepts were barely studied, discarded, or postponed until some 
distant future.
Further, questions have been raised about whether South Africa 
received nuclear weapons assistance from other countries. China 
and Israel in particular are mentioned. South African officials have 
maintained that South Africa did not receive nuclear weapons de-
signs or devices from any other country.
Figure 7.20 Inside the control building at center of site. Original panels from 




Building Completion date Comments
Offices and 
labs
February 1989 The main building had about 100 of-
fices and a “clean room” for more ad-
vanced manufacturing, including more 
sophisticated electronics manufactur-
ing. The main building was known as 
Uitsig (good view in Afrikaans)
Integration and 
test facility
June 1989 Designed for advanced weapons as-
sembly and integration with delivery 
systems. It had a long central bay with 
a large door at each end and rooms 
on either side of the bay. These rooms 
were to make and balance reentry 
vehicles, to cast and machine HEU, 
and store HEU, warheads, and reen-
try vehicle. The central bay was large 
enough to drive in a ballistic missile. 




September 1989 Composed of six bunkers and a con-
trol building for explosives processing, 
storing, testing, and manufacture. The 
general assembly bunker was licensed 
to handle up to 200 kilograms of high 
explosives. Facility known as Knop-
ppiesaagte (or valley with bulges);
High explosive 
test facility
July 1991 A small building licensed to withstand 
the blast of up to 10 kilograms of TNT 
while measuring blast phenomena. 
Intended to develop the shaped charges 
of an implosion-type nuclear device. It 
was known as Toiings (tatters)
High explo-
sives magazine




September 1989 Called Brandlaagte in Afrikaans.
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ADVANCED GUN- TYPE NUCLEAR DEVICES
Armscor intended to develop a more advanced gun- type nuclear 
device. The target date for completing this device was 1996. The 
modified device would have used a more modern propellant and im-
proved electronics. Armscor officials have made clear that if a missile 
warhead were developed, it may have carried an advanced gun- type 
warhead and not an implosion- type warhead. To that end, it needed 
to modify the series 500 warheads’ safety mechanism that prevented 
the HEU projectile from entering the HEU core when the barrel and 
sleeve mechanism were not aligned. This system was asymmetrical 
about the warhead’s central axis and thus not usable on a ballistic 
missile where symmetry is required for a successful flight. It was just 
starting to develop an acceptable new safety mechanism.
One loose end when the program ended was creating a new 
gun- type device for use in an underground test. The original Melba 
device was to be replaced by an updated device in 1991, codenamed 
Modulus; how much work was accomplished on this new device is 
unknown.4 This device would be expected to incorporate the latest 
safety mechanisms of the 500 series of devices. It would also likely 
have been designed for more rapid deployment at the test site than 
was possible with Melba, requiring additional or upgraded place-
ment and control equipment.
IMPLOSION- TYPE NUCLEAR DEVICES
Although research on implosion- type devices had occurred since the 
beginning of the nuclear explosive program in the early 1970s, im-
plosion research did not become a priority until the mid-1980s. One 
reason cited by former members of the program, is that the leaders 
of the program did not believe that an implosion weapon was really 
needed, given the focus on building gun- type nuclear devices.
By the 1980s, however, little work was being done at the AEC. 
Even its theoretical nuclear weapons work was not specific to an 
implosion design, although some of the basic physics research done 
in building 5100 could be applied to implosion designs.
The implosion work was taken over by Armscor. In the mid- 
to- late 1980s, its motivation was not strictly the development of an 
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implosion design.5 Armscor was interested in developing a method 
to use about half as much HEU per device, allowing the recycling 
of HEU in seven gun- type devices into 14 implosion- type devices. 
Another motivation was that lighter, smaller weapon systems could 
become available in the future, and implosion weapons could be 
miniaturized more easily than the gun- type devices. Another more 
immediate purpose, which applied to other advanced weapon de-
signs as well, was to help maintain the interests of the scientists and 
engineers who were involved in the design of the gun- type devices. 
The goal was to keep weapons scientists and engineers engaged 
by working on more challenging problems. This plan had the im-
mediate spin- off of helping maintain the technology base for the 
maintenance of gun- type systems.
Armscor’s implosion effort focused on developing, maintain-
ing, and demonstrating a technical level of sophistication. Although 
implosion development had always been present in South Africa’s 
nuclear explosive efforts, Advena’s capabilities were far more exten-
sive and reflected a stronger commitment to the development of a 
small implosion device.
Circle engineers correctly realized that a major stumbling block 
in developing an implosion system would be determining that a 
design would work satisfactorily. This problem was considerably 
simpler in the case of a gun- type device. The implosion program 
recognized that understanding compression during the detonation 
of the high explosives would be key to success, and decided to focus 
on developing good diagnostic capabilities to understand this phe-
nomenon. The primary focus of the implosion effort during the late 
1980s, according to Armscor, “was on the development of measure-
ment systems which could be used during the 1990s.” These included 
the development of diagnostic capabilities with flash x- rays, streak 
cameras, and flyer plates with pins that would allow for high ex-
plosive experiments where progress could be carefully documented.
By the end of the program, a number of implosion technologies 
were being developed.6 They included:
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• High explosive charge design;
• Ignition mechanisms;
• Detonic measuring techniques;
• Neutron triggering;
• Computer simulation and analyses;
• Plane wave lenses;
• Flyer plate acceleration (study on high explosive 
compaction);
• Casting experiments (TNT, HMS, Mixtures but not TATB);
• Isostatic pressing experiments (PBXs); and
• Machining experiments on simulants (plastics).
Safety considerations were being factored into future implo-
sion designs. An implosion device poses a risk that an accidental 
detonation of high explosives will trigger a nuclear explosion. To 
reduce this risk, Circle engineers began producing small quantities 
of TATB, an “insensitive” high explosive, in 1988. Insensitive explo-
sives ignite at higher temperatures than ordinary explosives. Firing 
a bullet into TATB will not cause it to detonate.
The program imposed very strict criteria on the implosion 
design. By the end of it, there was still no agreement on the specifi-
cations of a design, but the high explosive lens design had received 
most of the attention, according to a former member of the program 
who worked on the implosion effort.
According to Armscor leaders and members, the implosion de-
vice was to have a diameter of no more than about 50 centimeters, 
a size likely dictated by the RSA-3 missile re- entry vehicle. It would 
utilize about half the amount of HEU as the gun- type device, or 
28 kilograms of weapon- grade uranium. The actual amount would 
have depended on the design ultimately developed, but would have 
likely been in the range of 20-30 kilograms of weapon- grade ura-
nium in a solid ball. This relatively small diameter, according to 
another former senior Armscor member, placed a “tremendous con-
straint on the implosion system.”
Although no full- scale prototypes had been built, nor any de-
signs developed in detail, the program did have a cut- away scale 
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wooden implosion model. One participant remembered that it was 
of the high explosive system.
Unlike South Africa’s gun- type design, an implosion device 
would require a neutron initiator able to start the chain reaction 
at a precise moment. Armscor turned to the AEC to develop a min-
iaturized neutron generator based on accelerating deuterium into 
a tritium target. However, by the time the weapons program was 
cancelled, the AEC had built only a large laboratory model about 60 
centimeters long. They were able to get pulses of neutrons but had 
not yet miniaturized it. The then implosion design required a neu-
tron initiator that was no longer than about 15 centimeters, or one 
fourth as long as the lab model.
To develop implosion technologies, South Africa acquired a 
range of diagnostic and manufacturing equipment overseas. As dis-
cussed earlier, it had acquired flash x- rays and fast cameras. It also 
procured an isostatic press for pressing high explosives and a spe-
cialized five- axis computer controlled machine tool for precisely 
shaping the high explosives.
It was recognized that an implosion system would be easier to 
build with plutonium rather than HEU. However, without a source 
of plutonium, or the means to handle it safely, Armscor did little 
work on a plutonium- based implosion designs.
Armscor conducted at least one high explosive test of the 
spherical core using a surrogate material for the HEU. In 1987, the 
program conducted a six- point detonation test of a high explosive 
package with a steel ball at its center at the large Boskop high ex-
plosive test site several kilometers from Potchefshoom (southwest 
of Johannesburg). However, the test was unsuccessful; the steel ball 
was ejected and rolled down the hillside. Nonetheless, more tests 
were planned, using 12- and 20-point tests.
The Boskop site operated by Naschem had a high explosive 
detonics facility that was adequate to conduct large- scale implosion 
package tests. The site was comprised of a small high explosive test 
bunker, a flash x- ray machine of 300 KeV, and two streak cameras, 
one with a framing speed of half a million frames per second. Later, 
after the program ended, Armscor advertised this site as having a 
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flash x- ray and an ultra- speed camera with a framing speed of up to 
20 million frames per second.7
It is unknown whether Armscor would have ultimately built 
implosion devices as replacements for the gun- type devices. Armscor 
engineers have acknowledged that they would have faced many chal-
lenges producing an implosion weapon manufactured to the same 
level of demanding safety, security, and reliability specifications as 
the gun- type device. Nonetheless, Advena engineers appeared to be 
taking the right steps to build an implosion device, and they allowed 
for sufficient time. According to an Armscor official, a decision on 
building implosion weapons was still ten years away when the weap-
ons program was canceled.
A senior Armscor official said that an implosion- weapon pro-
gram would have required full- scale cold tests of the implosion 
system with a natural uranium core. Conducting such tests regu-
larly, he said, “would have posed risks with regard to detection.” 
One solution was to build a closed facility to conduct such tests. If 
Armscor had decided to build a closed arena large enough to con-
tain the detonation of large quantities of high explosives in a cold 
test, the arena would have cost about 12 million rand. This sum, he 
said, was considerable for the Advena program.
According to a former senior leader of the program, it may 
have been difficult to convince people that an implosion design 
would work without full- scale testing. If a full- scale nuclear test was 
needed to certify the weapon, the nuclear strategy would have had 
to be modified, another major challenge. This possible need for a 
full scale test was another factor that could have discouraged a de-
cision to build and deploy implosion- type nuclear weapons. At the 
least, developing methods to provide adequate safety, security, and 





For years rumors had abounded that South Africa made a war-
head that could have been fired from its 155-mm artillery system, 
called the G-6. A major reason for this rumor was South Africa’s 
announcement in 1982 that this system was capable of carrying a 
NATO nuclear warhead.8 In fact, South Africa conducted paper 
studies of artillery shells armed with nuclear devices, according to its 
declaration to the IAEA. Nonetheless, this project did not advance 
beyond preliminary paper studies of nuclear- armed artillery shells, 
according to Armscor officials involved in the program. The studies, 
including at least one done in the late 1980s, included shells with a 
diameter of 155 millimeters. Artillery shells with a gun- type device 
were also worked on. Earlier, following the 1985 decision, work had 
stopped on an artillery shell containing an implosion system using 
plutonium, according to South Africa’s declaration to the IAEA.
BOOSTED DEVICES
South Africa was interested in the idea of “boosting” the yield of its 
fission weapons by using a small amount of tritium and deuterium. 
The idea was to increase the explosive yield from 10-20 kilotons to 
60-100 kilotons. Small- scale theoretical work on the basic principles 
of nuclear fusion had started.9 Both a gaseous and solid form of the 
fusion fuel were considered. However, the gaseous form would have 
required the insertion of tritium and deuterium at high pressure into 
a capsule or reservoir, which the program judged as beyond South 
Africa’s capability.10 A solid pellet of lithium, tritium, and deuterium 
was selected instead.
For the gun- type device, the pellet would have been placed in 
the HEU projectile, according to South Africa’s declaration to the 
IAEA. Such placement would have been consistent with South Af-
rica’s command and control philosophy because the tritium in the 
fusion pellet decays radioactively in a relatively short period of time. 
Thus, the pellet would require periodic replacement.
Armscor, however, had little interest in boosted devices. In the 
1980s, its weapons effort was not ready for such an advanced concept 
and in any case not prepared to study the practicalities of boosting. 
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Moreover, Circle and Advena Central Laboratories did not have any 
facilities to handle tritium, which is very radioactive. In addition, 
Armscor officials said, if the purpose of the bomb program was to 
demonstrate capability, why would yield matter?
The work never moved to the point where tritium was used. In 
any case, the work was stopped in 1987, according to South Africa’s 
declaration to the IAEA. However, theoretical work may have con-
tinued afterwards or could have been restarted eventually.
Whether an effort to make a boosted device would have materi-
alized later is unknown. If it did, a new source of tritium would have 
been needed. Starting in 1987, the AEC started to sell the tritium that 
had been imported from Israel ten years earlier. Much of this tritium 
had already decayed radioactively since tritium has about a 12 year 
half- life.
The AEC decided to use its tritium handling laboratory, called 
the Gas Laboratory, at Pelindaba for making radio- luminescent 
light sources.11 Of the initial quantity of about 19.9 grams of tritium, 
about 9.31 grams were withdrawn from the four cylinders through 
1992 and about four grams were sold as light sources as of 1993.12 
By this date, the cylinders had been emptied and were then dis-
posed as waste because small amounts of tritium remained on their 
inner walls. By 1992, over half of the tritium had been lost through 
radioactive decay. Some, less than a gram, was also lost through 
uncontrolled releases or retained on container walls and disposed. 
Over time, more of the unused tritium decayed or was sold.
THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS
Although thermonuclear weapons were on a list of technologies 
to develop, little work was accomplished. The open literature was 
studied and some preliminary work was done by AEC or Arms-
cor experts, but nothing concrete, according to a senior Armscor 
official. There were lectures for program personnel on the subject, 
but one official who attended found the presentation simplistic and 
more like a report on an open literature search.
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FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
There have been allegations that Israel provided or offered nuclear 
weapons to South Africa, particularly in the 1970s. One often dis-
cussed case involves a declassified document describing a secret 1975 
meeting in Pretoria between Minister of Defense P.W. Botha and 
Israel’s Defense Minister Shimon Peres. In this meeting Botha ex-
pressed interest in receiving a limited number of units of “Chalet,” 
provided the correct payload could be provided.13 The Israeli De-
fense Minister said that the correct payload was available in three 
sizes. Chalet was a codename for the Jericho missile, and some have 
concluded that one of the “sizes” must have been nuclear. In essence, 
according to this interpretation, Botha was expressing interest in 
buying nuclear weapons from Israel and a ballistic missile to deliver 
them. Although the declassified document summarizing this discus-
sion does not mention a nuclear payload, it is plausible to assume 
that a nuclear warhead was one option, given the coded nature of 
the discussion. It would also be expected in such a delicate discus-
sion that deniability of any such possibility would be preserved.
After the document was made public, Peres and South African 
officials denied that the discussions involved the sale of any nuclear 
weapons. However, their denials do not settle the issue, given that 
the nature of the payload has not been revealed.
Complicating matters, following an earlier meeting in 1975 
where Israeli officials offered South Africa Jericho missiles,14 the 
South African military chief of staff wrote in a secret memorandum 
that “in considering the merits” of the offer, “certain assumptions 
have been made: that the warhead will be armed with nuclear 
warheads manufactured in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] or 
acquired elsewhere.”15 This memorandum added credibility to the 
claims that Botha was considering buying nuclear weapons later 
that year. However, this memorandum does not state that South Af-
rica asked Israel for nuclear weapons or that Israel offered them. 
It could as well be interpreted as the defense official expressing his 
own views about the growing need for South Africa to make a deci-
sion about obtaining nuclear weapons and reliable, credible delivery 
systems. Given concerns about the growing sophistication of enemy 
air defense systems, he mentions the need to consider acquiring 
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“stand- off television- guided bombs or surface- to- surface missiles,” 
noting that at that time South Africa possessed neither and would 
be advised to add these “very expensive but highly efficient weapons 
to our armoury.” In 1975 the South African defense establishment, 
headed by Botha as Defense Minister, was just starting a discussion 
about acquiring nuclear weapons. At the time, South Africa was con-
centrating on its peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) in a program 
run by the Atomic Energy Board that envisioned an underground 
test rather than deliverable nuclear weapons. Yet the official’s off- 
hand mention of acquiring nuclear weapons elsewhere implies that 
he may have thought that in addition to indigenous production, Is-
rael could also be a source for them.
Long before the declassification of the documents discussed 
above, the ex- Soviet spy Dieter Gerhardt said he had learned that 
in 1975 Israel had offered South Africa several Jericho missiles with 
six “special” warheads.16 He correctly said that the project was 
codenamed Project Chalet. He said that the special warheads were 
nuclear, based on his asking a more senior South African military 
official. Gerhardt’s information must be taken seriously; as a senior 
military official who spied for over twenty years, he had “access 
to some of the most sensitive information” in the South African 
Defense Force, according to former senior defense and nuclear of-
ficials.17 At a minimum, Gerhardt’s information would imply that 
some senior South African military officials believed that Israel was 
offering nuclear weapons to Pretoria or at least considering a re-
quest from South Africa for them.
In any case, Botha decided not to proceed with buying any 
Chalets at that time, and the Israeli prime minister may have been 
unwilling to approve a sale in any case. So, the nature of the payload 
was never established concretely in any deal.
Avner Cohen, a well- respected Israeli nuclear historian, makes 
a convincing argument that Israel did not make an actual offer to 
sell nuclear weapons to South Africa. He writes: “To the contrary, 
the conversation amounted to a probe by the South Africans, which 
ultimately went nowhere.”18 He added that he believes that both 
Israel’s then Prime Minister and its head of the nuclear program 
would have “opposed the sale of nuclear weapons, technology, or 
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even components—not just to South Africa, but to anyone.” How-
ever, what remains unclear is whether Botha made a direct or veiled 
request to purchase them.
The answer to what Botha intended with respect to Chalet pay-
loads may never be known. He was an intensely secretive leader. 
However, what is known is that Botha himself dates 1975 as when 
he “initiated discussions in respect of the possibility of creating nu-
clear weapons” for South Africa.19 Perhaps these negotiations with 
Israel focused South Africa’s defense establishment on the value of 
nuclear weapons and its perceived need to acquire advanced deliv-
ery systems. Until then, the South African military had expressed 
little interest in the PNE program run by the nuclear program. As 
discussed earlier, all of that would change in the late 1970s, as South 
Africa decided to build deliverable nuclear weapons. In parallel, it 
decided to build the stand- off television- guided bomb and later the 
capability to make surface- to- surface missiles in cooperation with 
Israel.
This episode highlights both countries’ skittishness with regard 
to discussing nuclear weapons. Armscor officials interviewed by one 
of the authors were unaware of any discussions with Israel in the 
1970s about nuclear weapons. However, they have stated often that 
during the 1980s, when Armscor controlled the nuclear weapons 
program, Armscor did not cooperate with Israel on nuclear weap-
ons. One official added that the mere mention of cooperation on 
nuclear weapons was taboo.
As is well- known, there was extensive cooperation between the 
scientists and engineers of Armscor and Israel on rockets, which 
each side called space launch cooperation. However, both countries 
used or planned to use these rockets as ballistic missiles to carry nu-
clear weapons, even if in the case of South Africa the rockets would 
also place a satellite into orbit. Moreover, in the case of South Af-
rica, there were Armscor experts who simultaneously worked on 
both the ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. Thus, the 
possibility for exchanges of sensitive nuclear weapons informa-
tion cannot be excluded, despite both countries’ officials stating 
that their countries maintained official policies banning such co-
operation. However, like the case discussed earlier about a South 
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African engineer seeking data about re- entry vehicles from Israe-
lis, Armscor engineers or scientists may have sought other sensitive 
nuclear- related information. They may have operated under general 
instructions to pick up sensitive information whenever they could; 
South African nuclear officials had such orders.20 However, other 
than information about re- entry vehicles discussed earlier, no evi-
dence was found that nuclear weapon information was obtained by 
South Africa from Israel.
The South Africans reported good cooperation with Israel on 
space launch vehicles but over time that cooperation suffered from 
the two countries having different operational requirements for their 
rockets, according to a former senior Armscor official. This official 
also said that Israel became worried about the cooperation during 
the mid- to- late 1980s, as international pressure against the apartheid 
government intensified. Despite their deteriorating relationship, by 
the late 1980s South Africa with Israeli assistance had created a ro-
bust rocket program expected to launch reconnaissance satellites 
and deploy nuclear- tipped intermediate range ballistic missiles.
SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE
As the 1980s closed, South Africa’s nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs were poised to make significant, albeit rather slow, 
advancements. Advena’s main objective was to develop the neces-
sary capability by the year 1996 to support a government decision 
to deploy a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. A multi- year de-
velopment effort was viewed as acceptable because of the number 
of obstacles that had to be overcome. As 1989 dawned and Advena 
became operational, however, the political winds in Southern Africa 
were shifting to greater regional accommodation and peace. The 
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By the 1980’s, several events were significantly changing the funda-
mental security situation in Southern Africa and increasing political 
support among white South Africans for an end to apartheid. These 
changes created the preconditions for denuclearization, even while 
support for nuclear weapons was growing in the South African 
military.
The June 1988 military exchanges between South African and 
Cuban troops along the Angolan/Namibian border appeared to 
shock both sides into finalizing a negotiated settlement. The US 
government was brokering a comprehensive peace settlement in 
Southern Africa in an effort led by Chester Crocker, then Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs.1
On August 5, 1988, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola established 
a de facto cease fire, followed by the complete withdrawal of South 
African troops from Angola by September 1, 1988.2 The agreement, 
called the “Geneva Protocol,” was followed on December 22, 1988 
with a tripartite agreement, signed at the United Nations by Cuba, 
South Africa, and Angola, which provided for Namibia’s indepen-
dence, the redeployment of Angolan and Cuban troops to northern 
Angola, and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola.3
The settlement of these long- standing issues in Angola and 
Namibia removed the major external security threat to South 
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Africa. The withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia went 
smoothly, and its old enemy, SWAPO, won the independence elec-
tions. The process demonstrated to white South Africans that major 
change could occur without catastrophic results. It also opened the 
door to a new set of expectations, namely that South Africa might 
move away from a confrontational relationship with the interna-
tional community to one of cooperation and development. The idea 
of South Africa as a regional leader for peace and prosperity started 
to emerge.
Parallel to achieving a settlement in Angola and Namibia, the 
leadership of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev fostered the per-
ception in the South African government that the Soviet Union was 
no longer the threat it used to be. In particular, Gorbachev reduced 
the impression among white South Africans that Moscow was 
behind all the imperialist ventures in southern Africa, and thus a 
major threat to its security. Since the African National Congress was 
viewed by Afrikaaners as a stalking horse for Moscow, this shift in 
belief meant that the government could now begin a more realistic 
reevaluation of South Africa’s domestic situation. Direct govern-
mental negotiations with the ANC need not be seen by white South 
Africans as tantamount to national suicide. The collapse of the Ber-
lin Wall in late 1989 brought an end to the Cold War and signaled 
the end of the Soviet threat in Southern Africa.
A growing desire to end apartheid may also have contributed 
indirectly to a reevaluation of the South African nuclear weapons 
program. By the late 1980s, economic sanctions and the withdrawal 
of investments from South Africa, combined with racial unrest, had 
left South Africa in its deepest financial crisis ever. In light of South 
Africa’s worsening economic situation, many important members 
of the ruling National Party had come to believe that apartheid 
was unworkable and that a political solution was needed to dis-
mantle the system. Several years of secret discussions between key 
Afrikaaner leaders, Nelson Mandela, and other ANC leaders in the 
mid- to- late 1980s had convinced much of the white leadership of 
the ANC’s moderation and its willingness to negotiate if all restric-
tions were lifted. It also convinced them that its rise in power within 
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South Africa was inevitable,4 or at the very least, many members 
of the National Party realized that the ANC and its political allies 
could not be defeated.
Although the above changes were necessary for a nuclear roll-
back, they may not have been sufficient. In 1988 and 1989, Armscor 
was finishing a new set of nuclear weapon production facilities and 
was initiating a long- term modernization program of South Africa’s 
nuclear arsenal. This included developing nuclear- tipped ballistic 
missiles and possibly increasing the total number of nuclear weap-
ons. A change in political leadership appears to have been necessary 
as well.
The most important patron of this weapons program, and 
opponent of ending apartheid, was President Botha, whose well- 
known explosive temper and authoritarian manner earned him the 
nickname the “old crocodile.” Although Botha was committed to 
reforming the apartheid system, he was unwilling to sacrifice Af-
rikaaner power in the process. For example, in the early 1980s, he 
created the powerful new office of State President and a tri- cameral 
Parliament. It gave separate houses to the Colored and Indian com-
munities, a controversial action that split the National Party. This 
led to the creation of the Conservative Party, whose members saw 
even these modest reforms as going too far.
Despite the controversy over his policies, Botha’s changes were 
seen by blacks as token reforms at best and served mainly to in-
flame them. His efforts to suppress the black rebellion were ruthless 
and intensified throughout the second half of the 1980s. It left him 
increasingly isolated in his efforts to defeat the rebellion before al-
lowing any negotiations with black leaders, which, according to 
Botha’s vision, would proceed only with “moderates” and not with 
the ANC.
Further serving to undermine reforms, Botha had created a par-
allel governing structure dominated by security elements. When he 
came to power in 1978, Botha launched basic changes in the gov-
ernmental structures for decision- making and implementation that 
led to the concentration of security issues in the hands of a revived 
State Security Council. This council was composed of the so- called 
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“securocrats” — mostly military, intelligence, and security officials, 
and a few of his closest ministers. The State Security Council, which 
was highly conservative, became the central instrument of control 
of the country, bypassing Botha’s own National Party and the Par-
liament, a fact increasingly resented by the members of the National 
Party.
Botha went further in concentrating power on certain secret 
projects, such as the nuclear weapons program. This project was 
never discussed in the State Security Council and only with those 
ministers who had a strict need to know.5 Cabinet level decisions 
on nuclear weapons, such as limiting the program in 1985, appear 
to have been made by an ad hoc group of ministers, including De-
fense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Mineral and Energy Affairs (see 
chapter 5).
In early 1989, an opportunity for significant political change 
appeared. Despite both the untenable domestic and international 
situation, Botha exhibited no intention to step aside. In January 
1989, he suffered a stroke and then unexpectedly resigned as leader 
of the National Party. Botha retained his position as State President, 
however, which sparked a political crisis since South Africa’s consti-
tution provided that the leader of the strongest party is also head of 
government. Although the desire for change was mounting within 
the National Party, few expected significant change when, in Febru-
ary 1989, F. W. de Klerk won the party leader position over several 
candidates who were considered “reformists” but were too closely 
linked to the securocrat faction.6 The stage was now set for de Klerk 
to oust Botha and claim the Presidency. Following a dramatic con-
frontation with his cabinet ministers in August 1989, Botha resigned 
as president on August 14, 1989.7 De Klerk became acting president 
the next day, and won the whites’-only election held in September, 
ushering in a new era for South Africa.
As has been extensively documented elsewhere, the political rise 
of F. W. de Klerk led to a fundamental transformation in South Af-
rica. This included the freeing of Nelson Mandela and hundreds of 
other political prisoners, the lifting of a ban on the ANC, the demil-
itarization of the government’s decision- making processes, and the 
starting of negotiations with the ANC and other opposition parties 
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to work out a new national constitution. Unseen and in parallel 
to these profound changes, de Klerk decided to secretly terminate 
South Africa’s nuclear weapons program and dismantle the existing 
nuclear weapons.
DE KLERK’S DECISION
Because he had been the Minister in charge of the Atomic Energy 
Corporation, namely Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs sev-
eral years earlier, de Klerk already knew about the nuclear weapons 
program. He had even attended the opening of the Kentron Circle 
Building in 1981 (see chapter 5). However, he had never been in 
Botha’s “inner circle,” so he never had an impact on the program or 
much to do with decisions about it. De Klerk said that by the time 
he became President in September 1989, “it was already evident to 
me, and also to my colleagues who were also informed, that it was 
in our national interest that a total reverse — also in respect to our 
nuclear policy — was called for.”8 Given the international and do-
mestic changes that had occurred, President de Klerk believed that 
“a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous, but in fact 
an obstacle to the development of South Africa’s international re-
lations.”9 The desire to rejoin the international community was a 
primary motivation for many of his subsequent actions.
Waldo Stumpf, the head of the Atomic Energy Corporation 
at the time, tells an anecdote that sheds some light on de Klerk’s 
thinking. One or two weeks after assuming office, de Klerk called 
a meeting of a few key Ministers and experts, including Stumpf. 
According to Stumpf, President de Klerk said that he wanted to 
make South Africa a “respected member of the international com-
munity, and we’ll have to turn around the politics and we’ll have to 
terminate this program, turn it around and accede to the Nuclear 
Non- Proliferation Treaty.”10 The termination process, Stumpf says, 
started then.
De Klerk believed that world opinion had become increasingly 
opposed to nuclear weapons. He also thought that South Africa 
would acquire significant advantages if it acceded to the NPT, 
which would include international exchanges of nuclear technology 
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beneficial to South Africa’s future. When South Africa did so in the 
summer of 1991, de Klerk expressed his hope that joining the treaty 
“[would] facilitate the international exchange of nuclear technol-
ogy, which is not only important for the maintenance and further 
development of South Africa’s own nuclear program, but [would] 
also be to the benefit of its neighboring states and the international 
nuclear community.”11 Nuclear weapons would have spoiled any 
such cooperation.
At home, opposition to the nuclear weapons program had been 
growing within portions of the top leadership, particularly after 
South Africa’s security situation eased in 1988 and the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact showed increasing signs of disintegration. 
Some of de Klerk’s colleagues who knew about the weapons pro-
gram had lost their faith in the potential usefulness of the arsenal. 
For example, Jeremy Shearer, then a senior member of the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs (DFA) who had been responsible for nuclear 
matters, recalled that he and others in the government had begun 
to wonder what might actually occur if South Africa exercised its 
nuclear option in a military crisis with front- line states and their 
Warsaw pact allies.12 He had come to believe that if South Africa 
implemented this strategy, the actual effect might be to invite the 
combined wrath of both the United States and Russia. The unin-
tended result could be the end of the South African government, 
rather than its preservation.
Initial opposition appears to have been mainly centered in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. A DFA memorandum from 1988 
shows strong opposition to the AEC and Armscor’s positions of 
maintaining the then nuclear weapons strategy and not signing the 
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. DFA’s argument, which is in a re-
sponse to a document circulated by the AEC and Armscor, centered 
on the point Shearer mentioned above. It also included a range of 
concerns that the policy of strategic nuclear uncertainty was not 
deterring South Africa’s enemies, but rather leading to greater in-
ternational condemnation, all at a time when South Africa needed 




Among those that believed the strategy had worked to deter 
Cuba and the Soviet Union, many of them agreed in general that 
regional and international changes had made the program unneces-
sary. Even Armscor’s leadership, according to former leaders of the 
program, had started to recognize the impact of these changes; at 
least they were not surprised by de Klerk’s actions.
Questions have been raised regarding why de Klerk acted so 
quickly on the nuclear issue after becoming State President. Mitch-
ell Reiss, who studied the South African nuclear program in the 
early 1990s, believes that de Klerk needed to seize the opening pro-
duced by his election victory to dismantle the program.14 He quotes 
a senior South African official: “If [de Klerk] had waited, he never 
would have gotten cabinet approval, since opposition to giving up 
the program in the defense community was great.”15
Significantly, many senior Armscor officials, who could have 
been strong advocates of continuing the nuclear weapons program, 
did not oppose ending it.16 Although the program had considerable 
momentum, the growing consensus among key Armscor leaders was 
that it was no longer needed because of the dramatic changes occur-
ring in Southern Africa and the former Soviet Union.
Moreover, at the time of the dismantlement decision, Arms-
cor understood that its space launch program would survive. This 
high- tech program was considerably larger than the nuclear weap-
ons program in terms of personnel, infrastructure, and funding. To 
Armscor, the demise of the nuclear weapons program had little in-
stitutional impact, although it had major strategic consequences and 
required careful consideration of how to end the program safely and 
securely. To Armscor’s great disappointment however, a few years 
later it was forced to abandon its space launch vehicle program 
as well. This decision was much harder to swallow for Armscor 
officials.17
Members of de Klerk’s government have consistently denied 
that the dismantlement decision was motivated by a desire to prevent 
nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded materials from falling into the 
hands of an ANC- led government, i.e. to prevent a “black bomb.” In 
1989 Stumpf reports that de Klerk was not really worried about the 
ANC getting the bomb; at least the discussion did not surface when 
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he was present in meetings.18 Another former member of the pro-
gram, who was also involved in implementing the dismantlement 
decision, similarly does not believe the question of inheritance was 
a major consideration of de Klerk.
However, according to André Buys, who in 1990 had become 
General Manager in charge of planning for Armscor, many in the 
program thought that a debate on the future of nuclear weapons 
would be harmful at that critical point in the transformation of 
South Africa.19 In addition, it is believable that de Klerk and his 
advisors did worry about whether a future multi- party government 
could successfully share control over the nuclear arsenal. Eliminat-
ing the arsenal before launching major reforms of the government, in 
this view, prevented potential conflict among the major parties and 
created a regional and international policy against nuclear weapons. 
Because the ANC had opposed the South African nuclear weapons 
program, it would find it hard to oppose what de Klerk had done.
Although there is little evidence that de Klerk’s thinking was 
dominated by concerns about a future ANC- led government inher-
iting nuclear weapons, Western intelligence agencies and right- wing 
military officials apparently worried a great deal about this possi-
bility. To these groups, the prospect of an ANC- controlled nuclear 
program that might have included stocks of nuclear weapons or 
highly- enriched uranium was a major concern up to the time of the 
first democratic elections in April 1994. According to a 1993 article in 
the London Sunday Times, Western intelligence officials were con-
cerned about the “unstable security situation in South Africa,” and 
had expressed “deep disquiet that a future ANC government might 
be tempted to start its own weapons- making program, or to sell 
the [highly enriched] uranium either to Libya, Iran, or the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, all of which gave the movement support 
during the years in exile.”20
Much later, after de Klerk publicly revealed the existence of the 
nuclear weapons program, South African and US officials expressed 
surprise to one of the authors at the support for nuclear weapons 
they heard from a few important members of the ANC. Individual 
members of the ANC, some of whom were destined for high office, 
expressed their opposition to the de Klerk government’s decision to 
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abandon nuclear weapons.21 These opinions, however, were never 
the mainstream opinion of the ANC leadership, and in particular 
not those of Nelson Mandela.
As an informal advisor in 1993 and 1994 to the ANC nuclear 
policy group chaired by Roger Jardine, one of the authors (Albright) 
was struck by the ease with which Mandela publicly supported the 
NPT well before his election to the Presidency. Albright had raised 
the issue with Jardine of Mandela endorsing the NPT one day in the 
summer of 1993. Jardine approached Mandela. Within a few days, 
Mandela in a public statement on August 30, 1993 pledged: “The 
ANC will abide by the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, and we 
fully support the declaration by the Organization of African Unity 
calling for the establishment of the African continent as a nuclear 
weapons- free zone.”22 Despite many differences over the timing and 
details of past government announcements about the nuclear weap-
ons program, Mandela unambiguously agreed that nuclear weapons 
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DISMANTLING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The end of the nuclear weapons program was an emotional expe-
rience for those who had labored tirelessly in secret to build the 
deliverable nuclear weapons. The previous few years had been par-
ticularly stressful, when most of the production quality nuclear 
weapons were built and tensions escalated in Angola.
Those in the program had to be told what President de Klerk 
had decided. After all, they would be the ones actually carrying out 
the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons. Armscor gathered those 
in the program into the new cafeteria at Advena Central Labora-
tories to tell them of their fate soon after President de Klerk had 
publicly announced the end of apartheid in February 1990 (see fig-
ure 9.1).
After that dramatic speech, heralding a far different South Af-
rica, most of the employees were not surprised by the decision to 
dismantle the nuclear weapons, according to one of the leaders of 
the Armscor nuclear weapons program.1 They understood the lack 
of need for these dangerous weapons. Nevertheless, the announce-
ment was an emotional blow to many of the workers, who had 
become like family. There was some relief that the government had 
decided to convert Advena to commercial purposes, ensuring that 
their jobs were secure, at least for a while.
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ORGANIZING AND IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
Soon after taking office in the fall of 1989, President de Klerk or-
dered the creation of an Experts' Committee to investigate various 
ways to dismantle the nuclear arsenal and to draw up a schedule 
for dismantlement and accession to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation 
Treaty as a non- nuclear weapon state.2 This committee, which in-
cluded senior officials of the AEC, Armscor, and the South African 
Air Force, examined the entire dismantlement process over the next 
several weeks.3
Committee members were in consensus in their recommenda-
tions to de Klerk, but that did not mean that there had not been 
disagreements along the way. Should the arsenal be dismantled before 
announcing the existence of the program? Who outside the program 
should witness the dismantlement process? Some advocated that the 
weapons should be dismantled in exchange for something tangible 
from the international community.4 However, this committee ruled 
out the IAEA as a body to verify the actual dismantlement process. 
The dismantlement would occur in secret and a nuclear weapons 
program would be denied, which would make it impossible to trade 
dismantlement for concrete benefits.
Figure 9.1 Cafeteria in Advena’s main building near the front entrance, as it ap-
peared in 2002. Here in early 1990, members of the nuclear weapons program 
heard that the nuclear weapons were to be dismantled. In the aerial image on 
right, the cafeteria appears on the bottom right of the building, with the sloped 
roof. The long building behind the cafeteria is where the clean rooms were lo-
cated. Photo Credit: Albright (left) and Al Venter, How South Africa Built Six 
Atom Bombs (right).
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This committee gave its report to de Klerk in November 1989 
with a formal recommendation to dismantle the arsenal and an out-
line of the dismantlement procedures.5 According to Waldo Stumpf, 
then head of the Atomic Energy Corporation and a leader of the 
dismantlement effort, de Klerk approved the plan in principle.6 He 
issued an instruction to stop the production of further nuclear de-
vices, to shut down the Y Plant, and to dismantle South Africa's 
nuclear capability before accession to the NPT.
A few more months would pass before the formal dismantle-
ment process was established. Many details needed to be worked 
out first.
Several recently declassified and translated documents shed 
light on the dismantlement decisions.7 Codenamed the Mantel Pro-
ject, the plan was intended for final review and approval by de 
Klerk. Outlined in a document dated February 8, 1990, it called for 
dismantling all the nuclear weapons and half- completed devices, 
components, and material in a tightly controlled manner along 
with melting down the HEU components.8 In keeping with the de-
cision to keep the nuclear weapons program secret, the plan stated: 
“Perform the necessary cleaning operations to attach credibility to 
the statement that the RSA [South Africa] did manufacture highly 
enriched uranium but did not undertake the final step of manufac-
turing nuclear weapons.”9 Thus, the existence of the weapons would 
be denied but not the production of HEU. Because of the ability of 
the IAEA to detect traces of HEU at the Y Plant and in the surround-
ing area, which had also been contaminated with HEU, hiding the 
AEC’s production of HEU was assessed as impossible.10 However, 
as will be discussed later, an effort was made to hide the presence of 
HEU at the Circle complex.
On February 26, 1990, de Klerk issued a written authorization 
to (1) release from the storage vault at Circle all existing nuclear 
devices and components, both complete and incomplete, (2) dis-
mantle all existing nuclear devices, and (3) to transfer the HEU in 
a safe and secure manner to the AEC for storage. He ordered that 
the dismantling and cleaning up process take place under the super-
vision of a steering committee composed of senior members of the 
South African Defense Force, AEC, and Armscor. (Stumpf eventually 
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became the head of steering committee).11 De Klerk also appointed 
an independent expert to audit the entire process and to report in-
dependently to him.12
The President in the February 26th document also charged the 
steering committee to evaluate and approve the plan for dismantling 
the weapons and decontaminating the related facilities, to approve 
the dismantling process step- by- step, and to report regularly to the 
State President.
The steering committee’s full set of specific responsibilities are 
not mentioned in the documents released by von Wielligh. How-
ever, key participants on the Steering Committee and its subsidiary 
working group charged with carrying out the dismantlement, have 
discussed these responsibilities. The following list was compiled 
mainly from a report by Stumpf.13 Other responsibilities are added 
below this list and their sources cited.
• Dismantle the six completed gun- type devices and the pre- 
production “cold devices” at Advena under controlled and 
safe conditions;
• Melt and recast the HEU from these six devices, as well 
as from the partially completed seventh device, and to re-
turn it to the AEC for safe- keeping. Careful accountability 
measures must be followed;
• Decontaminate the Armscor facilities fully and return se-
verely contaminated equipment to the AEC, such as the 
melting furnace;
• Convert the Advena/Circle facilities to conventional 
weapon and non- weapon commercial activities;
• Destroy/dispose non- nuclear components of the devices as 
well as technical design and manufacturing information. 
(Many components were recycled or left at Circle);
• Advise the de Klerk government of a suitable time- table for 
accession to the NPT, signature of a comprehensive safe-
guards agreement with the IAEA, and submission of a full 
and complete national initial inventory of nuclear material 
and facilities, as required by the safeguards agreement; and
• Close down the Y Plant at the earliest moment.14
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Additional responsibilities of the steering committee included:15
• Maintain security and safety during the dismantlement 
process;
• Carefully and sympathetically handle personnel through 
alternative employment, early retirement, and retraining. 
Before leaving employment, every member was to be de-
briefed and re- motivated for the changed circumstances. 
“Security (and motivation) follow- ups were arranged in 
those cases where it was known that the decision caused 
financial hardship or moral backlash;”16 and
• Conduct an internal audit of the nuclear weapons program 
by a combined South African Defense Force, Atomic En-
ergy Corporation, and Armscor internal audit team.
According to Stumpf, before actual dismantling of the nuclear 
devices could occur, the steering committee in conjunction with 
the working group had to create extensive operational procedures 
to fulfill the safety and security requirements associated with the 
dismantling process. The committee had to develop procedures on 
destroying equipment and documents and on handling the nuclear 
material. The dismantlement process also involved many security 
risks because disgruntled employees could decide to reveal the 
program's existence or steal materials or documents. As a result, 
procedures to inform program personnel about the dismantlement 
procedure needed to be established.
The steering committee also developed two options for disman-
tling the arsenal.17 One option called for first dismantling one- half 
of each device, for example, the front end of each device, before 
destroying the remaining halves. This option would be the quickest 
way to eliminate the arsenal. The other option involved dismantling 
one device at a time, allowing South Africa to preserve a nuclear 
capability until the last weapon was dismantled. De Klerk chose 
the slower option and approved the rest of the Steering Commit-
tee's procedures in July 1990. Dismantling then started. Table 9.1 
shows the dismantlement schedule of the seven devices with HEU, 
in particular when HEU was removed from the front sections of the 
devices and when the rest of the device was dismantled.
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TABLE 9.1: DISMANTLEMENT SCHEDULE OF SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES, AFTER PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S DECISION TO DISMANTLE THE NUCLEAR 
ARSENAL (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY WITH RESPECT TO REMOVAL OF HEU)
NOTES AND COMMENTS
1. The HEU core was recast.
2. The source for this table is South Africa’s 1993 declaration 





Start of Dismantling 
(HEU removed)
Completion of  
Dismantling 
(Rest of Device)
Set 7(1) July 16, 1990 July 26, 1990
504 Rear July 1990 October 1991
Front August 1990 October 1991
503 Rear October 1990 October 1991
Front November 1990 October 1991
Video/
Melba
Rear January 1991 February 1991
Front February 1991 February 1991
502 Rear March 1991 September 1991
Front April 1991 September 1991
501 Rear May 1991 September 1991
Front July 1991 September 1991
306 Rear August 1991 September 1991
Front August 1991 September 1991
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The center of dismantlement activities was the Circle and Ad-
vena facilities, by then collectively referred to as Advena. During the 
dismantlement process, the devices were removed from the vault at 
the Circle building and HEU removed. The HEU was melted and 
recast into ingots of a few kilograms each and then returned to the 
vault. Special shelves were installed in one internal vault to safely 
store the recast HEU ingots without causing a criticality accident. 
The nonnuclear components were taken from a device and grouped 
according to their design sensitivity and fate. A quality control 
group kept a careful record of the origin (by device) of each com-
ponent and its subsequent destination. Sensitive components were 
either dismantled into raw materials and non- sensitive parts or de-
stroyed by cutting and melting. Sensitive pyrotechnical components 
were destroyed. Explosives from the device (and samples stored sep-
arately for life- expectancy testing) were destroyed by detonation. As 
much as possible, components from different devices were grouped 
together and then cut up or destroyed in only a few campaigns. 
Non- sensitive components were transferred to Circle’s stores or dis-
posed as scrap. The dismantlement process is outlined in the sidebar 
for what Armscor called a “cold device,” which was a nuclear explo-
sive device that did not contain HEU.
Before the last device was dismantled, de Klerk was asked if 
he was certain of his decision.18 The President told Armscor and the 
AEC to finish the job.
To ensure secrecy, the HEU was sent from the Circle building 
back to Pelindaba at night in the trunks of Toyota sedans. For secu-
rity reasons, Armscor initially had scheduled many military guards 
to patrol the road without informing them of the true purpose of 
their mission. Nevertheless, the increased activity attracted the at-
tention of people living in the area. One curious neighbor of the 
site demanded to know what was happening. Subsequent shipments 
were done without arousing such curiosity, and involved far fewer 
guards. In total, about 20 shipments of HEU occurred over the four 
nights, March 12/13, March 14/15, September 3/4, and September 
5/6, 1991.19
Soon after sending the last HEU to the AEC, the Circle building 
was completely decontaminated, and contaminated equipment that 
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The following diagram is from a document preserved by South Africa and translated into 
English, titled “Rendering Harmless of Cold Device.” Following the diagram is a descrip-
tion of each step in the diagram.
1.1 AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO DEVICE
The front and rear part of the device will be released simultaneously for dismantling. Con-
cerned persons are:
ADVENA:  Integration Group   Mr ________
AIR FORCE:     Mr ________
The formal release for dismantling will be entered into the logbooks.
1.2 TAKE TO INTEGRATION BUILDING AND DISMANTLE
The device will be dismantled, and the individual parts will be grouped as indicated on 
the Parts List.
Dismantling will be done by ________ and ________ During dismantling the Quality Con-
trol Group will keep a record of the origin and destination of the various parts, and the 
record will be continuously updated. A device (front and rear parts) will be dismantled in 
the course of a week, but attempts will be made to speed up the process for subsequent 
devices.
DISMANTLING A COLD DEVICE
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1.3 TRANSFER PARTS TO STORAGE
Following the dismantling of the device, all parts deemed necessary for storage (ref. Parts 
List) will be transferred to raw materials storage. Storage staff will transfer components to 
the appropriate storage as soon as adequate numbers are available. The Quality Control 
Group will record the physical location of the transferred parts.
1.4 RECORD RECEIPT OF PARTS
The responsible storage staff will receive the parts at zero value. The parts will be stored 
separately. The storage staff may decide on the storage locations; however, it is important 
that the components can be traced.
1.5 TRANSFER EXPLOSIVES TO STORAGE
Following removal of the explosives from the device, they will immediately be placed in 
appropriate containers and transferred temporarily to explosives storage.
1.6 STORE PARTS TO BE MACHINED
Parts which need to be machined (ref. Parts List) will temporarily be transferred to storage 
so that they can later be machined in one campaign. It is recommend that the integration 
area be cleaned and used for this purpose.
1.7 TRANSFER PYROTECHNICAL COMPONENTS TO STORAGE
The pyrotechnical components which are not to be destroyed, such as detonators and 
cords, will be transferred to explosives storage and made available for later projects.
1.8 DESTROY EXPLOSIVES
The explosives from the device, as well as the separately stored samples used for life ex-
pectancy testing, will be destroyed in one major destruction campaign. The destruction 
will be carried out by ________ and ________ and be controlled by the Quality Control 
Group.
1.9 MACHINE PARTS
Sensitive parts that must be rendered harmless through machining must be stored in a 
location where they can be easily accessed. The machining must take place in the AD-
VENA workshop. The Quality Control Group must maintain records of the parts machined.
1.10 TRANSFER REUSABLE PARTS TO RAW MATERIALS STORAGE
Parts which are not classified as sensitive shall be transferred to raw materials storage and 
may be used for other projects.
1.11 MELT SCRAP MATERIAL
Parts which can no longer be used as raw material must be deformed in such a manner 
that they can be transferred to outside companies as scrap to be melted.
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had been used for the re- melting and casting of HEU sent to the AEC. 
Most other machine tools and equipment were decontaminated, if 
necessary, but remained at Advena for commercial nonnuclear ap-
plications. Computerized testing equipment was rendered useless 
for the weapons program by destroying the specific software that 
controlled the equipment's operation. In addition, the main ura-
nium processing section of Circle was carefully decontaminated. 
Walls were removed, and the concrete floor jacked out. Contami-
nation was reduced to background levels. Special doors were built 
over the high security vault that would have served as part of an 
effort to hide the vaults from inspectors (see figures 9.2 (a) and (b)). 
As per ordered, the intent was to leave the room clean enough so 
that South Africa could plausibly deny the existence of the nuclear 
weapons program. Armscor officials stated that they personally did 
not believe that the program would ever be revealed.20
This portion of the dismantlement work was completed by 
September 6, 1991, approximately two months after South Africa 
acceded to the NPT on July 10, 1991, but prior to entry into force of 
the safeguards agreement on September 16, 1991.
By September 1991, not all of the major nonnuclear compo-
nents of the weapons had been destroyed. In addition, detailed 
design drawings, computer software used in weapons design, doc-
uments, and photos of components remained. The retrieval of the 
classified records took time. The dismantlement team retrieved and 
indexed over 12,000 technical documents that described the design 
of the Y Plant and other nuclear weapon production facilities along 
with the methods for building nuclear weapons.21 The documents 
were stored in a steel cage near the Circle building until they were 
burned in 1993.
Only on March 17, 1993 did President de Klerk order the de-
struction of the sensitive documents. The destruction orders were 
not limited only to technical documents; even the nuclear strategy 
and nuclear weapons policy documents were ordered destroyed be-
fore de Klerk announced the program.22 By March 24, 1993, when 
President de Klerk announced the program's existence, sensitive 
weapon components had been destroyed or damaged beyond re- use.
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Figure 9.2(a) High security storage vault in Circle that held nuclear weapons, as 
it appeared in 2002, with outer doors to hide vault, in open and shut position. If 
the IAEA had asked to visit the Circle building prior to March 1993, the outer 
doors could have been blended into a blank wall to hide the vault from the 
inspectors.
Figure 9.2(b) The uranium processing area after the removal of the original con-
crete floor and partition walls with the vault in the background.
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De Klerk ordered certain documents to be preserved, mainly 
those needed to verify key decisions, the amount of HEU produced, 
the number of nuclear devices produced, and dismantlement oper-
ations. Because the production and material accountancy records 
of the Y Plant had been identified early in the process as critical 
to the verification that could be required under the NPT, the AEC 
had retained those records. South Africa also retained original doc-
uments relating to the initiation and termination of the project. By 
law, South Africa was required to keep medical and radiological re-
cords of all project personnel for 30 years.
Dismantlement records varied in their detail and thoroughness. 
Dismantling records involving HEU weapon components were de-
tailed; however, records for natural and depleted uranium used in 
the pre- production devices were sparse and non- quantitative. The 
dismantling records for the non- nuclear components were brief and 
largely involved listings of component systems dismantled from the 
deliverable nuclear devices. Records were absent for the dismantling 
of the pre- production experimental devices or the Melba device. 
There were no destruction records for the components.
In the February 26, 1990 order to dismantle the program, 
President de Klerk nominated Professor Wynand L. Mouton, a 
well- known retired nuclear physicist and academic, to audit the 
dismantlement process. He was tasked with ensuring that it was 
done in a safe, secure, and responsible manner, along with regularly 
informing de Klerk personally about the progress of the disman-
tlement.23 Mouton, in short, was de Klerk's representative during 
the dismantlement and clean- up process.24 He attended all steering 
committee meetings both during the planning and execution stages, 
contributing ideas and suggestions and responding to requests for 
his advice.
Mouton's primary responsibility was to help ensure that nu-
clear materials and secrets were not diverted. Because he was an 
auditor and thus present at Advena only a fraction of the time, he 
first sought to determine if he could trust the people responsible for 
the dismantlement process. Many of them had been his students 
or colleagues during his long professional career, but he needed to 
ascertain if they “kept information away from him.”25 In general, 
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Mouton later reported the personnel involved in the dismantlement 
process were both competent and trustworthy.
Although some people reportedly expressed unhappiness with 
the decision to give up the nuclear weapons program, their con-
cerns had more to do with hesitancy to give up on something they 
had worked years to create.26 Such concerns, however, influenced 
Mouton's recommendation to de Klerk to select the dismantlement 
option that would leave the country with a nuclear deterrent until 
the last weapon was dismantled. Mouton believed that this option 
was the “wiser one at that stage of the whole process”27 and would 
help “acclimate the dismantlement team to the reality of the presi-
dent's decision.”28
Typically, Mouton would go to the Circle or Advena facilities 
two to three times a month, staying a day or more. He witnessed the 
dismantlement of the first device and returned later to see another 
weapon taken apart. In particular, he wanted to see the HEU com-
ponents in the weapons. When the HEU ingots were sent back to the 
AEC, Mouton also accompanied the shipments in a separate car on 
two of the four nights. He also sampled the documents in the steel 
cage at Advena to ensure that the record keeping system was accu-
rate, and he was present when the records were burned.29
Mouton reported personally to de Klerk, in most cases, briefing 
the president orally from his notes. On March 23, 1993, Mouton 
presented de Klerk with a final report that contained his judgments 
about the dismantlement process. He declared that the dismantle-
ment objectives had been accomplished satisfactorily, namely that 
the nuclear devices were dismantled, all hardware for the nuclear 
devices in possession of Armscor was destroyed, no evidence was 
found that any documents ordered destroyed were deliberately 
withheld, and all of the highly- enriched uranium at Advena was sent 
back to the AEC.30
According to de Klerk, Mouton was charged “to satisfy himself 
that every gram of nuclear material had been accounted for and all 
the hardware and design information was destroyed.”31 However, 
despite Mouton's declaration, he could not accomplish such precise 
verification of the dismantlement process. For example, Mouton de-
termined that the amount of HEU that was taken from the nuclear 
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devices was “a few hundred grams” more than the amount sub-
sequently returned to the AEC.32 This amount, Mouton observed, 
was only a fraction of the amount needed for a nuclear weapon. He 
was not surprised by this small discrepancy, however, because the 
process of recovering the HEU involved steps such as removing the 
nickel coating that led to such losses of HEU.33 More importantly, 
Mouton was unable to provide credible assurance to those outside 
the government, particularly the IAEA, that no weapons or HEU 
had been hidden away.
Because some employees in the nuclear weapons program were 
suspected of having far right- wing sympathies, Armscor had to en-
sure that the program was phased out in an orderly manner without 
leakage of fissile material or sensitive information. To minimize 
these risks, the government decided to commercialize Advena Cen-
tral Laboratories and to gradually reduce the size of its operations. 
Its intent, according to Armscor officials, was “to reduce the risk 
of a security leak, or the even more serious risk of proliferation 
when persons with sensitive information [were] laid off.” When the 
Advena employees were told in February 1990 of the end of the pro-
gram, to soften the impact of the decision, management informed 
them that the site would be converted to the production of civil-
ian products and that they were important to achieving this new 
goal. The commercialization decision allowed the program to shrink 
more slowly and thus provided time for members of the program to 
find other work. According to a former member of the program, this 
“cooling off period” enabled a more natural attrition in the work-
force to occur. The workforce was reduced from about 300 to 100 
during the first year.34 Nonetheless, this rate of workforce reductions 
would be quite severe for any company.
Utilizing the remaining general and nonnuclear equipment, 
Advena sought to become a manufacturer of peaceful and commer-
cial products during the first half of the 1990s.35 Figure 9.3 shows 
the cover of Advena’s commercial brochure that advertised its new 
products, which collectively looked like they were produced at a 
former nuclear weapons production site.
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Figure 9.3 Cover of Advena Central Laboratories brochure, which advertised a 
rather unique set of products that suggested that Advena was a former nuclear 
weapons production site. The main building is visible with its entrance on right. 




However, this commercialization effort failed, and the site was 
formally closed. All the workers were gradually laid off or they 
took other positions within Armscor or Denel, a commercial entity 
created in 1992 to absorb all of Armscor's production divisions, in-
cluding Advena.
After several years of remaining unused, Advena re- opened 
in about 2001 or 2002 as a site to re- train military personnel who 
were being discharged as part of downsizing South Africa’s military. 
When it was re- opened, many of the items, signs, and infrastructure 
remained from the day it was originally closed.36 One Armscor of-
ficial who visited the site in 2002 felt like he was traveling back in 
time.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
All of the dismantlement activities were occurring in utmost secrecy. 
One of the first public signs to emerge that South Africa had given 
up its nuclear weapons was in September 1990, when then Foreign 
Minister Pik Botha announced in Pretoria that his government 
was “prepared to accede to the treaty in the context of an equal 
commitment by the other states in the southern African region.” 37 
Botha also announced Pretoria's support for a nuclear weapons free 
zone in southern Africa, in part as a way to remove suspicions and 
strengthen economic and geographical cohesion of the region. A re-
gional nuclear weapon free zone also would be seen domestically as 
a clear positive achievement for de Klerk.
At the time, the announcement disappointed but did not sur-
prise the IAEA members meeting at the annual General Conference 
in Vienna. Leading members of the IAEA initially had been optimis-
tic that South Africa would announce an unconditioned pledge to 
join the treaty. However, the South African government wanted its 
neighbors to make nuclear non- proliferation commitments as well. 
Following Zambia's and Tanzania's decision to sign the NPT, South 
Africa announced on June 27, 1991 its intent to accede to the treaty.
In his 1990 announcement in Pretoria, Pik Botha had refused to 
confirm whether South Africa had built nuclear weapons, saying the 
question was “irrelevant” now that the country had agreed to sign 
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the NPT. 38 Several governments, experts, and the ANC disagreed 
and pressed the South African government to come clean.
Shortly before the announcement that South Africa would join 
the NPT in the summer of 1991, the de Klerk government revisited 
the decision to keep secret the existence of the nuclear weapons pro-
gram. President de Klerk, however, remained unwilling to reveal the 
program.
Stumpf has given several reasons for de Klerk's decision in the 
summer of 1991.39 First, when South Africa acceded to the NPT, it 
was under no obligation to reveal the existence of its past nuclear 
weapons program. Under his interpretation, which was common 
at the time, the NPT essentially looks forward and requires exten-
sive accounting of nuclear material and facilities that exist when 
the treaty takes effect. More importantly, de Klerk decided that the 
internal political situation, including forming a new constitution, 
was not conducive to revealing a nuclear weapons program. Lastly, 
if the government revealed a secret nuclear weapons program right 
when international attention was focused on highly intrusive and 
confrontational nuclear inspections in Iraq, South Africa could be 
easily branded in the eyes of the public and the press as a second 
Iraq. This was despite the fact that South Africa, unlike Iraq, had 
not violated the NPT since it never signed it. Officials worried that 
South Africa would end up subject to the same type of confronta-
tional inspections as those being conducted in Iraq.
Although in mid-1992 officials again advised de Klerk to an-
nounce the program, he continued to reject this course of action 
until February 1993. By this time, however, the government's lack of 
candor about the nuclear weapons program had erupted into both 
a domestic and international political controversy. In his speech 
revealing the program, de Klerk said that some countries and the 
media had alleged that South Africa still had covert nuclear weapon 
aspirations and had not fully revealed its stockpile of highly enriched 
uranium. This suspicion, de Klerk observed, was hurting South Afri-
ca's efforts to commercialize its nuclear infrastructure, particularly 
its efforts to export high- technology products. Other South Afri-
can officials have said that lack of candor was also interfering with 
South Africa's negotiations for an African nuclear weapons free 
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zone and with its cooperation with other African countries. In retro-
spect, Stumpf has said that South Africa would have been “possibly 
more correct to have announced the past program at accession to 
the NPT.”40
Within South Africa, the ANC intended to make the secret nu-
clear weapons program an election issue, and this obviously worried 
de Klerk's party. At a late December 1992 press conference in Johan-
nesburg, the ANC demanded full disclosure of all present and past 
nuclear weapons activities, calling on the government to “admit the 
full extent of its nuclear weapons program and weapons- grade ura-
nium stockpile now.”41 The ANC warned in its press release: “To 
continue to act clandestinely and give ambiguous answers on nu-
clear matters undermines the important process of building the 
confidence of all South Africans in the process of democratizing our 
country.”42
US officials privately urged South African officials to fully re-
veal the country's nuclear weapons program in order to reestablish 
South Africa's international credibility.43 Yet they were met with 
stubborn denials. One US official who met with Wynand de Villiers, 
then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Corporation, shortly before de 
Klerk’s announcement, reported that de Villiers slammed his fist on 
his desk while vehemently denying South Africa had had a nuclear 
weapons program.44 De Villiers said that South Africa had assessed 
a peaceful nuclear explosive but did not develop it.
To encourage greater South African candor, US officials “leaked” 
to the media information or, in most cases, worst- case suspicions, 
about the program. For example, on March 18, 1993, six days be-
fore de Klerk's announcement and coinciding with a visit of South 
Africa's Foreign Minister to Washington, a Washington Post arti-
cle quoted US officials as saying that they “strongly suspect South 
Africa has not accounted fully for all the bomb- grade uranium it 
produced or the other nuclear weapons components it amassed and 
[it] may still be hiding some nuclear bomb- related items.”45
Lacking an admission of past nuclear activities, the US gov-
ernment started seriously questioning South Africa's commitment 
to the NPT. On January 19, 1993, in the annual report by the Pres-
ident to Congress detailing the adherence of other nations to arms 
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control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, commonly 
called the “Pell Report,” the Bush administration stated: “The United 
States has serious questions about South Africa's compliance with 
its Article II and III obligations” under the NPT.46 Article II forbids 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosives or their transfer 
to other countries, and Article III requires IAEA safeguards on all 
nuclear materials. The implication was that the United States had 
suspicions that South Africa had not declared all its HEU.
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service expressed similar con-
cerns. In early 1993, it reported that certain experts doubted that 
South Africa had declared all of its nuclear materials from nuclear 
explosive devices or weapons.47
Although President de Klerk had apparently already made his 
decision to reveal the program before the March 18th Washington 
Post story, he admitted that enough had leaked out that the govern-
ment was getting press inquiries from “quite a number of sources.”48 
Both countries and important commentators, he added, were ex-
pressing doubts that all the HEU had been disclosed, eroding trust 
in the government. However, suspicions remained even after de 
Klerk’s March 1993 announcement.
The ANC, for instance, accused the government of hiding impor-
tant information. “Despite his appeal, we cannot believe that 'South 
Africa's hands are clean' until we obtain full disclosure of all details 
of the weapons program and its alleged dismantling, the stockpile 
of weapons- grade uranium, and the full extent of international co-
operation with Armscor and the Atomic Energy Corporation.”49 
However, the worst of the suspicions would be laid to rest by a rig-
orous inspection effort by the IAEA. Although the inspections never 
became as confrontational as the ones then happening in Iraq, the 
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When South Africa decided to abandon its nuclear weapons pro-
gram, the nuclear nonproliferation regime offered South Africa few 
precedents for joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
while convincing the international community that it did not have 
nuclear weapons. Professor Mouton’s audit could provide impor-
tant corroborating evidence, but it was insufficient to replace the 
need for international oversight.
South Africa’s approach was to create a managed transparency 
policy of its past nuclear activities within the context of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) verification effort under 
the NPT. IAEA verification had become more stringent following 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, after the weaknesses of international 
safeguards were revealed. As a result, the IAEA requested more in-
formation and inspected more sites than South Africa may have 
expected. Although South Africa was never completely transparent 
about its past programs, it eventually revealed a remarkable level 
of information about them. The government’s extensive coopera-
tion with the IAEA increased confidence in the truthfulness of its 
declarations.
The inspection process can be divided into two overlapping pe-
riods. The first followed South Africa’s submission to the IAEA on 
October 30, 1991 of a report on its initial inventory of nuclear ma-
terials as of the end of September. This declaration is required of all 
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nonnuclear weapon states acceding to the NPT. The submission of 
this report triggered the IAEA’s investigation of South Africa’s dec-
laration of the amount and location of all its fissile material. The 
inspection effort was hindered during this phase by South Africa’s 
decision to mislead the inspectors about its past nuclear weapons 
program.
The second phase of the inspections followed de Klerk’s March 
1993 announcement about the nuclear weapons program. In a 
unique verification exercise under the NPT, IAEA inspectors, aug-
mented by nuclear weapons experts, were tasked to assess the status 
of the former nuclear weapons program, determine that all weapons 
had been dismantled, and verify that the highly enriched uranium 
from this program had been fully accounted for. South Africa gave 
the Agency’s inspectors full access to facilities involved in the past 
nuclear weapons program along with many of the historical pro-
duction records of those facilities.
“DO- IT- YOURSELF OPTION”
Verification was complicated by the nature of the South African 
dismantlement process, which Waldo Stumpf, the then head of the 
Atomic Energy Corporation, described, as a “do- it- yourself” option 
followed by accession to the NPT.1 Although this option allowed 
South Africa to join the treaty as a non- nuclear weapon state, it 
immediately raised questions about whether all the nuclear weap-
ons had been dismantled, whether sensitive nuclear weapons design 
information was hidden away, or whether some highly enriched ura-
nium had been hidden and not declared upon joining the NPT.
Such concerns resurfaced well into the 1990s. For example, 
Wally Grant, a chief inventor of South Africa’s uranium enrichment 
process and an important member of the right- wing Afrikaaner 
Peoples’ Front (Volksfront), claimed to have documented the entire 
history of the nuclear weapons program, which he was reportedly 
preserving for future generations.2 In early 1995, a British TV doc-
umentary produced for the Channel 4 Dispatches, quoted various 
unnamed sources who claimed (with no substantiation provided) 
that a South African right- wing group had secretly obtained a stock 
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of nuclear weapons that had not been declared to the IAEA by the 
South African government. South African officials were quick to dis-
miss that individuals such as Wally Grant or right- wing groups had 
obtained nuclear weapons or weapons- grade uranium. Armscor offi-
cials called the British documentary “a load of nonsense,” and ANC 
Defense Minister Joe Modize said the program had “caused mirth, 
but no concern.”3 Nevertheless, the possibility that some HEU was 
missing can never be completely dismissed. Even the IAEA conclu-
sions do not eliminate such a possibility.
However, Stumpf argues that South Africa’s dismantlement 
choice was the only one available to de Klerk. Because the NPT has 
only two categories of members  — the five acknowledged nuclear- 
weapon states and non- nuclear weapon states — in effect, it does not 
allow a state like South Africa, which had not detonated a nuclear 
explosive by the required date, to dismantle its weapons within the 
NPT and its associated INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement.4 The 
possession of nuclear weapons by a non- nuclear weapon state would 
be a violation of the treaty immediately upon accession. Reclassify-
ing the weapons as “peaceful nuclear explosives” also would not be 
acceptable under the NPT.
The de Klerk government viewed options that would have 
allowed the IAEA to verify the dismantlement process directly as 
too burdensome and political. According to Stumpf, these options 
probably would have also raised international legal problems. The 
principal alternative involved implementing INFCIRC/66 safe-
guards agreements on all South Africa’s nuclear activities, including 
the nuclear weapons, before its accession to the NPT. According to 
Stumpf, however, this path would have also required lengthy nego-
tiations on each facility, and in the end, it might have encountered 
serious legal obstacles. (For example, redefining the weapons as 
PNEs would likely have conflicted with more recent interpretations 
of INFCIRC/66). In addition, South Africa was unsure prior to rat-
ifying the NPT if the IAEA’s ruling body, the Board of Governors, 
would allow IAEA inspectors to become involved directly in a safe-




In choosing the “do- it- yourself” options, the South African 
government realized that it would need to be fully transparent to 
the IAEA about its past nuclear materials production activities. 
Stumpf relates an incident with the IAEA’s Director General Hans 
Blix in February 1991 in Vienna, when it was clear that South Af-
rica would soon be joining the NPT.5 Blix asked Stump how the 
IAEA would convince the world that South Africa had acceded to 
the NPT openly, without a nuclear weapons program. Stumpf re-
plied that South Africa would make available additional records of 
its enrichment plants. Later, upon implementation of the safeguards 
agreement, South Africa issued a standing invitation to the IAEA to 
“visit anywhere, anytime, any place  — within reason.”6
This policy of transparency and openness, according to Stumpf, 
was chosen as a fundamental part of South Africa’s entire “rollback” 
strategy.7 The South African government decided that a policy of 
cooperation and transparency would avoid the type of confronta-
tional inspections that were occurring in 1991 in Iraq and about to 
commence in North Korea. If such confrontations occurred, accord-
ing to Stumpf, South Africa’s effort to gain international credibility 
would have been jeopardized.
This policy was also seen as necessary because at the time, the 
NPT and its associated INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement con-
tained no agreed- upon procedures to promote transparency of 
activities or data beyond the nuclear materials and facilities declared 
in the initial report. Although the initial South African declaration 
was a comprehensive document which included quantitative data 
on all types of nuclear material on a facility- by- facility basis, it was 
limited to nuclear materials subject to safeguards at the time the 
agreement entered into force, or September 30, 1991.8 According to 
Stumpf, based on commonly accepted safeguards interpretations, 
South Africa was under no obligation to reveal: (1) projects or pro-
grams that predated the time of entry- into- force; (2) dual- purpose 
facilities that already had been converted to non- nuclear work; and 
(3) historical flows of nuclear materials.
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THE IAEA’S INSPECTION EFFORT
When the NPT took effect in South Africa in the summer of 1991, 
the IAEA was undergoing a fundamental reformation as a conse-
quence of the dramatic revelations of Iraq’s secret nuclear weapons 
program and the failure of the IAEA to detect those secret activi-
ties. The IAEA was under intense international pressure to be more 
aggressive in its verification effort in South Africa and to rely on 
member states for additional information about South Africa’s past 
nuclear activities.
In a dramatic move, the IAEA General Conference voted on 
September 20, 1991 to request the Director General to verify the 
completeness of the inventory of South Africa’s nuclear installations 
and materials and to report back to the Conference. Instead of ver-
ifying only the correctness of South Africa’s declaration, as it had 
done in past cases, the IAEA was instructed to also determine that 
South Africa’s declaration was complete. Determining completeness 
is a more difficult step to accomplish, and it is far more important 
than just determining the correctness of a declaration when deciding 
if a country has met its NPT obligations. In practical terms, the in-
spectors were charged to determine if South Africa had declared all 
its nuclear material or had hidden some of it. The most important 
nuclear material when the IAEA’s first inspections started in Novem-
ber 1991 was the HEU. Because it is not possible logically to prove 
that South Africa was not hiding any nuclear material, i.e. one can-
not prove a negative, the IAEA had to create methods to develop 
confidence that South Africa had declared all its HEU. To accom-
plish these goals, the IAEA’s Director General appointed a special 
technical team of senior safeguards officials, several of whom had 
gained valuable experience in Iraq after the Gulf War.
Although the IAEA realized that South Africa was hiding its 
former nuclear program, it was rather tentative in pressing South 
Africa to reveal it. When the IAEA received South Africa’s initial 
declaration, it saw immediately that much of the HEU was reported 
in the form of metal ingots, a form which immediately raised suspi-
cions that this material had been removed from nuclear weapons. 
Yet the IAEA formally said nothing about its suspicions to the pub-
lic nor directly challenged South Africa’s deception in its safeguards 
reports to its members. Such a direct approach was complicated 
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by INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements at the time, which were 
widely interpreted as requiring the IAEA to keep secret virtually all 
the information in the initial declaration and most other informa-
tion provided by the state. In addition, South Africa conditioned its 
transparency policy on the IAEA maintaining a high level of con-
fidentiality about the information the government was providing 
to the inspectors. As a result, the IAEA believed it had neither a 
mandate to reveal its suspicions about past use of this material, i.e. 
to “blow the whistle” on South Africa, nor the motivation to under-
mine South Africa’s commitment to transparency, albeit involving 
obvious untruths about its nuclear programs.
That the IAEA knew that South Africa was likely lying is also 
revealed by the information supplied to the IAEA by member states. 
In August 1992, the IAEA received information, possibly from the 
United States, about South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. Ac-
cording to a declassified 1993 document, the IAEA had “received 
US briefings on most aspects of the weapon program.”9 The infor-
mation was detailed and accurate, although like much intelligence 
information, it also contained inaccuracies (for comparison, see 
earlier chapters). The IAEA received the following information, ac-
cording to a “Note to File”:
• In 1974 South Africa constructed a criticality facility out-
side the Valindaba perimeter, which was mothballed in 
1978. This reference is to building 5000.
• In 1973 the Kalahari test site was surveyed and two large- 
diameter shafts were prepared. The site was abandoned in 
1978.
• In 1978 responsibility of the nuclear weapons program was 
transferred to Armscor under the Department of Defense. 
Armscor’s subsidiary Kentron was responsible for pro-
ducing advanced weapons and missiles, including nuclear 
weapons. The Jericho missile program was established in 
the same year.
• The Naschem Boscop Plant in Potchefshoom had a flash x 
ray, high speed camera, and a high explosive bunker.
• Armscor had a flash x ray bunker, evidently a reference to 
the high explosive bunker at Advena Central Laboratories.
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The Note to File also contained information about the orga-
nizational structure of the nuclear weapons program, including 
identifying the location of the Circle facility. Figure 10.1 duplicates 
this schematic.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, 
AS PROVIDED TO THE IAEA BY MEMBER STATES IN AUGUST 1992




Valindaba Pelindaba    Armscor 
HEU   Early R&D    weaponization 




      Kentron  Naschem 
 
 
  Weapons Complex in Armscor, Military Vehicle Test Facility (Gerotek) 
Figure 10.1 From the IAEA “Note to File,” recording information provided by a 
member state to the IAEA.
The information shows that by the late summer of 1992, the 
IAEA understood important details about key parts of South Afri-
ca’s nuclear weapons program. Using this information, it asked to 
visit two sites.
The IAEA started by asking to visit Building 5000 (see figures 
10.2 and 10.3).10 Two inspectors visited the site on August 20, 1992 
and took pictures and environmental samples. South African offi-
cials told the inspectors that Building 5000 was a former general 
purpose critical facility for the AEC’s Reactor Development Group 
that had been decommissioned many years earlier. Although the 
South Africans facilitated access to Building 5000, they deliberately 





Figure 10.2 Building 5000 as it looked in early 1994, many years after being 
emptied of the pulse reactor used in the nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. 
Visible in the right image are barrels and redundant equipment that appear simi-
lar to those described by the IAEA inspectors in their 1992 visit to the building.
Figure 10.3 An aged emergency phone in Building 5000 that likely dates to the 
1970s when the building housed the pulse reactor. The phone may have been for 
communicating with the reactor’s control room in Building 5100 (see chapter 2).
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The IAEA also requested to visit the Kalahari nuclear test site, 
which it visited in September 1992. It asked in particular to visit 
what is called the “shade” (see figure 10.4).11 To hide renovation 
activities at the first test shaft from overhead surveillance, Armscor 
had several years earlier constructed a galvanized corrugated iron 
hangar on a concrete foundation over one of the test shafts. South 
Africa referred to this building as the “shade.” The South Africans 
told the inspectors that the Vastrap area was owned by the South 
African Defense Force and was used as a military target range. They 
said the shade was used by the air force for storage and as a work-
shop, providing no indication that the shade covered a nuclear test 
shaft.12 The IAEA uncovered no evidence that the building had been 
used or was then being used for the testing of nuclear explosive 
devices, although it did not ask to excavate the shade’s floor. Its en-
vironmental sampling did reveal the presence of natural uranium, 
but this was not seen as indicative of deceptive behavior.
Figure 10.4 The building, or “shade,” over the first test shaft at the Kalahari test 
site. Photo source: IAEA.
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The Note to File shows that the IAEA was informed about a 
nuclear weapons complex at Gerotek, namely the Circle facility. 
Whether it was given the precise location is unknown. However, 
the IAEA did not ask to visit this site until after President de Klerk’s 
March 1993 announcement. The reason for not doing so is unknown.
These visits would have added to the IAEA’s disbelief in South 
Africa’s willingness to fully disclose its past nuclear activities. In a 
study of South Africa’s deception practices, Frank Pabian, one of 
the foremost experts on South Africa’s nuclear weapons program, 
identified both building 500 and the test site cases as clear- cut efforts 
of “dissimulation and obfuscation in keeping with the original NPT 
accession plan” of South Africa.13 Nonetheless, the accumulating in-
formation necessarily raised questions about whether South Africa 
was also hiding highly enriched uranium.
HEU VERIFICATION
Because of the difficulty of ensuring that the declaration was com-
plete, in the fall of 1991 the IAEA informed South Africa that success 
would require closer cooperation. The inspectors intended to create 
a “balance” in terms of uranium and uranium 235, involving all of 
South Africa’s production, imports, and exports of enriched and de-
pleted uranium. This result would then be verified by comparing it 
to the accounting and operating records of the Y and Z Plants.
This approach required a greater level of cooperation than 
Stumpf had earlier volunteered to the IAEA. Nonetheless, consistent 
with its overall policy to be transparent about nuclear materials, 
South Africa agreed to supply additional access to records of the Y 
and Z Plants but without providing the source of imported uranium.
The priority was the HEU because it had been used in nuclear 
weapons. South Africa had also produced a large quantity of low 
enriched uranium (LEU) in the Y and Z Plants, but creating the 
balance of this material was a lower, albeit no less difficult, priority. 
Creating an accurate balance of the HEU was complicated because 
it had been produced for over fifteen years in the Y Plant, which was 
part of a nuclear weapons program that only slowly met civilian 
standards of nuclear material accountancy.
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The underlying idea of the balance approach was to conduct a 
consistency check on the isotopic balance of the HEU inventory. It 
compared the amount of uranium-235 in natural uranium entering 
the Y Plant to the amount of uranium-235 leaving the plant in en-
riched uranium product and depleted uranium waste. To illustrate 
this process, consider 1,000 kilograms of natural uranium entering 
or being “fed” into the plant. It contains about 7.11 kilograms of 
uranium-235. If the plant produces uranium enriched to 90 percent 
uranium-235, and the waste contains uranium with 0.4 percent ura-
nium-235 (tails assay of 0.4 percent), then it would produce about 
3.47 kilograms 90 percent material and 996.53 kilograms of waste. 
In this theoretical example, the product contains 3.12 kilograms of 
uranium-235 and the waste contains 3.99 kilograms of uranium-235, 
matching the original amount of the natural uranium feed.
In the case of the Y Plant, however, the situation was highly 
complex. A balance would prove elusive. The total amount of natu-
ral uranium entering the plant — the “feed” — was about 384 tonnes, 
or 384,000 kilograms. The plant produced HEU of many enrichment 
levels. In total, South Africa produced almost 1,000 kilograms of 
HEU with an average enrichment of about 70 percent (see tables 
1 and 2 in chapter 3).14 Of this, about 550 kilograms of HEU were 
enriched over about 80 percent in the isotope uranium 235. About 
480 kilograms of this HEU were assigned to the nuclear weapons 
program, much of which was later taken from dismantled nuclear 
weapons at the end of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. 
Earlier, a fraction of this HEU was returned to the AEC as man-
ufacturing scrap and slated for recovery. Another 90 kilograms of 
weapon- grade uranium were used to blend up a stock of imported 
LEU to the appropriate level needed for the Koeberg nuclear power 
reactors. South Africa also inadvertently produced another 450 ki-
lograms of HEU enriched to less than about 80 percent as a result 
of problems in the enrichment plant. Almost 250 kilograms of this 
HEU were deposited in filters and powders or other scraps, most of 
which were slated for chemical recovery. The Y Plant also produced 
many tonnes of low enriched uranium for the Koeberg reactors. 
The depleted uranium waste, or “tails,” contained about 371,000 ki-
lograms with a wide variety of tails assays between less than 0.2 
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percent and up to 0.6 percent, and an average of about 0.45 percent. 
In addition, the depleted uranium was treated as a waste.
The depleted uranium in the chemical form of uranium hexa-
fluoride had been placed in several hundred large cylinders and sent 
for storage nearby. It had not been weighed or evaluated carefully 
enough by the AEC during the program to meet the IAEA’s safe-
guards accountancy standards for measuring the total uranium and 
its content of uranium 235. Because so much uranium-235 went into 
waste, the IAEA found it hard to take a balance at the Y Plant. 
After about a year of investigation, the IAEA concluded that the bal-
ance indicated an “apparent discrepancy,” which could indicate that 
some HEU was either unaccounted for or had not been declared.15 
In June 1992, the apparent loss of uranium 235 was estimated as 120 
kilograms, enough for more than two gun- type nuclear explosives.16 
Many were skeptical that the balance approach could work.
Nonetheless, during the next year, the IAEA further examined 
the records, leading to a reduction in this discrepancy. President de 
Klerk’s March 1993 revelations also helped resolve some of the dis-
crepancy in the HEU estimates. Despite all the hard work over two 
years, and the use of two different approaches, imbalances remained 
of about 75 and 95 kilograms of uranium 235, still more than enough 
for a gun- type nuclear explosive.17 The problems remained mainly 
because of the uncertainty of the uranium 235 content in the de-
pleted uranium and to a lesser extent chemical and other losses in 
the enrichment process, which were discussed in chapter 3.
Although the balance approach was refined in the second year 
of the verification effort, after the first year, in the summer of 1992, 
the magnitude of the imbalance had stimulated a look for another 
method. The conclusion was that the balance approach alone could 
not eliminate suspicions among some member states and the pub-
lic that South Africa had hidden away some of its HEU. The most 
straightforward way to reduce the uncertainty would be to mea-
sure every cylinder containing the depleted uranium, in addition to 
all the waste drums containing small amounts of HEU generated 
during the various recovery operations. Characterizing the depleted 
uranium would be extraordinarily expensive and time consuming. 
Later the HEU in the drums would be thoroughly analyzed, but 
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this effort would take years. Measuring the cylinders and drums, 
while straightforward, was too time consuming to meet the pressing 
need to verify the completeness of the HEU declaration. More-
over, that approach would have inevitably led to questions about 
whether South Africa had provided all the cylinders and drums for 
measurement.
As a result, after the first year of investigation, the IAEA de-
cided on a second approach that would examine the performance 
of the Y Plant over its entire operating history. The aim was to in-
dependently estimate the HEU output of the plant using detailed 
historical data. This analysis was the first of its kind for the IAEA 
and potentially an extremely powerful verification technique if the 
state cooperates sufficiently, which South Africa was willing to do.
This approach depended on knowing how the Y Plant func-
tioned throughout its history. The IAEA therefore asked South 
Africa for many more documents, hoping they would still exist. 
AEC personnel had to search for these records, eventually locating 
them in metal boxes in an unheated, dusty storage shed.18 Although 
South Africa had agreed to provide them, it had expected the IAEA 
to conduct “spot checks” of the records, rather than seek compre-
hensive sets of operating documents.
Nevertheless, the IAEA experts received a full set of operating 
records of the Y Plant, representing about 3,000 cascade- days of op-
erating records. The records detailed daily operations at the plant in 
terms of the availability of each enrichment section of the plant, the 
rate of uranium feed entering the initial enrichment section, and the 
rate and assay of the enriched uranium and waste withdrawn from 
the plant.19 To ensure that the records were genuine, the IAEA con-
ducted forensic analyses on them.
The IAEA also interviewed people who had produced the re-
cords to seek clarification and additional information. The ability of 
the AEC to find the people involved in the operation of the Y Plant 
and to arrange for the IAEA to interview them would turn out to be 
key to the success of this approach.
Yet it was not without complications. Initial IAEA calcula-
tions of the maximum production capacity were about double the 
amount of enriched uranium product that South Africa declared as 
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withdrawn from the Y Plant. The IAEA had not realized all the loss 
mechanisms in this one- of- a- kind facility.
The IAEA experts had to verify the unique loss mechanism 
that reduced significantly the expected output of the Y Plant, as 
discussed in chapter 3. The most important one was the loss of en-
riched uranium through reactions involving the process gas mixture 
of uranium hexafluoride and hydrogen and the Teflon filters used 
throughout the enrichment cascade. Early in the plant’s history, this 
problem led to the plant “crashing” when a catalytic reaction in-
volving larger than expected chloride impurities in the uranium feed 
resulted in the plating out of large amounts of uranium on the inside 
of the cascade, halting operation for almost two years.
South African scientists were able to prevent another catastro-
phe at the Y Plant by carefully monitoring the operation of the 
cascade and the buildup of uranium solids on filters, changing them 
before the buildup was too great. Controlling these chemical losses 
was a key reason that the plant maintained detailed records of the 
plant’s operation. These daily records were invaluable to the IAEA.
Because so much enriched uranium was lost in this process, the 
IAEA asked South Africa to conduct certain experiments that would 
confirm this loss mechanism. This exercise was completed satisfac-
torily in the summer of 1993.
Using all of this information, the IAEA experts put together an 
independent estimate of the daily HEU production of the Y Plant.20 
The final result was extremely close to South Africa’s declared out-
put. For example, the uncertainty in the amount of HEU produced 
by the Y Plant for the nuclear weapons program was six kilograms, 
according to South Africa’s declaration. This amount is substantially 
less than one significant quantity, or 25 kilograms of uranium-235. 
After two years of intense effort, the IAEA wrote: “It is reasonable to 
conclude that the amounts of HEU which could have been produced 
by the pilot enrichment plant are consistent with the amounts de-
clared in the initial report.”21 Despite this seemingly vague wording, 
the sentence allowed the ending of the completeness investigation of 
the HEU stock. (The lower priority investigation of the complete-
ness of the LEU stock continued).
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There will always be some uncertainty attached to quantitative 
assessments of HEU production. Nevertheless, the second method 
resulted in an HEU estimate that was so close to the declared value 
as to provide added confidence that the government’s declaration 
of HEU production was both accurate and complete. In the end, 
successful verification required the IAEA to obtain large amounts of 
historical information about the Y Plant, to reconstruct in detail the 
daily operation of the plant, and to oversee experiments that could 
help explain apparent discrepancies in the initial report about HEU 
production.
VERIFYING THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM
During his March 1993 announcement, President de Klerk prom-
ised the IAEA full access to facilities involved in the past nuclear 
weapons program, along with their historical records. Two IAEA 
inspectors, who were already in South Africa, visited several of these 
facilities the next day, beginning an unprecedented inspection effort 
that would last five months.22 This effort focused on ensuring that 
there were no hidden stocks of HEU or weapons, including major 
weapon subcomponents.
The key to the success of this inspection effort was the IAEA’s 
inclusion of nuclear weapon experts from the nuclear weapon states. 
Initial disclosures by South Africans tended to be circumspect, but 
the ability of the nuclear weapon experts to recognize key activities 
led to significantly more openness on the part of the past members 
of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. Using weapons experts 
also helped to protect sensitive information against unauthorized 
release to non- weapon states at the IAEA. Moreover, the most sen-
sitive information was communicated orally and not written down. 
Thus, South Africa revealed the important details of its weapons 
program only to nuclear weapon experts or to leaders of the IAEA 
effort, reducing the risk that this information could pass to unau-
thorized personnel.
In assessing the status of South Africa’s former weapons pro-
gram, the IAEA focused on the program’s origin and scope, and on 
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the adequacy of measures taken to dismantle and destroy sensitive 
components of the devices and to recover the nuclear materials in-
volved. Specifically, the inspectors sought:23
• To gain assurance that all nuclear materials used in the nu-
clear weapons program had been returned to peaceful uses 
and placed under IAEA safeguards;
• To confirm that all nonnuclear weapons- specific compo-
nents of the devices had been destroyed, that all laboratory 
and engineering facilities involved in the program had 
been fully decommissioned and abandoned or converted 
to peaceful use (commercial nonnuclear uses or peaceful 
nuclear uses), and that all weapons- specific equipment 
had been destroyed and all other equipment converted to 
peaceful use;
• To obtain information regarding the dismantling program. 
This involved learning about the destruction of design 
and manufacturing information, including drawings, and 
the philosophy followed in the destruction of the nuclear 
weapons;
• To reduce the likelihood or ease of reconstituting the 
nuclear weapons program. Specifically, the inspectors con-
sulted on the arrangements for, and ultimately to witness 
the rendering useless of the Kalahari test shafts;
• To visit facilities previously involved in or associated with 
the nuclear weapons program and to confirm that they 
were no longer being used for such purposes; and
• To consult on future strategies for maintaining assur-
ance that the nuclear weapons capability would not be 
regenerated.
To achieve these objectives, the inspection teams visited many 
facilities, examined and audited dismantlement, destruction, and re-
covery records, and had extensive discussions on various phases of 
the program with former members of the program from both the 




By the start of this phase of the inspections, most of the weap-
ons components and technical documentation had been destroyed. 
The inspectors, however, were able to correlate the records of the 
dismantlement of the HEU components of the weapons with corre-
sponding data in AEC nuclear material accountancy records.
A similar procedure with respect to natural and depleted ura-
nium in the devices was unsuccessful. Armscor and the AEC placed 
little nuclear or financial value on both materials and thus kept few 
records of the transfer of these materials.
Although Armscor destroyed documents as part of the disman-
tling process, it kept sections of each device’s “build- history” log 
book and dismantlement record.24 Items such as drawings and as-
sembly instructions were removed from these records and destroyed, 
but information such as quantities of material and serial numbers of 
components were retained.
Inspectors used this information in combination with the hard-
ware destroyed by mechanical cutting to reconstruct a consistent 
picture of the number and fate of the deliverable weapons, the 
demonstration device (Melba), and the pre- production experimen-
tal models. In particular, they could compare identification numbers 
on hardware with these records.
In general, Armscor possessed more non- nuclear components 
than the bare minimum necessary for the nuclear devices and ex-
perimental pre- production devices. However, the inspectors were 
never able to establish the exact number of each component that 
had been originally ordered. Nevertheless, the inspectors found no 
indication that South Africa had retained any sensitive non- nuclear 
components other than those that had been destroyed or converted 
to commercial non- nuclear applications or peaceful nuclear uses.
Finally, the inspectors audited the records of the transfer of 
HEU between the AEC and Armscor. The IAEA concluded that the 
HEU originally supplied to Armscor had been returned to the AEC 
and placed under safeguards when the safeguards agreement en-
tered into force. The IAEA also concluded that the “findings from 
the team’s examination of records, facilities, and remaining nonnu-
clear components of the dismantled/destroyed nuclear weapons and 
from the team’s evaluation of the amount of HEU produced by the 
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pilot enrichment plant are consistent with the declared scope of the 
nuclear weapons program.”25
To confirm the completeness of the inventory of nuclear instal-
lations, the IAEA made visits to a number of facilities not originally 
listed by South Africa, relying on information that it had received 
from member states, particularly the United States. Although the 
NPT did not require such visits, South Africa permitted them in any 
case and even supplied detailed information about their activities at 
these sites, helping the IAEA to obtain a more complete history of 
the past program.
South Africa also took the IAEA to a site of which it had been 
unaware. It was the Witbank mineshaft where the first nuclear ex-
plosive was stored in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
At the end of these intensive inspections, the IAEA said that it 
did not possess “any information suggesting the existence of any 
undeclared facilities.”26 The annex to this chapter lists the main fa-
cilities visited by the IAEA.
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AND ACCESS GRANTED; AND 
INFORMATION NOT PROVIDED
South Africa had initially pledged to provide considerable informa-
tion to the IAEA. However, faced with the completeness challenge, 
the IAEA did not consider this information sufficient and requested 
and received the following additional information from South Af-
rica after the safeguards agreement was implemented in the fall of 
1991:27
• The accountancy and operating records of the Y Plant, 
including data on electricity consumption, which was 
available for the years since 198028;
• The accountancy and operating records of the semi- 
commercial enrichment Z Plant before September 1991;
• The historical flows of nuclear material, including the 
quantity of all imported material; and
• Historical values of material unaccounted for (MUF), as 
determined by the AEC for the purpose of financial control.
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In the end, South Africa provided the IAEA with extensive in-
formation and access, including:29
• All historical nuclear material inventories and flows for a 
period in excess of 15 years;
• All available commissioning and operating records for 
both enrichment plants, spanning a period of more than 15 
years for the Y Plant and a period of more than six years 
for the Z Plant, where only LEU production had taken 
place;
• Extensive details of the nuclear weapons program;
• Free access by the IAEA to numerous former facilities, 
now converted to commercial nonnuclear use, as well as 
to private industrial companies, military testing sites and 
conventional armaments factories;
• Free access to identified key individuals associated with the 
past nuclear weapons program, a number of whom had 
already transferred to private industry;
• Free access to Wynand Mouton, the independent auditor 
appointed by President de Klerk to audit the dismantling 
process; and
• Permission to take environmental samples from any loca-
tion desired.30
In addition, the government updated its completeness report 
at least three times, incorporating more detail about the enrich-
ment program. After President de Klerk’s announcement about the 
program, South Africa added an overview of the nuclear weapons 
program to this report.
It is important to note what South Africa decided not to share 
with the IAEA. The government:
• Decided not to provide certain nuclear material import 
data. The government provided information on the quanti-
ties of imports of enriched, natural, and depleted uranium, 
but it decided not to provide the name of the suppliers.31 
Separate sources named China as supplying about 60 tonnes 
of low enriched uranium and France as providing natural 
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uranium hexafluoride. With regards to the latter material, 
during a 1994 interview with a senior Y Plant official with 
one of the authors, he freely revealed that France had been 
the source of natural uranium. Although the official policy 
was not to name suppliers, informally, those names were 
provided.
• Decided not to reveal to the IAEA the names of the key 
suppliers of direct- use and dual- use equipment to its 
enrichment and nuclear weapons programs. Armscor of-
ficials broke with this ban and provided a list of goods it 
acquired for its nuclear weapons programs, although the 
list was not comprehensive and the names of the suppliers 
were sometimes omitted;32
• Released little information about the nuclear weapons de-
livery systems, particularly the Raptor glide bomb and the 
RSA-3 ballistic missile; and
• Did not reveal the entirety of its nuclear strategy, in par-
ticular, the threat to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
SOUTH AFRICA’S DEMANDS
In exchange for its cooperation, South Africa also had certain 
demands on the IAEA. According to Stumpf, the South African gov-
ernment insisted that three key conditions be satisfied. By meeting 
these demands, the IAEA significantly eased South Africa’s task of 
establishing and maintaining transparency.33
First and most important, the IAEA had to assure the confi-
dentiality of the information that it received from South Africa. 
Although the safeguards agreement contains a strict confidential-
ity clause, many of the IAEA’s activities went far beyond the legal 
boundaries of the safeguards agreement. As a result, the IAEA and 
South Africa agreed to maintain confidentiality on activities in these 
other areas as well. Nevertheless, some information leaked out in 
news reports as a result of the public’s intense interest in this subject. 
South Africa and the IAEA believed, however, that confidentiality 
was successfully maintained to the satisfaction of both parties.
Second, the IAEA had to avoid any political bias. Since South 
Africa often had been criticized at the IAEA’s General Conference 
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in the past, the IAEA was probably only able to satisfy this condi-
tion because the de Klerk government wanted to abolish apartheid 
and accomplish other domestic reforms. Prior good experience with 
the IAEA’s safeguards division facilitated the establishment of confi-
dence between the two parties.
Third, South Africa wanted the IAEA to maintain continuity 
with regard to the inspectors intimately involved in the verification 
process. Although achieving this goal was difficult for the IAEA, 
given its other responsibilities and the need to include nuclear 
weapon specialists, South Africa believed that this goal was met 
sufficiently.
One has to ask whether South Africa’s secrecy requests were 
excessive. In particular, were these extraordinary secrecy require-
ments aimed at stifling debate among publics and governments and 
thereby aiding South Africa’s goal of deceiving the IAEA about the 
past nuclear weapons program?
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 10: FACILITIES VISITED BY THE IAEA 
INSPECTORS34
The facilities visited by members of the team during the assessment 
of the status of the former nuclear weapons program included:
1. The buildings of the AEC establishment at Pelindaba 
where the initial research and development phase took 
place and the first demonstration nuclear device was man-
ufactured (called Building 5000 complex), as well as the 
buildings where the HEU was produced (Y Plant), the ura-
nium metal was produced (Building 2700), the laboratories 
involved with the tritium and lithium-6 program, and the 
development work on neutron generators.
2. The Armscor/Circle establishment where the first device 
was ultimately stored and the other completed devices 
were manufactured, assembled and stored. This establish-
ment included the high security vaults where the completed 
devices were stored, high explosive test cells, nuclear ma-
terial casting and machining workshops, conventional 
workshops for the production of mechanical and electrical 
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components, an environmental testing facility, and a high 
explosive magazine.
3. The new facilities of the Advena Central Laboratories 
near the Circle establishment, which were intended for 
further nuclear weapons development work on advanced 
gun- assembled and implosion- type devices. The facilities 
included bunkers for explosives processing and testing, an 
“integration building” for advanced weapons assembly 
and integration with delivery systems, high- security stor-
age vaults and an explosion test chamber.
4. An explosives test facility, including a small instrumentation 
bunker, located on military property near Potchefstroom.
5. A purpose- built high security vault in a military ammuni-
tion depot at Roedtan, which had been intended for the 
storage of nuclear devices.
6. An ammunition depot of the South African Defense Force 
in an abandoned coal mine, near Witbank, about 90 kilo-
meters east of Pretoria, which stored the first nuclear 
explosive device from November 15, 1979 until April 1982, 
when it was sent to the Circle facility for storage.
7. The Vastrap site in the Kalahari Desert, where two shafts 
prepared for underground testing of the devices were 
located.
8. Armscor facilities at Naschem, near Boskop, and at the 
SOMCHEM establishment in the Cape Province. The latter 
was involved in the 1970s with the research and develop-
ment work on the mechanical and pyrotechnic sub- systems 
of gun- type nuclear devices.
9. The site at Gouriqua in the Cape Province, where construc-
tion of a reactor facility for the production of plutonium 
and tritium was planned. Beyond some rudimentary civil 
engineering preparations, the site was never developed; it 
was sold by the AEC to a private purchaser.
10. The Alkantpan firing range in the Cape Province, where 
some development work had been undertaken on heavy 
metal armor penetrators, involving a small number of test 
firings using depleted uranium and shaped charges. Al-
though there are common areas between this technology 
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and implosion technology, the team found no apparent link 
between the Alkantpan test range and the former nuclear 
weapons program. The diagnostic facilities at Alkantpan 
were not considered particularly useful to a nuclear weap-
ons development program.
11. Armscor/Circle facilities at the Kentron Central Factory 
near Pretoria, where the nuclear weapons program had 
a secure office. Kentron executives were unaware of the 
activities of the Circle team in the building and merely pro-
vided space. This office contained the headquarters of the 
nuclear weapons program and conducted special activities, 
such as job advertising, recruitment, and interviews, and 
provided a commercial cover to the program. Using this 
office address, Circle could establish a credit rating with 
commercial suppliers. In addition, commercial bids and 
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CHAPTER 11
ENSURING AGAINST REVERSAL
After South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons program, it re-
tained the capability and knowledge to resurrect it. It had many 
hundreds of kilograms of weapons- grade uranium, and its experts 
had the knowledge and expertise to turn this material into nuclear 
weapons despite many of the documents and other records being 
destroyed. In addition, South Africa had established several sophis-
ticated technologies and capabilities in its civilian industrial sector 
that could also be used to develop and produce nuclear weapons, if 
a decision was made to do so.1
The leaders of the nuclear programs were well aware of this re-
sidual capability and the suspicion that remained in the international 
community about their or a future government’s intentions. To build 
confidence that South Africa would not build nuclear weapons, the 
government allowed several transparency steps that would make re-
constitution of nuclear weapons more time consuming and subject 
to detection. However, countries such as the United States wanted 
South Africa to do more. It did some of these steps, despite their 
cost. Yet it resisted others, in particular eliminating its HEU stocks, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES
One of the first priorities was ensuring that the nuclear weapons 
program had been thoroughly dismantled. Based on a new mandate 
to more thoroughly investigate nuclear programs following its fail-
ure to detect Iraq’s large- scale nuclear weapons effort prior to 1991, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) undertook a num-
ber of initiatives specifically related to nuclear weapons to hinder 
the recreation of the nuclear weapons program. These steps went 
beyond the dismantlement steps ordered by the de Klerk govern-
ment and the practices of traditional safeguards.
One of the IAEA’s key steps after President de Klerk’s March 
announcement was to focus on the destruction of remaining nu-
clear weapons components, blueprints, and documents.2 By March 
1993, when de Klerk revealed the past nuclear arsenal, many nuclear 
weapons- related items had not been destroyed. Armscor considered 
these items non- sensitive, but upon examination, the IAEA had a 
stricter definition of a sensitive item.
The inspectors discovered many of these items in the Circle or 
Advena storage rooms as they toured these sites under South Af-
rica’s expanded transparency policy. The risk of diversion of these 
items had been minimized because these storage areas had remained 
classified even after the commercialization of Advena in the early 
1990s.
The inspectors inventoried the contents of the storage rooms 
and other areas in the plants then segregated items into three cat-
egories. The first and most sensitive category included items that 
could reveal significant dimensions or the design of the nuclear 
material core of the weapons. Examples of such items included 
tungsten reflector segments, mock- ups, and drawings and photos of 
key components. The second category included components, such 
as the gun barrel and computer- controlled electronic boards, that 
would simplify the engineering design or reveal dimensions of other 
sensitive components. The reason that the gun barrel was in the 
second category is probably related to the fact that earlier, during 
dismantlement, Armscor had cut off what it called the “shoulder” of 
the gun barrel, rendering it, in its eyes, unusable in a nuclear device. 
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The third category was everything else, such as motors, brackets, 
and cables, which the IAEA did not consider sensitive.
After inventorying the leftover goods, the inspectors recom-
mended the complete destruction of any remaining components, 
photographs, and drawings which could reveal critical design in-
formation for nuclear weapons and their components. South Africa 
destroyed items in the first two categories. If an inspector had a 
serious concern about an item in the third category, it was also de-
stroyed. The IAEA defined “destruction” to mean that the critical 
dimensions of a destroyed component would no longer be measur-
able or reproducible, that the intended function would no longer 
be recognizable, or that a destroyed item could not be reconstituted 
faster or more economically than it could be redesigned or rebuilt.
The IAEA also recommended that some equipment specific to 
the nuclear weapons program should be scrapped. For example, it 
asked Armscor to destroy the cages for lowering personnel and cam-
eras into the test shafts at the Kalahari site.
DISMANTLING THE KALAHARI NUCLEAR TEST SITE.
One of the more dramatic dismantlement steps followed the IAEA’s 
request that South Africa render useless the two test shafts at the Ka-
lahari nuclear test site. The IAEA specifically requested that South 
Africa fill in the test shafts in such a way as to make their recon-
stitution more difficult or expensive than the construction of new 
facilities.
Filling in the test shafts turned out to be more difficult to do 
than expected.3 Work commenced on June 2, 1993 and was finished 
by August 1993. This process was recorded by Armscor in a video 
available on the ISIS web site.4
The first task involved removing the concrete and steel plugs 
over the test shafts. Afterwards, the shafts had to be filled with sand 
and debris in such a manner that re- drilling would be very difficult. 
The video contains a schematic of the dismantlement plan (see Fig-
ure 11.1), which essentially alternated layers of sand with steel and 
concrete obstructions that would damage drilling equipment (see 
Figure 11.2). The obstructions were steel drums filled with concrete 
and scrap metal (see Figure 11.3).
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However, while attempting to fill the shafts with sand using 
a large bulldozer, much of the sand was explosively ejected from 
the shafts, undoubtedly a result of the over- compression of the air 
in the shafts (see Figures 11.4 and 11.5: Sand shooting out of test 
shaft, Vastrap, June 2, 1993). Ultimately, while dramatic to watch, 
this problem merely delayed the completion of this task.
These measures to render useless the test shafts were success-
fully completed from July 26 to 30, 1993 and were witnessed by 
Figure 11.1 The plan for filling in the test shafts at the Kalahari test site. Source: 
Armscor video on ISIS website, footnote 4.
Figure 11.2 Procedure for rendering useless test shaft 1, which was located in the 
shade. Source: Armscor, see video, footnote 4.
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Figure 11.3 Barrels for insertion into the test shafts at Vastrap. Source: Armscor, 
see video, footnote 4.
Figure 11.4 Sand shooting out of test shaft while destroying it, June 2, 1993. The 




IAEA inspectors. The IAEA team visited the Kalahari site in August 
1993 and concluded that Armscor had taken sufficient measures to 
render useless the two test shafts. Their destruction helped South 
Africa and the IAEA establish internationally that South Africa had 
indeed dismantled its nuclear weapons program. It also showed that 
the IAEA had supplemented its inspection efforts associated with 
the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty.
FUTURE TRANSPARENCY VISITS
In addition to further dismantlement requests, the IAEA also re-
quested South Africa to continue to provide transparency. To that 
end, it stated that it intended to request access on a case- by- case basis 
to former nuclear weapons sites and other locations or facilities that 
it believed warranted inspection.5 The rationale was based on a rec-
ognition that the IAEA’s inspection efforts to establish confidence 
in the absence of undeclared activities necessarily entailed uncer-
tainties. Moreover, a state can resume nuclear weapons activities in 
secret. The IAEA’s conclusions therefore leave open the possibility, 
however remote, that some undeclared activity has been missed. To 
reduce these uncertainties the IAEA wanted to conduct additional 
visits or inspections in the years after the initial revelations and 
Figure 11.5 Casting concrete in test shaft 1 inside the shade (July 1993). Source: 




inspections. In the ensuing years, the IAEA has in fact visited facili-
ties associated with the former nuclear weapons program.
STEPS AGAINST REVERSAL
South Africa took a number of steps independently to maintain pub-
lic and international confidence that the nuclear weapons program 
would not start again or spread. In Waldo Stumpf’s view, these ef-
forts, like the dismantling of its nuclear arsenal and joining the NPT, 
“should be seen in the light of a fundamental reappraisal of South 
Africa’s constructive role in promoting international nonprolifera-
tion.”6 In response, the South African government was increasingly 
seen as an international leader of nonproliferation and nuclear dis-
armament initiatives.
Recognizing that it needed to do more than ratify the NPT, 
the government launched a series of measures to better ensure that 
nuclear and missile technologies would not be exported to coun-
tries that were seeking weapons of mass destruction. In 1992, even 
before de Klerk’s announcement, Armscor established an interde-
partmental committee chaired by Gideon Smith, a senior Armscor 
official and former leader of the nuclear weapons program, to draft 
nonproliferation legislation specifically aimed at creating a national 
non- proliferation authority.7 Smith recommended creating an inde-
pendent statutory body, but the government decided to place the 
authority, called the Council for the Non- Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, under the Minister for Trade and Industry.
The draft bill was finished at the end of 1992 and circulated 
widely for review, including to the US government. According to a 
South African Foreign Ministry official, almost all the changes sug-
gested by the United States were included in the final bill. In July 1993 
South Africa brought this act into force as the Non- Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (Act no. 87 of 1993).
The act created the national legal framework for the Council for 
Non- Proliferation and for the government to prevent the develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including controlling 
trade in goods potentially related to WMDs. The act made it a crim-
inal offense for any South African citizen to develop or assist in the 
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development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well 
as missile delivery systems for such weapons, including ballistic mis-
siles.8 This act established national control over the use, import, or 
export of dual- use equipment, relevant materials, or purpose- built 
equipment. The list of controlled nuclear dual- use items reflected the 
dual- use list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The Nuclear Energy Act (Act no. 131 of 1993) was revised in 
1993 to embody the obligations undertaken by South Africa when 
it acceded to the NPT and signed a safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA. This act and associated regulations prohibited the export of 
nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities to non- nuclear weapons 
states unless they have full- scope IAEA safeguards in operation, a 
condition that is equivalent to the obligations assumed by members 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Under this legislation, the AEC was 
given responsibility to control nuclear exports.
The standing up of the Council for Non- Proliferation in-
volved establishing a range of regulations based on the 1993 
Non- Proliferation Act. Many of the arrangements went beyond the 
efforts of many countries at the time, including some in the NSG. 
Companies had to register if they possessed, manufactured, or used 
controlled goods. Exports from South Africa would be subject to 
extensive end use checks. The Non- Proliferation Council’s process 
of evaluating export requests involved an impressive checklist of 
factors.
A few problems were identified while the implementation regu-
lations were being debated.9 The 1993 legislation did not require the 
establishment of corporate internal compliance systems or a clear 
mechanism for holding company leaders at fault for illegal exports. 
Such systems were being developed in Europe at that time as a result 
of the failures in their implementation of export controls.10 There 
were concerns that the South African government would not allocate 
sufficient resources to implement its export controls and adequately 
enforce them. One related concern was whether South Africa would 
seek cooperation with other international organizations and for-
eign governments, especially regarding problem countries that may 




Diplomatically, South Africa took the initiative to become a 
leader of international and regional non- proliferation efforts. At the 
April 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, South Africa 
played a decisive role in achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT. 
Led by nuclear policy experts of the ANC and officials from the de 
Klerk government, South Africa declared its early support for indef-
inite extension of the NPT. This strongly affected other members of 
the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) and helped to block efforts for 
a united NAM position advocating limited NPT extension. South 
Africa’s proposal of Principles and Objectives on Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament, which created a yardstick to measure states’ 
progress on nonproliferation and disarmament goals, was the basis 
of the formula that overcame the differences between the Western 
and NAM nations over indefinite extension. According to U.S gov-
ernment, “Without South Africa’s contribution, the achievement of 
the indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions would have 
been far more difficult.”11 Its action demonstrated the new govern-
ment’s commitment to nuclear non- proliferation and its ability to 
bridge the gap between the developing and Non- Aligned Movement.
Within the region, South Africa fully supported the creation of 
an Africa- wide nuclear weapons free zone treaty. The Organization 
for African Unity (OAU) had sought the denuclearization of Africa 
for three decades, but progress could not occur until South Africa 
dismantled its nuclear arsenal. In April 1996, over 40 nations signed 
the treaty, which is known as the Treaty of Pelindaba in honor of 
South Africa’s role.
INTERNATIONAL INCENTIVES
Although incentives are not typically viewed as a defense against 
reversal, they created an important motivation for South Africa to 
stay its course of action. They also served to better integrate South 
Africa into the international community, which has also been an im-
portant defense against reversal.
South Africa received several specific incentives for its decision 




• In the early 1990s, the United States and other Western 
countries lifted their nuclear sanctions, allowing South Af-
rica to proceed with expanding its sales of uranium and 
other nuclear materials;
• South Africa and the United States negotiated a new bilat-
eral nuclear cooperation agreement;
• The IAEA re- admitted South Africa to its many bodies, 
including the General Conference and the Board of Gover-
nors. It appointed a South African to the Advisory Groups 
on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) in 1992; and
• South Africa held bilateral discussions with other African 
states regarding agreements on the use of medical isotopes 
and training programs. South Africa became a member of 
the African Regional Cooperative Agreement (AFRA), an 
IAEA organization that coordinated peaceful nuclear pro-
jects in the region.
South Africa also joined a number of international efforts to 
control exports and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction, including the:
• Zangger Committee of the NPT;
• Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials;
• Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weap-
ons Convention;
• Conference on Disarmament;
• Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Membership in the NSG and MTCR brought international 
prestige and access to technology and international markets in nu-
clear and high tech goods. However, obtaining that membership 
also required South Africa to take additional steps, some of which 
would turn out to be painful for Armscor and the defense industries.
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DEMISE OF THE SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM AND TOUGH CONTROLS 
ON ARMSCOR
Gaining membership to the Missile Technology Control Regime in-
cluded tough conditions. The United States demanded that South 
Africa end its space launcher program, the rocket program that US 
officials viewed as essentially a dangerous ballistic missile program. 
It also demanded that South Africa further limit its foreign sales of 
missile goods. The US government also imposed a range of condi-
tions on Armscor (and Denel, a state- owned commercial company 
that took over the Armscor manufacturing subsidiaries in 1992) 
because of past illicit trade practices. South Africa agreed, but the 
damage to Armscor and in particular Denel was immense. Hun-
dreds if not thousands of high- tech defense jobs were lost.12
When the South African government ended the nuclear weap-
ons program, it approved Armscor commercializing what had been 
a military space program that aimed to launch spy satellites and 
eventually develop a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile. The space 
launch/missile programs involved thousands of personnel and con-
ducted three launches of solid- propellant rockets from June 1989 to 
November 1991, including a two- stage missile that travelled down 
range from the Oberberg Test Range almost 1,500 kilometers. With 
the demise of the military program, Armscor was charged with 
finding commercial, civilian projects. Armscor subsidiaries such as 
the Oberberg Test Range and Somchem, which made the rocket 
launcher, became part of the government owned commercial com-
pany Denel in 1992 and sought new customers (see Figure 11.6). 
According to a senior South African foreign ministry official, France 
was asked to participate, but the cooperation did not materialize.
The United States opposed this commercialization. It insisted 
that South Africa end its indigenous program to build and launch 
rockets. It did not object to South Africa pursuing its commercial 
satellite and final- stage booster program, but it wanted any ex-
ports tightly controlled and consistent with US and international 
standards. The level of mistrust between the U.S. government and 
Armscor was so high that US officials insisted on witnessing the 
destruction of the remaining South African launchers, materials, 
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and manufacturing equipment. Denel’s rocket division Houwteq de-
stroyed its larger rockets. Somchem destroyed its inventory of rocket 
fuel, rocket casting pits, and static motor rocket stands. Faced with 
a lack of funds, South Africa insisted that the United States pay a 
substantial portion of the destruction costs.
Denel’s subsequent commercialization effort was not successful. 
By mid- to- late 1994, the satellite program was without customers, 
and these programs were ended as well. The new ANC- led govern-
ment was no longer willing to subsidize defense industries since 
funds were needed for national reconstruction, despite the loss of 
many more high technology jobs.
Further hurting Denel’s (and Armscor’s) prospects, the US gov-
ernment remained very suspicious of Armscor’s past and potential 
illicit procurement activities, even after South Africa ended its nu-
clear weapons program and halted its cooperation with Israel on 
rockets.13 In 1991 the United States had indicted Armscor, its subsidi-
ary Kentron, and seven South African citizens allegedly acting under 
instructions of Armscor for illegal exports from the United States 
that violated the arms embargo.14 It also banned Armscor from 
Figure 11.6 Examples from Denel’s commercial literature advertising its space 
launch capabilities at Houwteq and the Oberberg Test Range (OTR).
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obtaining exports from the United States that were on the MTCR 
lists.15 After the ANC took over the government in 1994, it asked the 
United States to drop the charges. The Clinton administration was 
unwilling to do so, insisting that these past crimes must be prose-
cuted.16 The US Justice Department sought guilty pleas and a fine 
of $50 million, according to a senior Armscor official.17 The South 
African government was unwilling to pay such a high fine or allow 
Armscor, a government entity, to plead guilty, principally citing the 
financial demands of national reconstruction. In 1994 Armscor, 
along with Denel and its subsidiaries, were formally debarred under 
US law and banned from doing business in the United States. In 1997 
a deal was finally reached, whereby Armscor and Kentron pled no 
contest to violating US export controls and agreed to pay relatively 
small fines. As part of settling this case, Armscor had to provide 
information about past illegal procurements and agreed to accept 
stringent export controls on its trade activities. It also had to cre-
ate tough internal compliance mechanisms, including a compliance 
manual approved by the US State Department, in order to ensure 
that its international trade met the highest international standards. 
After Armscor met all of the conditions set out in the plea deal, the 
United States dropped sanctions on Armscor temporarily in March 
1998, then permanently in 2004.18
EX- EMPLOYEES OF ADVENA
As its problems with the United States intensified, Armscor faced 
threats from former employees that they would reveal nuclear se-
crets. These threats occurred against the background that South 
Africa had committed to preventing ex- employees of the nuclear 
weapons or ballistic missile program from aiding other nuclear 
weapons or missile efforts. To that end, Advena Central Laborato-
ries had been commercialized in an effort to find other sources of 
funding for members of South African nuclear weapons programs. 
However, the commercialization program was not profitable, and 
Advena was closed permanently in early 1993.
That closure involved the transfer of the remaining staff to 
Armscor and other Denel subsidiaries, but also required laying 
off 60 people.19 The next year, sixteen of these laid- off individuals 
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threatened to reveal to the highest bidder secret information about 
nuclear weapons, South Africa’s secret cooperation with Israel on 
missiles, and specialized equipment suppliers in Britain, France, and 
Germany. In return for their silence, they asked for more than a mil-
lion dollars in unemployment benefits.
In response, Armscor obtained an injunction barring the 16 from 
revealing any sensitive information about Armscor’s and Denel’s ar-
mament supply, export, import, manufacture, or research. Armscor 
officials also visited each of the 16 to ensure that they understood 
their prior oath of secrecy, the conditions of the injunction, and the 
danger of their actions. Condemning the threats as tantamount to 
blackmail, ANC officials supported Armscor’s action. Roger Jar-
dine, the ANC’s National Coordinator of Science and Technology, 
told the newspaper The Citizen, “The threats can be construed as 
holding South Africa hostage to a nuclear threat.”20
As far as is known, the 16 individuals complied with the injunc-
tion and admitted that their threat was a bluff, essentially a tactic to 
negotiate a better retirement package. It is hard to judge the damage 
they could have done if they had carried out their threat. Accord-
ing to a senior Armscor official knowledgeable about the case, the 
individuals, of whom only about 2-3 were scientists, had limited 
knowledge about nuclear weapons. They knew some details about 
the pyrotechnical side of the nuclear device, but none had knowl-
edge of the entire device.21 However, they were knowledgeable about 
the cooperation between Israel and South Africa.
During 1994, as the defense sector continued to shrink, Arms-
cor reached out to the United States for financial help for those who 
had worked on its nuclear and space launch vehicle programs or 
possessed skills and know- how that could “contribute to prolifer-
ation and who are either unemployed or threatened by lay- offs.”22 
In addition to preserving South Africa’s industrial capabilities, these 
efforts aimed at domestically utilizing highly trained scientists, en-
gineers, and technicians in order to keep them from unknowingly 
or deliberately posing proliferation risks by leaving the country or 
selling to foreign buyers in South Africa. The Institute for Science 
and International Security aided in this effort by reaching out to 
the US government to recommend non- proliferation aid for these 
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South Africans.23 At the time, the United States was providing as-
sistance to former members of the Soviet nuclear weapons complex 
at the newly created International Science and Technology Center 
headquartered in Moscow. Broadening the assistance to South Af-
rica made sense and was certainly needed. However, this effort was 
unsuccessful, largely due to lack of awareness of the issue and lin-
gering mistrust of Armscor residing among US officials.
Several years later, André Buys studied the fate of the roughly 
400 personnel who had been in the nuclear weapons programs at 
Pelindaba and Circle/Advena right after they left the program.24 This 
group is only a small subset of the total number of individuals who 
produced enriched uranium for weapons or acquired or supplied 
components, equipment, materials, and services for sensitive nuclear 
programs. Nonetheless, the group Buys investigated is composed of 
those who in essence worked on making and maintaining the nuclear 
weapons themselves. As such, it is a relatively small group but one 
possessing highly sensitive knowledge and expertise. He found that 
most were proud of the work they had performed for their country 
and found it hard to do “ordinary” work again. Only a small mi-
nority believed that the program should not have been terminated.
Buys estimated that about 16 percent of this group worked 
abroad after leaving the program; several individuals reported re-
ceiving a nuclear or armaments related job offer overseas. However, 
he did not report evidence that any of these individuals aided a for-
eign country’s nuclear effort, although he did not have the resources 
to investigate these cases.
Although the educational level of this group was relatively high, 
their employment immediately after being terminated was not as lu-
crative as would have been expected for those who had performed 
such a vital national security task. The largest fraction of those Buys 
studied, or 44 percent, indicated that their monthly income decreased 
after they left the nuclear weapons program. For about 34 percent of 
this group, their income was unchanged. Only 22 percent reported 
that their income increased. Overall, Buys concluded that most of 
these former members of the program did not pose a proliferation 
risk. However, he assessed that a minority of them did in fact pose 
a risk. It was namely those that had been laid off, about 40 percent 
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of the total, who then went on to face unemployment and financial 
hardships. Although he did not quantify this minority, to reduce the 
risk, he concluded that this subgroup should have received more 
generous compensation packages and additional assistance finding 
new employment.
Although Buys documented no cases of individuals in this sub 
group proliferating, he did not investigate those cases where for-
mer members had worked overseas. He also did not investigate the 
larger group of people associated with supplying South Africa’s 
nuclear programs. A few members of that group turned out to be 
proliferating on a major scale.
LEAKAGE
Although the post- apartheid South African export control system 
contained several innovative measures, it was unable to detect or 
stop major violations by a small group that had already been se-
cretly supplying Pakistan’s and likely others’ nuclear programs for 
many years. Key members of this group spent years helping bust 
sanctions for the apartheid regime. When business with the regime 
lessened in the mid-1980s, they turned to helping other countries’ 
nuclear programs. Their illicit proliferation activities continued well 
past the end of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program.
Unlike the group of ex- nuclear weapons people, who were pe-
riodically checked on by Armscor authorities in the 1990s, the other, 
far larger group of individuals who produced enriched uranium for 
weapons or acquired or supplied components, equipment, mate-
rials, and services for the sensitive nuclear programs were largely 
not scrutinized by trade control officials. Armscor officials from the 
former nuclear weapons program, who could have helped detect 
suspicious activities and keep track of former members of the il-
licit supply chains of the old regime, were largely sidelined starting 
in about 1995 by the Non- Proliferation Council, when it ended a 
key contract with Armscor aimed at implementing export controls 
regulations and practices. Key officials in the AEC from the earlier 
nuclear program, such as Waldo Stumpf, were likewise losing their 
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positions and influence in the new government, further eroding the 
ability of government to detect illicit trade.
Later, during the late 1990s and early 2000s South African trade 
control authorities missed or ignored hints of this group as it ex-
panded its illicit procurements to include a major nuclear weapons 
program in Libya. It learned of this group only after it was exposed 
by the United States and Britain. The exposure followed the interdic-
tion by the United States and Britain of the BBC China in October 
2003 in the Mediterranean carrying a load of centrifuge parts to 
Libya. The evidence gathered by the United States and Britain re-
vealed a vast, transnational network of smugglers headed by the 
Pakistani A.Q. Khan, with a long- established node in South Africa 
run by this group.25
The key members of the South African node were Gotthard 
Lerch, Gerhard Wisser, Daniel Geiges, and Johan Meyer. From the 
mid-1980s until 2004, these four individuals and others at their com-
panies became secret suppliers of centrifuge equipment to not only 
Pakistan, but also Libya, India, and possibly Iran and North Korea. 
They also tried unsuccessfully to sell centrifuge designs to South 
Africa’s centrifuge program. Until they were exposed following the 
seizure of the BBC China, they operated their illegal operation in 
South Africa undetected and mostly unhindered.
Lerch was a German, who arranged to buy nuclear and dual- 
use equipment for Pakistan’s gas centrifuge program starting in the 
1970s. Frustrated in his attempts to buy these sensitive goods and 
equipment for Pakistan in Europe with its more stringent trade con-
trols, in about 1985 Lerch recruited Gerhard Wisser, another German 
who had moved to South Africa years earlier. Wisser had established 
a lucrative business with the South African nuclear and armaments 
industry as the agent for the German companies Leybold- Heraeus 
(later Leybold) and AEG Telefunken.
Wisser was interested in Lerch’s new business with Pakistan. In 
1984 and 1985, his company Krisch Engineering had lost a substantial 
amount of its business with the South African nuclear establish-
ment, as it reduced its procurements. Earlier, Krisch Engineering 
was a “major supplier of systems, components, and technology” to 
South Africa’s nuclear programs, “including its uranium enrichment 
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activities.”26 One senior AEC official said that Wisser was the “AEC’s 
vacuum equipment supplier,” among two to three other suppliers.27 
Geiges, a Swiss citizen, joined Krisch Engineering in 1978 and rose 
to become the company’s chief engineer. Meyer met Wisser and Gei-
ges in the 1970s while he was working at the Valindaba enrichment 
plants run by UCOR. By 1980, Meyer had formed one of his com-
panies, Roxound Engineering Works and started making equipment 
for UCOR’s enrichment plants.
Lerch’s choice of South Africa was inspired. In the 1980s, the 
South African government depended on smuggling for its nuclear 
programs, and Krisch Engineering was involved in this smuggling. 
South Africa was unlikely to detect Krisch selling to Pakistan’s cen-
trifuge program. What better place to hide a clandestine, illegal 
procurement operation for Pakistan than within an illegal one for 
South Africa.
Although South Africa had pledged in 1984 to abide by the 
guidelines of the Nuclear Supplier Group and not export nuclear 
goods or sensitive technology to any unsafeguarded nuclear pro-
gram, it never established a credible enforcement mechanism until 
1993 with the passage of the Non- Proliferation and Nuclear Energy 
Acts.28 The main intent of the 1984 announcement was to assuage 
US concerns that the South African government itself would sell 
sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and other goods to unsafe-
guarded programs, not to pledge that it would work to stop South 
African companies from making such sales without government au-
thorization. In addition, this pledge did not cover dual- use goods, 
which were a critical part of what Krisch would supply to Pakistan 
and others.
The individuals in this group left visible traces of their illicit 
activities. Moreover, members of the group were known to senior 
nuclear officials because of their earlier procurement activities for 
South Africa. Meyer did not hide all his sales to sensitive overseas 
customers; he openly discussed them. One of his company’s archived 
web sites from the early 2000s notes a 1988 export of process piping 
for an enrichment plant to a sensitive country or customer.29 The site 
adds that if the reader is interested in more information about such 
a sale, he or she should contact the managing director. However, 
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the AEC, renamed the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa 
(NECSA) in 1999, and the Non- Proliferation Council did not appear 
to have the resources or capabilities to detect this web site or other 
slip- ups by the Khan network.
In the end, the South African node was fully exposed after 
South Africa received the evidence from the United States and Brit-
ain in 2004. Meyer subsequently agreed to cooperate with South 
African authorities, which guaranteed the success of the prosecu-
tions against Wisser and Geiges. Lerch was tried in Germany and 
pled guilty. However, the sentences were relatively minor for such a 
heinous crime.
The Khan case should serve as a reminder to all of the difficulty 
of controlling nuclear assets and those who supply sensitive nuclear 
programs. In the case of South Africa, this case should also serve as 
a lesson that maintaining control over a diminishing nuclear pro-
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CHAPTER 12
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM INVENTORY
Although fears of South Africa reconstituting its nuclear weapons 
program have faded with time, concerns have remained over the 
security of the highly enriched uranium leftover at the end of the 
nuclear weapons program. In 1991 when South Africa signed the 
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, it had over 800 kilograms of HEU 
stored at Pelindaba under heavy security and IAEA safeguards (see 
tables 1 and 2 in chapter 3). The US government has consistently 
tried to convince South Africa to eliminate this stock because of the 
risk that some of it would be diverted or stolen. Concerns remain 
that extremist groups or criminal elements might seize the HEU for 
political or material gain. There have been break- ins at Pelindaba, 
one of which implied a high degree of organization.
The debate over the fate of the HEU started soon after South 
Africa signed the NPT in 1991. Originally, the question over the 
future of the HEU centered on the possibility of the Atomic En-
ergy Corporation selling “excess” HEU to a nuclear weapon state. 
According to then head of the Atomic Energy Corporation Waldo 
Stumpf, in September or October 1992 South African government 
officials approached both the British and US governments and asked 
them whether they would be prepared to buy the excess HEU.1 Only 
the US government expressed interest, but US officials told the South 
Africans that because of the approaching presidential election, they 
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could not act at that time.2 After the election, the relevant officials 
either were not yet appointed or were unprepared to act during the 
transition. In any case, by February 1993, US officials told one of the 
authors that they expected to take up South Africa’s offer within 
several weeks and were willing to buy all of South Africa’s HEU.3 
The US intention was to buy HEU without involving the ANC, 
which was not yet in government in any case.
Initially in 1992, the ANC was undecided about selling the HEU, 
emphasizing the need to provide safe transport and assurance that 
no HEU could end up in the US nuclear weapons program. How-
ever, the ANC position on a sale hardened. In 1993 the ANC started 
to view the sale of this stock of material as another example of the 
“unilateral restructuring” being undertaken by the de Klerk gov-
ernment, which aimed to transfer many governmental institutions 
to the private sector and effectively place these institutions beyond 
the reach of an ANC- led government. The ANC had earlier criti-
cized Armscor’s transfer of military industries in 1992 to Denel, and 
this sale may have contributed to souring the ANC’s view of sell-
ing HEU. At a July 1993 meeting of senior ANC and AEC officials, 
Stumpf promised not to dispose of the HEU before the formation of 
a democratic government.4
The AEC told US officials that they could make more money if 
they used the HEU as fuel in the Safari research reactor at Pelindaba 
to make radioactive isotopes for sale. Because the government had 
given the Safari-1 reactor a directive to operate with fewer govern-
ment subsidies, the AEC created plans to minimize reactor costs. 
One option was preserving the existing HEU stock to fuel this re-
actor. By the summer of 1993, the AEC was considering keeping all 
HEU enriched above 60 percent to fuel the Safari reactor over its 
expected lifetime. The AEC was still willing to consider down blend-
ing the HEU that was enriched less than 60 per cent to low enriched 
uranium (LEU) for use as fuel in the Koeberg power reactors.5
In the summer of 1993, the US government proposed that the 
Safari reactor be converted to burn new low enriched uranium fuel 
rather than HEU fuel. Under this option, the HEU would not be 
necessary for the successful commercial operation of the Safari re-
actor, and South Africa could then sell or blend down its stock of 
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM INVENTORY
269
HEU to low enriched uranium. By September 1993, the AEC and 
the US Department of Energy had reached an agreement to jointly 
study the technical and economic feasibility of converting Safari to 
LEU fuel.6 Although the AEC fully endorsed the goal of converting 
to LEU fuel, it also stated that conversion would be subject to eco-
nomic constraints, which were expected to increase with time. In the 
protocol, South Africa also stated that it recognized the importance 
of minimizing or eliminating international trade in HEU. Toward 
this end, it agreed that it would not engage in trade in HEU under 
any circumstances.
During these discussions over the fate of the HEU, the Safari 
reactor continued to use domestically produced 45 percent enriched 
uranium fuel and operate at about one- fourth of its design power, or 
near 5 megawatts- thermal (MWth). In 1994, however, South Africa 
increased the power of the reactor to 20 MWth and resumed the use 
of 90 percent enriched uranium fuel.
It also decided to keep the 45 percent HEU. South Africa 
launched a major effort to commercialize the Safari reactor and 
make molybdenum 99 (Mo-99) for medical uses through the irradi-
ation of targets fashioned from 45 percent HEU. Neutrons produced 
in the reactor fuel irradiate the HEU targets, causing the uranium 
235 to fission; one fission product is Mo-99, which is the parent 
isotope of the short- lived technetium 99m, the most widely used iso-
tope in nuclear medical diagnostic procedures. South Africa decided 
to become a leading supplier of molybdenum 99, which signified it 
was no longer interested in blending down its HEU enriched to less 
than 60 percent. It essentially decided to keep all its HEU.
The joint reactor conversion study was completed in 1995 and 
concluded that conversion to LEU fuels was feasible.7 However, 
the economic feasibility study, which was done by the AEC alone, 
concluded that conversion could significantly add to the cost of run-
ning the reactor and threaten its commercial viability.8 Based on 
an economic analysis of a limited number of options, the AEC ar-
gued that conversion would be “economically penalizing” during 
the time the AEC was concentrating on developing commercial cus-
tomers for the reactor products. AEC officials, however, said that 
the AEC would be willing to convert to low enriched uranium fuel if 
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the funds were provided. Given that the South African government 
would not provide the funds to convert, the question became what 
would the United States do?
The US government’s first reaction was to question the eco-
nomic study. According to a senior member of the US Reduced 
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program, the 
AEC’s economic study appeared to ignore important options for 
domestic fuel fabrication that would significantly lower the total 
costs of the conversion effort. A complete appraisal of all the major 
options, in this view, would be vital to determine the true costs that 
would accompany conversion to LEU fuel. If costs were fairly de-
rived, he added, the US government may be willing to contribute to 
the conversion costs.
However, during 1996 and early 1997, the US government did 
not act because of internal disagreements between the State Depart-
ment and the Energy Department over the full cost of converting the 
Safari reactor.
Meanwhile, the AEC proceeded to institutionalize the use of 
HEU fuel and targets in the Safari reactor. The impasse over conver-
sion to LEU was to last over a decade.
Only in 2009 did South Africa finally convert the reactor to the 
use of LEU fuel.9 Since then, it has obtained LEU fuel from abroad, 
and thus it no longer requires the use of its domestically produced 
HEU in fuel. In 2012 South Africa received approval from the US 
government to import 975 kilograms of US- origin LEU, containing 
up to 19.95 percent uranium 235.10 Currently, the near 20 percent 
LEU is sent to the French fuel manufacturer AREVA CERCA, which 
makes the fuel for the South African reactor operator NECSA. South 
Africa’s integration into the international fuel cycle system showed 
that HEU fuels are unnecessary.
The reactor started using LEU targets to make medical isotopes 
in 2008 or 2009.11 As in the case of the fuel, the targets have been 
made by AREVA CERCA, using US- supplied LEU. However, it is 
unclear from open source information if South Africa has stopped 
using HEU targets in addition to the LEU targets.12 It appears that 
the process of complete conversion to LEU targets has slowed as 
some of South Africa’s overseas customers have encountered delays 
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in obtaining approval from their governments’ licensing authorities 
to use medical isotopes produced via LEU targets instead of HEU 
targets. In the meantime, South Africa is believed to have continued 
using HEU targets to make a fraction of these isotopes.
South Africa still possesses a sizeable inventory of HEU. The 
sidebar shows that as of the end of 2014, South Africa had hundreds 
of kilograms of HEU, including a few hundred kilograms of unir-
radiated 80 and 90 percent enriched uranium, the most dangerous 
types.13
Much of the HEU in South Africa is in forms that can be trans-
ported to the United States for disposition. The plans to send the 
HEU in spent fuel to the United States are well underway, although 
they do appear delayed. The HEU in the leftover target material 
could also be shipped to the United States. The total amount of 
HEU in irradiated forms is estimated to be 485-615 kilograms (ini-
tial mass) or equivalently 395-525 kilograms (post- irradiation mass). 
The United States may also encourage South Africa to blend down 
to near 20 percent LEU its remaining fresh 80 or 90 percent HEU, 
which amounts to about 220-250 kilograms. An alternative strategy 
may be for South Africa to avoid the costs of blending down this 
fresh HEU and instead sell or barter it for LEU to its closest nuclear 
partners, namely the United States or France.
ANNEX: SOUTH AFRICA’S HEU INVENTORY, END 201414
From 1994 to the end of the use of HEU fuel, the Safari reactor irra-
diated about 225 kilograms (initial mass) of domestically produced 
90 percent enriched uranium. This material is stored in spent fuel. 
The Safari-1 reactor is estimated to have also irradiated about 75 
kilograms (initial mass) of 45 percent enriched uranium in fuel. So, 
in total, about 300 kilograms (initial mass) of HEU is in spent fuel. 
Another 185-315 kilograms (initial mass) of domestically produced 
45 percent HEU are estimated as used to make Mo-99. This lightly 
irradiated material is stored.




Because of the irradiation of the HEU fuel, as discussed above, 
the mass of the HEU stock would have decreased by about 90 kilo-
grams uranium 235. The HEU used in targets is lightly irradiated and 
only a small fraction of the uranium 235 would have been consumed. 
Therefore, the decrease in mass due to the fissioning of uranium 235 
in the targets is not included here. Accounting for fission, the total 
mass of irradiated HEU is estimated as 395-525 kilograms (post- 
irradiation mass).
About 220-250 kilograms of HEU remain in the form of fresh 
80 and 90 percent HEU. The range is determined in this estimate by 
the possible need to blend down up to 30 kilograms of 80 or 90 per-
cent HEU to produce additional 45 percent HEU for targets. Likely, 
the 80 percent HEU would have been preferred for blending, since it 
was not being used as fuel. Blending down would have increased the 
total stock of 45 percent HEU by up to almost 55 kilograms. The net 
increase in the total HEU stock would be about 23-24 kilograms of 
HEU. Depending on the amount of 45 percent HEU used in targets, 
there may also be stocks of fresh 45 percent HEU. In this estimate, 
this stock would not exceed about 75 kilograms.
In terms of the initial mass of the HEU, South Africa had a 
stock at the end of 2014 of about 815-835 kilograms of HEU. The 
increase in the initial mass of the stock in this estimate relative to the 
total initial mass in the early 1990s results from the blending down 
of some 80 percent HEU to 45 percent HEU.
This estimate assumes that all of the HEU produced in the Y 
Plant is available for use. In fact, some small amount of the HEU en-
riched near 45 percent may be economically unrecoverable or better 
treated as waste. However, such a reduction would be offset some-
what by the additions to the HEU inventory that occurred after 1994 
or 1995, as HEU was found in waste drums.
To derive a post- irradiation HEU estimate, the amount of ura-
nium 235 that fissioned must be subtracted from the initial mass. 
About 90 kilograms of uranium 235 are estimated to have fissioned, 
leaving 725-745 kilograms. There are other uncertainties in this HEU 
estimate that are hard to quantify with the available information. As 
a result, the final estimate of the total HEU stock at the end of 2014 
is broadened to 700-750 kilograms of HEU.
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The case of South Africa shows that nuclear disarmament is possible 
even after a country has built nuclear weapons. Its extensive coop-
eration allowed a rigorous verification of denuclearization by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was aided and 
supplemented by nations with a special stake in ensuring that all of 
South Africa’s weapons were dismantled and the highly enriched 
uranium fully accounted for.
Sadly, no other country with nuclear weapons has followed 
South Africa’s example. Twenty- five years after dismantling its arse-
nal, South Africa remains the only country to have produced nuclear 
weapons and given them up. The situation is no better today and is 
perhaps even worse. Although Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan 
gave up inherited Soviet- era nuclear weapons, North Korea has 
joined the ranks of countries with nuclear weapons, bringing the total 
to nine. The other eight countries with nuclear weapons — Britain, 
China, France, Russia, the United States, Israel, India, and Paki-
stan — have made little progress on achieving nuclear disarmament, 
despite reducing the size of their arsenals in some cases. India and 
Pakistan have even substantially increased their numbers of nuclear 
weapons. In short, the set of circumstances that led South Africa to 
give up its nuclear weapons has not been duplicated in other states 
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that possess them. This lack of progress highlights the remarkable 
confluence of factors that led to South African disarmament.
Despite nuclear- armed states not following the example of 
South Africa, its experience remains a rich example for stopping 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and understanding the condi-
tions necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament. There is detailed 
information of why, how, and when it pursued nuclear weapons, al-
though a sufficiently detailed picture of its nuclear efforts has taken 
a few decades to emerge.
There are a few remaining dim spots. The full story of the 1979 
flash in the South Atlantic is a good example. Exactly what hap-
pened in what many regard as a secret, low- yield Israeli nuclear 
atmospheric test remains unsettled, including if there was any South 
African involvement or knowledge of the alleged test. There also re-
main questions about the South African Air Force’s and Armscor’s 
plans for the production of additional and more capable nuclear 
weapons in the 1990s.
On balance, the current picture is sufficient to discuss a number 
of lessons on non- proliferation, export controls, sanctions, verifica-
tion, nuclear strategy, and IAEA safeguards. Those presented here 
are admittedly motivated by the more technical focus of this book. 
However, the subject is rich enough to support many perspectives, 
and political and social scientists may choose to focus on other as-
pects of the South African case
MORE HOLISTIC VIEW OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON
For South Africa, a nuclear weapon was both a nuclear device and 
a delivery system. Rarely did the members of the nuclear weapons 
program run by Armscor ever call the device or warhead itself a nu-
clear weapon. South Africa’s most threatening delivery system was 
Armscor’s ballistic missiles, which were under development at the 
end of the program. A ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear 
weapon is in key ways the same as a space launch vehicle capable of 
putting a satellite into orbit. Therefore it is significant that, in addi-
tion to dismantling its nuclear devices and associated infrastructure, 
South Africa also dismantled its civilian space launch vehicle pro-
gram. South Africa’s agreement to dismantle its most threatening 
LESSONS FOR TODAY
277
nuclear- capable delivery system is often overlooked in discussing its 
denuclearization. Yet it remains a significant action, despite its cost 
in terms of lost jobs and technological development.
The dismantlement of both South Africa’s nuclear device and 
space launch programs highlights their close connection, which is a 
view in contrast to traditional ones in the nuclear non- proliferation 
community. In many cases, the delivery system is not treated as the 
other part of a nuclear weapon. A recent example is the Iran nu-
clear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), whose 
designers pride themselves on having sculpted a deal that limits it-
self to nuclear issues without directly involving other areas, such as 
ballistic missiles. The JCPOA does not contain a word on Iran’s bal-
listic missiles, some of which appear to be designed to carry nuclear 
weapons. Even United Nations Security Council resolution 2231, 
which institutionalizes the JCPOA in international law, accepts a 
weaker ban on Iranian ballistic missiles than the previous Security 
Council resolutions on Iran. Further, as Iran violates the new Secu-
rity Council ban on testing ballistic missiles, the United States has 
carefully stated that Iran has not violated the JCPOA and its ban on 
nuclear weapons. This is in spite of the concern that these Iranian 
missiles could eventually carry a nuclear warhead.
It is certainly important to focus on the nuclear device itself, 
since it may be that a state first wants to develop the capability to 
detonate one in order to demonstrate nuclear weapons status. South 
Africa sought to do this with its first device codenamed Melba, even 
though it decided against detonating it. However, a narrow view of a 
nuclear weapon as only constituting the device can leave significant 
portions of the nuclear weapons program outside the specified lim-
its or verification arrangements of an agreement. It specifically risks 
fostering agreements that do not limit ballistic missile programs, 
even though these programs may still be part of a secret nuclear 
weapons plan or ambition.
In the case of Iran and the JCPOA, unless more is done, Iran 
will essentially be able to work on one key facet of nuclear weapons 
– perfecting its nuclear- capable missile delivery systems – while only 
temporarily limiting its nuclear programs. This schism will likely 
create further regional and international insecurity regarding Iran’s 
intentions when the nuclear restrictions start to lift in year 10 of the 
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JCPOA. Thus, treating the warhead or device separately from the 
missile is counterproductive.
The United States should re- orient its policy on Iran and make 
stopping its ballistic missile program a higher priority. Otherwise, 
when most of the nuclear limitations in the JCPOA end after year 
15, it may face an Iran not only racing to a nuclear warhead, but 
also one well positioned for rapidly deploying those warheads on 
long- range ballistic missiles. Iran’s nuclear arsenal could be highly 
threatening in short order.
Likewise, any future nuclear deal with North Korea should in-
volve limits on its space launch and missile programs, as the 2011 
Leap Day deal tried to do. Although the Institute for Science and 
International Security has been sympathetic in the past to allowing 
a space launch exemption in any nuclear deal with North Korea, its 
domestic space launch capability hides a ballistic missile program. It 
should at least be frozen in any nuclear deal.
More generally, a lesson of the South African case is not to 
isolate the effort to build a nuclear device from the development or 
acquisition of advanced delivery systems, in particular ballistic mis-
siles. They go together. The goal of nuclear non- proliferation and 
disarmament should be achieving limits on both.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION
In addition to confirming the importance of ballistic missile pro-
grams, the South African case reaffirms the common view that 
producing enough fissile material for nuclear weapons is challeng-
ing. Moreover, it also proves that efforts to acquire such material 
may hide secret or latent nuclear weapons intentions and should be 
seen as dangerous, justifying steps to prevent or limit these activities.
South Africa was able to build its first nuclear explosive device 
two years before it had enough highly enriched uranium to do so. 
Because of problems in its enrichment plant, it could not produce 
enough for its second device for another two to three years.
Further, South Africa started its uranium enrichment program 
before it knew for sure it would build nuclear weapons. It was 
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ambivalent about its ultimate intentions during almost the entire 
first decade of its enrichment program.
As a result, efforts to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, 
the two primary ways to acquire nuclear explosive materials, should 
be discouraged in regions of tension, particularly the Middle East, 
South Asia, and Northeast Asia. As a matter of policy, these activi-
ties should be viewed with concern and as an indication of possible 
nuclear weapons intentions, regardless of national statements that 
they are for peaceful use or will be under IAEA safeguards. Perhaps 
they are peaceful. However, the South African case would suggest 
that a more suspicious attitude about efforts to separate plutonium 
or enrich uranium is prudent when that activity occurs in regions of 
tension.
As discussed, Iran’s centrifuge program will likely remain a risk 
that will grow after the nuclear restrictions in the JCPOA lift start-
ing in year ten. The United States and its allies need to view Iran’s 
centrifuge program as an on- going risk to international security and 
step up their efforts to constrain or negotiate an end to Iran’s cen-
trifuge program.
More broadly, the United States needs to ensure that other states 
in the Middle East do not seek plutonium separation or uranium en-
richment capabilities. Several countries may be motivated to follow 
Iran’s lead in seeking sensitive nuclear facilities and capabilities.
The reprocessing programs in the non- nuclear weapon states 
of North Asia deserve another look, as North Korea’s expanding 
nuclear weapons program leads to increased discussions among 
U.S. allies about acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Although 
the governments in these countries remain against them, the secu-
rity situation is fluid and could shift over the next several years. 
In certain cases, the pressure to acquire nuclear weapons could in-
crease and the easy availability of separated plutonium may assist 
the motivations in deciding to build nuclear weapons. As a result, 
new reprocessing or enrichment programs in North Asia should be 
discouraged. In the case of existing ones, if reprocessing or enrich-
ment is not economical or otherwise clearly justified, these programs 




Deception was critical to South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. It 
was fundamental in keeping its adversaries and allies guessing about 
its nuclear efforts and intentions. Its nuclear strategy depended on 
maintaining a highly sophisticated concealment effort. Moreover, 
illicit procurement required a great deal of deception about the end 
use of the goods Armscor and the nuclear establishment bought over-
seas. Failures to hide the program, such as unfortunate statements 
by uninformed or misguided South African government officials, 
were denied officially; however they were also used to create uncer-
tainty about the existence of South Africa’s nuclear weapons as part 
of phase 1 of its nuclear strategy.
Frank Pabian has pointed out that despite the “shining suc-
cess story” of South Africa’s nuclear disarmament, there “are the 
concealment efforts that continued despite outward signs of coop-
eration and transparency.”1 These continued until March 1993. Even 
after, there were further efforts to hide parts of the nuclear weapons 
program and downplay certain aspects, such as the delivery systems 
of the nuclear weapons, the full nuclear strategy, the sophistica-
tion of the nuclear weapons, and foreign procurements. Likewise, 
distortions were readily disseminated in expert and governmental 
communities.2
Both Iran and North Korea also use deception as a tactic. De-
spite the overwhelming evidence, including IAEA judgements, Iran 
still denies it ever had a nuclear weapons program. It is also still hid-
ing parts of nuclear efforts of which the IAEA had evidence. North 
Korea both hides activities, such as it did for years with the centri-
fuge program, and exaggerates its accomplishments. For example, 
North Korea recently claimed that it could strike the United States 
with a nuclear- tipped ballistic missile.
One obvious implication of the South African case is to treat 
official Iranian and North Korean statements with a high degree of 
skepticism, along with the echoes of their supporters. The simple 
fact is that Iran and North Korea, like South Africa and others, lied 
about nuclear weapons. They did so out of a recognition that their 
success depended on maintaining secrecy and out of knowing that 
lying can minimize the international consequences of the truth.
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Countering the nuclear deceptions of countries such as Iran and 
North Korea requires robust international inspections and intelli-
gence operations. It also requires an independent non- governmental 
community willing to uncover and challenge their deceptions. North 
Korea’s exaggerations need to be guarded against lest they increase 
instability and overreactions among the United States and its allies.
SAFEGUARDS, TRANSPARENCY, AND REVERSAL
The IAEA was profoundly affected by its experience in South Af-
rica 25 years ago. It deployed new approaches, such as verifying the 
completeness of a declaration, gaining access to military industries 
associated with the former nuclear weapons program, deploying 
nuclear weapon experts to investigate, and conducting in- depth 
interviews with those involved in making nuclear weapons. All of 
these practices have become important tools for IAEA safeguards.
For its part, South Africa’s eventual transparency and coopera-
tion stand out as one of the most significant aspects of its dismantling 
its nuclear weapons program and coming into compliance with the 
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Full access, openness, and 
transparency were vital to ensuring the credibility of the dismantle-
ment effort and reaping the sought after international engagement.
South Africa’s initial positon on transparency was not adequate. 
However, in reaction to calls for more transparency, fortunately, the 
government agreed. The evolution of President de Klerk’s thinking 
from 1991 to 1993 was especially important. When the IAEA launched 
its verification of South Africa’s initial inventory of nuclear materi-
als, South Africa first sought to manage the amount of transparency 
it would provide. It even misled inspectors about its past activities 
in Building 5000 and at the Kalahari test site. Nonetheless, after the 
ANC, the United States, Russia, and the natural course of the IAEA’s 
investigation pressured de Klerk to allow greater transparency, he 
had the wisdom to modify the South African government’s posi-
tion and come clean. By coming clean and committing to greater 
transparency, South Africa also avoided serious conflicts with the 
IAEA that would have also undermined its international goals. The 
experience showed that in order to counter remaining international 
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suspicions and revive international engagement, South Africa had to 
eschew an attitude of “the past doesn’t matter” regarding its nuclear 
weapons program. For South Africa, this path also helped achieve 
the important security goal of a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa.
The evolution of South Africa’s transparency also shows the 
critical role of international oversight in the dismantlement process. 
It is needed so that the international community, and in particular 
regional neighbors, can gain confidence in full dismantlement and 
future intentions.
Although South Africa rejected IAEA involvement while it was 
dismantling its nuclear weapons, it is still worth considering whether 
a different course would have been more effective. Had the IAEA 
been able to supervise the dismantlement from the start and oversee 
how the components of the program were destroyed, repurposed, 
or dispersed, it may have also been able to reach a quicker deter-
mination about the correctness and completeness of South Africa’s 
nuclear declaration along with the absence of an ongoing military 
nuclear program.
Relatedly, if a state initially decides to secretly dismantle large 
portions of a nuclear weapons program like South Africa did, 
needed documentation and information can be lost. This delays the 
process of IAEA verification – particularly nuclear material accoun-
tancy. The South Africa dismantlement process, even though it was 
overseen by the auditor Wynand L. Mouton, left IAEA inspectors 
lacking uniform and rigorous records about nuclear weapons dis-
mantlement, which affected the investigation. Nevertheless, with 
careful and recalibrated verification processes, the IAEA was able to 
overcome most of these challenges.
In its initial investigations, the IAEA was relatively tolerant 
of South Africa’s deceptions about its nuclear weapons program. 
Confronted with the existence of highly enriched uranium in metal 
form soon after South Africa signed the NPT, the IAEA was im-
mediately suspicious about South Africa’s initial declaration. Its 
suspicions were clearly increased by the information about the past 
program received from member states about a year later. However, 
in its initial investigations, the IAEA said little to South Africa, IAEA 
member states, or the public about its doubts about the truthfulness 
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of South Africa’s declarations. At the time, the IAEA and many states 
viewed traditional safeguards agreements as requiring the IAEA to 
keep secret virtually all the information in the initial declaration 
along with most other information provided by the state. Compli-
cating the IAEA blowing the whistle on this deception, South Africa 
had conditioned its transparency policy on the IAEA maintaining a 
high level of confidentiality. As a result, the IAEA had neither a man-
date to reveal its suspicions about the past use of this material nor 
the motivation to undermine South Africa’s commitment to trans-
parency, albeit involving untruths about its nuclear programs. This 
hesitancy to reveal critical information is a problem that even today 
the IAEA has not fully settled.
Another key lesson for future dismantlement cases is that 
taking specific, publicly reassuring steps is important in ensuring 
against the restart of a dismantled nuclear weapons program. A key 
step South Africa took was permitting the IAEA to determine the 
scope of the program by allowing inspectors “anywhere, anytime” 
access to sites, along with access to nuclear weapons program offi-
cials. South Africa also revealed and allowed visits to sites that the 
IAEA had not previously known about. Further, South Africa agreed 
to allow ongoing investigations and case- by- case visits to former 
nuclear weapons related sites and experts upon IAEA request. This 
was done in order to ensure the program was not reconstituted.
South Africa also recognized that it needed to do more. It 
passed necessary domestic nonproliferation legislation and insti-
tuted export controls on sensitive goods. In addition to joining the 
NPT and engaging in efforts to expand NPT membership and com-
pliance, it also joined other international nuclear nonproliferation 
regimes and groups and became a strong advocate for nuclear dis-
armament. Later in 2002 it began adhering to the IAEA Additional 
Protocol, and even today encourages broader signature of these ex-
panded IAEA inspection authorities. All of these steps have helped 
reassure the international community and regional neighbors that 
South Africa is committed to its reformation as an NPT- compliant 
non- nuclear weapon state.
Ambiguous nuclear weapon states seeking greater interna-
tional engagement may be less able to extract concrete benefits for 
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denuclearization. Such states must grapple with whether revealing a 
nuclear weapons program while asking for concessions would harm 
efforts to be seen as a newly responsible member of the international 
community. By initially dismantling its program in secret, South Af-
rica removed the option of trading dismantlement and accession to 
the NPT for concrete benefits from the international community. 
This decision was premised on an attempt to save face and not incur 
any additional sanctions or negative repercussions. It remains un-
clear if this decision making model has set any precedents for future 
dismantlement cases. The only similar case for comparison would be 
officially nuclear- ambiguous Israel, as it would be difficult to imag-
ine Israel demanding concessions for a future decision to undertake 
nuclear weapons dismantlement.
Despite its eventual high level of cooperation and transpar-
ency, South Africa does not represent the “gold standard” for IAEA 
verification. Olli Heinonen, a former Deputy Director General of 
safeguards at the IAEA who was involved in the South Africa in-
spections in the early 1990s, believes South Africa represents a 
“silver standard” for verification. To him, Libya represents a “gold 
standard.” South Africa of course abandoned deliverable nuclear 
weapons, while Libya fell short of even making them. Yet once for-
mer dictator Muammar Gaddafi decided in 2003 to abandon the 
turn- key nuclear weapons program purchased from the Pakistani 
A.Q. Khan network, he immediately allowed unhindered access to 
IAEA inspectors, in addition to the full scale removal of the program 
from the country, which included nuclear weapons designs, compo-
nents, and documentation. The IAEA was able to reach a conclusion 
in its Libya investigation with only a few remaining caveats on its 
knowledge of a weaponization effort. Not only did South Africa 
delay providing full access, it also initially tried to mislead the in-
spectors about its nuclear weapons program. It decided not to reveal 
to the IAEA details about its nuclear delivery systems, and it with-
held foreign procurement information from the inspectors. Much of 
this information has emerged since the mid-1990s as a result of new, 
less restrictive declassification policies of the ANC- led government, 
decisions by former members of the nuclear weapons program to re-




In comparison to South Africa and Libya, Iran has met neither 
the gold nor silver standard. Heinonen judges Iran as approach-
ing a “bronze standard,” with potential for placing higher if the 
JCPOA succeeds or if Iran comes clean about its past nuclear weap-
ons activities. Iran has pursued a much more limited transparency 
strategy than South Africa, and IAEA verification of Iran’s military 
nuclear weapons program has been highly limited. Iran continues 
to deny it ever had one, despite the overwhelming evidence and the 
IAEA judgment that it did have one. To reach even a superficial de-
termination about Iran’s past military nuclear activities, the IAEA 
was forced to rely on evidence it had gathered or obtained from 
member states. Iran denied access to most sites, experts, and doc-
umentation of concern. Under the JCPOA, Iran has accepted the 
Additional Protocol, which requires the IAEA to re- look at its past 
nuclear activities. However, it is unclear if Iran will allow the IAEA 
sufficient access to sites and individuals in order to provide assur-
ance that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. International concerns 
about its intentions are likely to remain for some time. Moreover, 
Iran has not made a credible effort to show that its military program 
has indeed ended. Remnants of the military nuclear effort likely re-
main in- country, largely unknown to the IAEA, and are available 
for use if needed. Iran will thus represent a case that provides less 
international and regional confidence over the longer term about its 
potential for building nuclear weapons. Further, while it remains at 
the bronze level of IAEA compliance, Iran may also face far greater 
obstacles to international economic engagement than it initially 
counted on. Whether it will ever reach the silver or gold standard is 
unknown.
Like in the South Africa case, US on- going involvement remains 
critical in the case of Iran and the nuclear deal. As a result of un-
certainty about Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the United States 
should ensure independently that Iran’s nuclear program is indeed 
peaceful. It should insist upon thorough IAEA verification and Ira-
nian implementation of the conditions in the deal, but it should in 
parallel make its own determination annually about whether Iran 




Could South Africa, after all of its efforts, reverse course and 
decide to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program? Once a country 
has acquired the knowledge needed to produce nuclear weapons, it 
is unlikely that it can be lost forever. Moreover, it retains hundreds 
of kilograms of HEU. Despite the burning of ostensibly all weapons- 
related records, could nuclear weapon designs or other sensitive 
documents remain somewhere in South Africa? Several government 
documents that were thought to be destroyed have reemerged over 
the years, although none that relate to sensitive nuclear weapons in-
formation have appeared. Nonetheless, the possibility remains that 
weapons documents still exist; at the very least South Africa would 
have a head start at reconstitution.
On a practical level, this concern is minimal, at least today, 
given the absence of the conditions that led to its nuclear armament 
in the 1970s and 1980s. A democratic government currently remains 
in power, South Africa’s engagement with the international commu-
nity is strong, and it lacks major security concerns. Nevertheless, the 
situation requires on- going monitoring.
Overall, the South Africa experience demonstrates that in-
creasing the effectiveness of IAEA inspections has tangible security 
benefits. In addition, this case confirms that IAEA verification is crit-
ical in ensuring international peace and security.
ILLICIT TRADE
As has been the case for many developing countries, South Africa’s 
military and civilian nuclear programs depended on the overseas 
procurement of a wide variety of goods and sensitive technologies. 
South Africa pursued a tactic of exploiting international coopera-
tion and procurements to obtain additional sensitive information 
for its nuclear programs. The South African case confirms that the 
detection of these procurements is a reliable indicator of secret nu-
clear activities, including nuclear weapons efforts.
South Africa was hardly alone in efforts to illicitly acquire 
many nuclear- related goods from abroad. India, Pakistan, Israel, 
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, were also active during this historical 
period in buying for their covert nuclear programs.
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South Africa made most of its key procurements when export 
controls were in their infancy. Only after the end of the South African 
nuclear weapons program and after the IAEA inspectors exposed 
Iraq’s vast, covert nuclear programs and its extensive amount of for-
eign procurements, were dual- use goods controlled internationally.
Nonetheless, the controls existing during the 1980s did compli-
cate South Africa’s procurements. Despite that dual- use goods were 
not specifically controlled internationally until the early 1990s, the 
growing number and effectiveness of embargoes on South Africa’s 
military and nuclear programs posed a challenge. Armscor, after all, 
was a military entity subject to sanctions. To counter them, South 
Africa employed many deceptive and inventive tactics to acquire 
needed, controlled goods from abroad. South Africa exploited weak 
export controls internationally to obtain key equipment. It sent en-
gineers and technical professionals abroad to gather expertise from 
friendly countries willing to violate the embargoes. For example, its 
missile engineers worked with Israeli counterparts, which in at least 
one case informed related nuclear weapons applications. As the pro-
gram matured, South Africa also developed advanced, indigenous 
nuclear and military capabilities. However, it still required procure-
ments from abroad for its rocket programs and Advena Central 
Laboratories.
The international focus on restricting the supply of goods 
slowed South Africa’s nuclear efforts. In that sense, the South Af-
rican case confirms that trade controls can create key chokepoints 
and bottlenecks that can slow programs and raise their cost. Thus, 
they can provide time for diplomacy or other remedies to have suc-
cess in convincing countries’ leadership to change course. The South 
African case also shows that without rigorous enforcement of sanc-
tions and export controls, proliferant states can more readily and 
more quickly acquire the goods they seek and expand their nuclear 
programs.
South Africa sought many goods for its military programs that 
were not on control lists; however, they were critical to a particu-
lar nuclear or missile program, including uranium enrichment and 
nuclear weaponization. Although more goods are controlled now, 
this type of strategy continues today among those seeking goods il-
legally such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. This phenomenon 
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underlines the need for governments and companies to expand 
export control lists and more effectively implement “catch- all” pro-
visions in export controls and UN Security Council resolutions. 
Toward that goal, a helpful strategy is to develop and use “watch 
lists” to detect and prevent illicit nuclear and missile procurements. 
A watch list is a list of both controlled and non- controlled compo-
nents, equipment, and materials that make up the technical aspects 
of nuclear programs, such as centrifuge enrichment programs. Gov-
ernments and suppliers can work together to determine what goods 
may be targeted by proliferant states and add them to watch lists in 
order to better detect when a new proliferant state emerges or un-
cover strategic and tactical intelligence about a particular program.3 
A proliferant state seeking several goods on a watch list may sound 
an alarm to authorities and suppliers, enabling them to better stop 
such efforts.
During the dismantlement phase, extensive, prior illicit com-
modity trafficking by South Africa for its nuclear and missile 
programs posed an unexpected problem. In particular, Armscor’s 
smuggling history was difficult to reconcile with South Africa’s de-
nuclearization and caused conflict within the new government and 
with the United States. It also undermined South Africa’s new stature 
as a nonproliferation and disarmament leader. Armscor’s transpar-
ency and cooperation was critical in overcoming these problems.
Iran’s public commitment to on- going illicit procurements 
for its missile and arms programs and possible illegal acquisitions 
of nuclear- related goods likewise undermines confidence in doing 
business with Iran. Companies and banks need to exercise extreme 
caution not to become entangled inadvertently in Iran’s on- going, 
illegal procurement activities.
Nuclear dismantlement is made easier and more verifiable by 
revealing past illicit nuclear and delivery system procurements. 
Moreover, methods are needed to assure the international commu-
nity that the state has revealed enough and will not illicitly procure 
again. The Iran deal lacks these and is weaker as a result. In the 
case of North Korea, a nuclear agreement should include conditions 
banning illicit nuclear and missile trade. It should also have a mech-
anism to determine what has been acquired in the past.
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The South African case highlights another type of leakage of 
nuclear assets, other than the leakage of dangerous nuclear materi-
als highlighted in the post- Soviet context and the Nuclear Security 
Summits. This other type of leakage is associated with nuclear com-
modity trafficking and involves insiders and former members of a 
program illegally selling dangerous goods and technologies to other 
covert nuclear programs. The continuation of the South African 
node of the A.Q. Khan network was a particular egregious over-
sight. Such leakage was not fully anticipated by the government or 
the nuclear or armaments industries.
Following a country’s decision to dismantle or limit its nuclear 
programs, a priority is developing methods to prevent leakage of 
nuclear assets. These activities should certainly target nuclear ma-
terials, such as HEU, but they should also do more. They should 
focus on blocking the leakage of expertise to foreign nations and 
shutting down illicit procurement networks. In essence, the South 
African case shows that the problem of leakage after dismantlement 
needs to be understood more broadly than just focusing on nuclear 
materials.
SANCTIONS
The trade controls imposed by other nations on South Africa were 
made more effective by sanctions flowing from international oppo-
sition to the combination of apartheid and nuclear weapons. In fact, 
the concern about nuclear weapons served to expand international 
opposition to the apartheid state because the nuclear weapons pro-
gram was viewed as more of a threat to world security. However, 
like trade controls, the sanctions were not capable of stopping the 
nuclear weapons program, although they slowed it and made it 
more costly. Moreover, political isolation increased the incentives to 
build nuclear weapons. It led South Africa’s defense establishment 
to become more self- sufficient and more determined to defend itself.
Nuclear- related sanctions did slow down the nuclear programs 
by forcing them to economize. In the long term, economic and 
nuclear sanctions contributed to the draining of South Africa’s econ-
omy, including its nuclear programs. As the 1985 budget cutbacks 
discussed in chapter 5, sanctions and an impacted economy played 
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a role in slowing South Africa’s nuclear program and forcing it to 
prioritize. The nuclear program was required to make difficult de-
cisions, such as halting the construction of a plutonium and tritium 
production reactor and discontinuing lithium production efforts 
intended for making thermonuclear- type weapons. Sanctions, com-
bined with trade controls to restrict the supply of sensitive foreign 
goods to a nuclear program, do have an effect on restricting spend-
ing, forcing a nuclear program to make difficult priority choices, 
and constraining nuclear expansion.
Achieving the desired effect of sanctions can take time. Affect-
ing South Africa’s leadership to limit its nuclear weapons program 
was a slow process. Sanctions in the mid-1970s served to reinforce 
the mentality and deepen the resolve of South African leaders to 
weaponize their nuclear device. Thus, any country imposing sanc-
tions on a proliferant state should anticipate keeping them in place 
over a long duration in order to see desired change. They may be 
faced with the reality of needing to eschew competing policy re-
quirements. Convincing a proliferant state to undertake nuclear 
dismantlement or significant nuclear limitations should take prece-
dence over other policy goals if sanctions are to have success.
Sanctions influenced political events in South Africa in part be-
cause they had equal effects on the minority whites. This democracy 
of effects, albeit narrow, allowed for the creation of dissent against 
the pro- nuclear policies of the defense and nuclear establishments. 
The election of President de Klerk amounted to “regime change” on 
this issue, but it happened in a white- controlled democratic process.
There is now a case to be made for strong nonproliferation 
sanctions of the kind that were levied against Iran starting in 2012. 
These impacted its oil sales, foreign investment, banking, shipping, 
and other commercial ties. Many analysts judge that these sanctions 
had a direct result in changing Iran’s cost- benefit analysis regarding 
its nuclear program, in part as a result of rising domestic discon-
tent. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, who was elected in 2013, 
was less internationally combative. He was soon understood to 
have a mandate to seek sanctions relief in return for limits on the 
nuclear program. So, on balance, strong sanctions may influence 
political events and bring into power leaders who support reducing 
sanctions. Iran’s elections are of course highly constrained as far 
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as the extent of democracy, and such a mandate would likely have 
been approved or even initiated by Iran’s Supreme Leader, but the 
grievances of citizens appear to have had an impact on the political 
leadership.
By contrast, however, sanctions on North Korea have not had 
the same effect. North Korea’s highly isolationist dictator and mili-
tary regime have been able to remain largely untouched by nuclear 
and other sanctions. Their needs are met with what they are able to 
reap from the poor economy, and citizens are unable to rise up in 
protest. It remains to be seen whether newly strengthened sanctions 
against North Korea in the form of UN resolution 2270 (2016) will 
have an effect on convincing its leaders to undertake new nuclear 
talks and consider limitations in return for sanctions relief and other 
incentives.
In the case of South Africa, the sanctions became another rea-
son to eliminate the nuclear weapons program, especially when it 
no longer served a security purpose. South Africa expected rewards 
for its actions, in particular a quick end to its international isolation. 
As the leading economic and military power in Africa, South Africa 
viewed itself as contributing importantly to the peace, stability, and 
development of Southern Africa. It also stood to benefit from new 
trade and investment in the region. South Africa expected significant 
rewards from the international community, particularly for joining 
the NPT. It is doubtful whether the actual rewards matched the orig-
inal expectations, but South Africa’s international political prestige 
benefited enormously from its actions.
On the negative side, as discussed above, sanctions and isola-
tion led to the rise of Armscor as a highly militarized, independent 
defense organization. The defense industry, cut off from foreign 
purchases by the UN arms embargo, developed an autonomous at-
titude and contempt for international and national trade controls. 
It secretly procured many defense goods abroad. It procured many 
goods from abroad in violation of embargos by using a wide range 
of deceptive means with suppliers. Arguably this phenomenon is 
present with regard to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Iran’s 
defense industries, as well as similar entities in North Korea. All 
have also benefited in that way from sanctions. In South Africa, as 
well as Iran and North Korea, foreign expertise and goods were 
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sought as needed and often obtained. As in the case of Armscor, ef-
forts to limit nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea should also 
seek to limit their indigenous defense establishments, particularly 
those involving the most threatening military systems associated 
with nuclear weapons.
Overall, the South African case would argue that economic 
sanctions need to be carefully balanced with ongoing efforts to en-
gage the political leaders of a proliferant state and other attempts 
to reduce security concerns. Otherwise, the effect may merely be to 
turn the country further inward and increase its focus on nuclear 
weapons armament. On balance sanctions did play a positive role in 
limiting and contributing to ending the apartheid regime and South 
Africa’s nuclear weapons program. Their application elsewhere re-
mains a valuable policy tool.
NUCLEAR STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS
South Africa’s initial reasoning for its nuclear weapon strategy fol-
lowed the revelation of its nuclear test site in 1977 and its decision to 
gain the ability to test rapidly. From that point onward, the strategy 
evolved as South Africa built its nuclear arsenal. Although the nu-
clear strategy drove specific decisions on building nuclear weapons, 
it also paralleled and in some ways helped justify the country’s ef-
forts to acquire more sophisticated delivery systems.
South Africa’s nuclear strategy was unique. It is the only nu-
clear strategy in the short history of nuclear weapons that was based 
on the theory that they would never be used. South Africa’s politi-
cal leaders saw deterrent value in nuclear weapons, but argued that 
the use of such weapons would amount to political suicide and un-
doubtedly result in a devastating nuclear counterattack from the 
Soviet Union, its primary strategic threat. According to those in the 
program, South Africa would have rather capitulated than use nu-
clear weapons and suffer Soviet retaliation or more accurately utter 
destruction.
The exclusion of the operational application of nuclear weap-
ons appealed to the scientists and engineers who built the bombs. 
Some of their leaders contended that the top political leadership 
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had promised them that the weapons would never have been used 
offensively.
But it is necessary to ask whether the strategy would have 
worked. And would the leadership in the end have reneged on their 
non- military use commitment and made a last stand against the So-
viet Union rather than capitulate?
Determining whether the strategy would have worked in de-
terring a Soviet attack is difficult. In many cases, one would expect 
that the United States would have sought a resolution between the 
two that would be short of South Africa losing a war. However, this 
nuclear strategy was risky. The implied threatened use of nuclear 
weapons could escalate a crisis dramatically as South Africa insti-
tuted its strategy and did not receive the expected response from the 
United States or the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States may 
not have been able to constrain the Soviet Union in some situations, 
potentially escalating the regional conflict to a global superpower 
one. The strategy’s final step of threatening to use nuclear weapons 
on the battlefield could have prompted a pre- emptive nuclear strike 
by the Soviet Union.
There was also the risk that as the crisis worsened, and the re-
actions were not as expected, the South African leadership could do 
something desperate and highly dangerous. For example, in think-
ing thorough various options in case a crisis was not going well, 
according to a former leader of the nuclear weapons program, the 
South African planners thought about the possibility of putting a 
nuclear warhead on a torpedo and shooting it at a U.S. aircraft car-
rier. It is unclear if the warhead would be set to detonate but even 
in the case of a dud, the United States would be highly threatened, 
perhaps seeing it as an act of war. Certainly, it would have viewed 
an actual detonation as such an act. This option, according to this 
same official, was never seriously pursued. Nonetheless, it serves as 
an example of what could happen in desperation.
The strategy could have backfired. The United States and the 
Soviet Union could have banded together to end the South African 




In terms of actual use, the issue was not with the strategic plan-
ners. It centered on P.W. Botha and the South African military. ANC 
officials did not believe that the government would have refrained 
from dropping nuclear bombs on black Africans to defend the Af-
rikaaner way of life. ANC officials wondered, in particular, what 
would have happened if a confrontation in the 1980s had spiraled 
out of control, and South African troops had faced a major military 
defeat against Cuban forces? If Cuban troops with full Soviet back-
ing had invaded South African territory, for example, would South 
Africa have detonated its nuclear weapons?
A concern is that State President P.W. Botha in a moment of 
desperation may have overridden the strategy plans and used them, 
leading to a devastating Soviet counterattack. However, it is by no 
means clear that he would have done so, given that the other side 
had nuclear weapons and appeared ready to retaliate in kind.
This strategy was embedded in a regional security threat envi-
ronment that proved to be temporary. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of regional peace, a nuclear weapons program 
became a liability as South Africa transformed to a democracy. But 
if the apartheid regime had somehow continued, the strategy may 
have been further developed under the control of the Air Force. It 
is unclear if the no- operational military use condition would have 
survived. It is also unclear if an apartheid South African government 
would have refrained from testing nuclear weapons in the 1990s or 
2000s as a way to certify advanced weapons or project itself as pos-
sessing nuclear weapons, as India, Pakistan, and North Korea have 
done since South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons.
In the 1980s, Cuban forces reportedly were deterred from invad-
ing by South Africa’s perceived nuclear arsenal. The senior Cuban 
official Jorge Risquet, who led the Cuban delegation in the talks 
ending the southern African conflict in 1988, told former South Af-
rican officials Pik Botha and Waldo Stumpf many years later that 
Cuba feared South Africa’s nuclear weapons and was deterred from 
invading Namibia.4 Risquet said that Cuban planners believed that 
South Africa had deliverable weapons from 1985 onward.
There were mistaken perceptions on the part of South Af-
rica. André Buys said in an interview in 2011 that based on Cuban 
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writings, the Soviet Union did not support Fidel Castro’s decision 
to send Cuban troops to Angola.5 Buys said that South Africa had 
thought the opposite and had been deterred from sinking Cuban 
ship transports or taking over Angola, fearing a harsh Soviet in-
tervention. But the implication of these writings is that the Soviet 
Union would not have intervened if either had happened. Lack of 
Soviet support would have likely also deterred Cuba from invading 
Namibia, regardless of South Africa’s perceived nuclear weapons 
capabilities. Thus, one of the major motivations for a nuclear deter-
rent, namely Soviet intervention, may have been overstated.
Taken as a whole, it is difficult to see how South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons contributed to regional stability or deterred its enemies 
from pursuing their goals in Angola and other parts of southern 
Africa as well as within South Africa. It is unclear whether nuclear 
weapons provided anything other than temporary assurance to an 
overly cautious and embattled government. South African officials 
were wholeheartedly convinced, on the other hand, that the Soviet 
Union would attack and saw its backing of communist leaning par-
ties in South Africa as a sign of possible interventionist plans.
As the security situation for South Africa improved, and perhaps 
unfairly in hindsight given what is known today about Soviet calcu-
lations, one must ask whether nuclear armament was ultimately a 
necessary expenditure or simply wasted effort and resources with an 
untenable nuclear strategy undergirding it. That question will likely 
remain controversial.
In any case, the two sides’ militaries did not engage in security 
dialogues. Perhaps, such dialogues would not have been possible. 
Nonetheless, if South Africa and the Soviet Union and its allies 
had found a way to open a dialogue on their security issues in the 
1980s, South Africa in particular may have benefited. It may even 
have avoided some of the effort and expense of nuclear weapons 
development.
In general, security dialogues among adversaries’ militaries are 
valuable. They can reduce misperceptions and threats. As a result, 
the United States should make special efforts to establish and main-
tain strategic dialogues among adversaries.
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HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM STOCKS
One piece of unfinished business is South Africa’s sizeable stock 
of highly enriched uranium that was produced for use in nuclear 
weapons. As Thomas Cochran, former director, Nuclear Program, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, has pointed out, South Afri-
ca’s breakout time is zero. The breakout metric measures how close 
a country is to having enough HEU or separated plutonium for a 
nuclear weapon and was critical in the Iran nuclear debate. Being 
at zero means that if South Africa were to decide to build nuclear 
weapons, it could do so relatively quickly. For comparison, Iran 
having reached a breakout time of 2-3 months was seen as alarming.
The chance that South Africa would build nuclear weapons 
today seems small. World events in recent times, however, show how 
security calculations can sometimes quickly change.
Moreover, concerns remain over the HEU’s security against 
theft or diversion by criminal or extremist groups. Although the gov-
ernment has taken steps to increase security, these concerns remain.
For 25 years, the United States has worked to convince South 
Africa to blend down this HEU into low enriched uranium or send it 
out of the country. However, most of this HEU remains in South Af-
rica. One of the most challenging aspects of South Africa’s nuclear 
dismantlement has been its desire to hold onto its HEU stock. The 
United States did finally succeed in convincing South Africa to con-
vert its Safari reactor to the use of low enriched uranium fuel and 
targets. However, this conversion took years and is not completely 
finished, as South Africa may still use some small amount of its HEU 
in targets for medical isotope production. This residual, temporary 
requirement for HEU does not change the underlying fact that South 
Africa has no reason to hold onto its large HEU stock, either as fuel 
or targets for the Safari reactor.
It should be noted that in the early 1990s, some senior nu-
clear officials in South Africa considered sending all or a significant 
amount of the HEU abroad. A stumbling block was that no nation, 
including the United States, was prepared to act quickly and take 
the HEU before South Africa revoked the offer. The United States 
and other countries, including Russia, are better prepared today to 
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seize such opportunities. The South African experience should serve 
as a reminder of how important these programs are.
A remaining step that South Africa should take to ensure 
against leakage of nuclear material is to blend down or ship out 
its remaining highly enriched uranium or trade it for low enriched 
uranium. This step would also signify a commitment to nuclear se-
curity norms which seek to reduce the amount and presence of HEU 
worldwide. The United States and other countries should remain 
steadfast in pressing and helping South Africa achieve the goal of 
having little or no HEU.
PROLIFERATION AND DISMANTLEMENT PROSPECTS TODAY
The experience of South Africa and the factors which led to its deci-
sion to acquire nuclear weapons and then abandon them can inform 
today’s discussion of the risk of proliferation or the chance for nu-
clear disarmament. The factors discussed in earlier chapters that 
affected South Africa’s proliferation and dismantlement decisions 
are present in other countries faced with difficult national security 
decisions. In the case of South Africa, perceived security threats, lack 
of security guarantees, political leadership conducive to interna-
tional isolation and domestic power centralization, and a growing 
technological capability, were determining factors for nuclear ar-
mament. For dismantlement, key factors were the diminishing of 
the security threat, and political evolution wherein leaders seek in-
ternational engagement and domestic power sharing. The length of 
time a country possesses a nuclear weapons appears to also be a 
factor in dismantlement likelihood; for example, the longer a coun-
try possesses them, the risk grows that they become embedded in 
the national security structure. South Africa’s dismantlement nota-
bly came relatively early after the manufacture of its first deliverable 
nuclear weapons.
One of the most striking implications of South Africa’s actions is 
that for most countries the prospects of nuclear proliferation or dis-
armament must be evaluated within the context of regional tensions 
and insecurities. If the security situations in the Middle East, South 
Asia, North Asia, can be resolved, proliferation may be prevented 
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and wide- scale nuclear disarmament may become more likely. How-
ever, no one should underestimate the challenges of solving these 
regional problems, and solving the regional tensions may not be 
enough to prevent proliferation or achieve disarmament. Nonethe-
less, ignoring or downplaying the need for a regional focus is unlikely 
to stop proliferation or raise the chances of denuclearization.
Overall, nuclear dismantlement has to be assessed to be rare. 
The factors that led South Africa to dismantle are currently miss-
ing among countries with nuclear weapons. In looking at Israel, 
India, Pakistan, and North Korea, only one – North Korea – is as-
sessed as possibly abandoning its nuclear weapons in the short to 
medium term, and only if political and security conditions are ade-
quate. India, Pakistan, and Israel may undertake limited reductions 
at some future point.
The likelihood of dismantlement for the NPT nuclear weapon 
states is assessed to be very low, except for Great Britain, which oc-
casionally reevaluates the existence of its nuclear weapons. These 
countries have integrated nuclear weapons as part of their great 
power and national security status. These arsenals are also perceived 
to preserve a balance between China, Russia, and the United States 
and the US nuclear umbrella is perceived as preventing aggression 
in Europe and North Asia. The NPT nuclear weapon states will thus 
likely be the last to disarm. Despite this difficulty, arms control re-
strictions and reductions should be diligently pursued among these 
states. However, they should be seen as having limits, absent the 
prevention of further proliferation and the resolution of regional 
security threats from which proliferation stems.
One of the most important lessons from South Africa is that 
proliferation can be prevented and nuclear disarmament achieved. 
However, that effort has to start locally, or by focusing on the re-
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